



AAR # 266

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847.31

AFTER ACTION REPORT

701ST TANK DESTROYER BN.

11 NOV 42-JAN 44, MAR 44-MAY 44,  
~~JULY 44~~ AUG 44, OCT 44-DEC 44,  
FEB 45 - APR 45.

Classification cancelled or changed to  
by authority of DDP DIR 5200.9 on  
....., 19.....

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Captain, Armor  
Ch. Sely & Doc Branch

9 JUN 1959

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 251, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

Auth: TAG  
Initials: RAK  
Date: ~~SEP 13 1943~~  
24 September 1943.

SUBJECT: Operations Report.  
TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. (thru channels).

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943 the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 8 November 1942 to 11 May 1943 is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit and Staff Journal, the Battalion diary, and of Officers concerned; and supporting evidence for said statements is on file in the records of this Battalion.

3. This report was prepared by the Intelligence Section of the Battalion.

ALBERT B. MORRISON  
Captain, 701st Tank Destroyer Bn.  
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DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

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① AS 314.7-701st Tank Destroyer Bn. (24 Sep 43)

F/W

701<sup>st</sup> TANK DESTROYER  
BATTALION

8 November 1942  
to  
10 May 1943

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## PREFACE

On December 15, 1941 the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion was activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with Lt. Colonel Chauncey C. Benson in command. The Battalion was, upon activation, attached to the 1st Armored Division. The period from December 15 to February 20 was spent in organizing the integral companies and in the equipping and training of replacements which arrived from the ARTTC and Camp Wheeler, Georgia. From March 1st to April 1st the Battalion participated in problems staged on the Fort Knox Military Reservation, and on the 1st of April the Battalion was alerted for movement. Movement orders came, and with the 1st Armored Division, the Battalion wheeled vehicles left Fort Knox on the 6th of April for Fort Dix, New Jersey (track vehicles by train). The overland trip lasted four days and the period was marked by continuous rain, high winds, and extremely cold weather. The next two months were spent in range firing and in preparation for overseas movement.

The Battalion entrained on the 31st of May for Jersey City, crossed the river to the Port of New York, and there loaded on the U.S.S. Thomas H. Barry. The transport sailed in conveyer for Northern Ireland via Halifax. The trip was marked by many cases of diarrhea, acute sea-sickness, and a "12 on 12 off" deck shift. The arrival, on June 11th, at Belfast was greeted by shouts of the dock workers clamoring for American cigarettes and candy. Upon debarkation the Battalion was split up and the companies sent to separate bivouac areas: Reconnaissance Company to Crossgar; Bn. Hq., Hq. Company, "C" Company, and Medical Detachment to Ballykinalar; "A" Company to Newcastle; "B" Company to Downpatrick - all in County Down.

On the 18th of June Major Harrison King assumed command of the Battalion.

A demonstration for the King and Queen of England was fired on the 25th of June. Corporal Stena, later killed in action in North Africa, performed in an impressive manner as gunner.

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From the 6th of August to the 8th of August the Battalion participated in the problem of Defiance along with the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment. The Battalion was attached to the British 61st Infantry Division under command of Brigadier Hawkins, and maneuvers were held around Ballymore and Ballyclare north.

On the 3rd of October Companies "B" and "C" and one platoon under Lt. Smith of Reconnaissance Company left their respective stations in Northern Ireland for destination unknown via Macclesfield, England. Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company, "A" Company and the Medical Detachment remained in Northern Ireland.

*Errata —*

*1<sup>st</sup> sentence, last paragraph.*

*"B" Company left N.I. on 27 Sept. 1942.*

*"C" Company left N.I. on 30 Sept. 1942.*

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Operations Of Company "B", 701st T.D. Bn.

Period - 27 Sept. '42 to 12 Feb. '43

It was on September 27, 1942 that Lt. Clark and 27 enlisted men from "B" Company left on the advance detail from Downpatrick, County Down, Northern Ireland. Trask vehicles under Lt. Edison left for the new station on October 2nd. The following day Captain Ellmann and 65 enlisted men departed by train while the remainder of "B" Company followed immediately with wheeled vehicles under Lts. McKnight and Whitsit. Captain Ellmann's group arrived at the new location, Hankelow Court, England, on October 4th. Lt. Clark and his advance party already had the house ready for occupancy. The next day the wheeled vehicles arrived after a trip via Larne and Stranraer, and Lt. Edison arrived with the trask vehicles and drivers the same day.

Lt. Smith with members of the 2nd Reconnaissance Platoon, Reconnaissance Company pulled into Hankelow on October 13th. The platoon was attached to "B" Company for future operations. Now the personnel assembled in England amounted to six officers and 203 enlisted men. The latter figure now included 15 replacements received on October 9th, 23 men of the attached Reconnaissance platoon, and 5 first-aid medics. Vehicles consisted of eight 75mm self-propelled guns, four 37mm self-propelled guns, four 3/4 ton weapons carriers, three half ton weapons carriers, six 1/4 ton "peeps", three 2-1/2 ton trucks, one trailer, and seven motorcycles. In addition to heavy weapons, "B" Company possessed 38 .50 caliber machine guns, 26 .30 caliber machine guns, 56 Tommy guns, 170 rifles, 10 caliber .45 pistols, and 18 Very pistols.

Pay day fell on October 9th. The usual aftermath was in full swing and four AWOL's disappeared to return the following day.

Lt. Whitsit and the 3rd Platoon, less three men AWOL and the drivers, left Hankelow for H.M.S. "Miska" at Weyness Bay, Scotland, October 10th. What remained of the company, including the three AWOL men, entrained at Nantwich, October 13, for Liverpool where they boarded H.M.S. "Derbyshire". This portion

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of the company along with 2000 other personnel. The personnel remained on the "Derbyshire" for 25 days. Several days were spent in Liverpool Harbor, some time was then put in off Kent Allen Station, Scotland, where a practice landing, in which "B" Company did not participate, was attempted, and finally the convey was assembled off Glyde.

On October 26 The "Derbyshire" crept out of Glyde Harbor along with 60 companion vessels. The stormy seas made it rough going for several days, especially for the men in the bow of the ship. "B" Company's musical talent emerged with violins, guitar and ukulele to furnish entertainment for the entire assemblage on ship. This lasted throughout the voyage. November 2nd turned out to be a memorable day as the destination was made known. Combat Command "B", of which "B" Company was a part, had the mission of taking and holding Tafaraoui, La Senia, and Oggas airports, and of proceeding against Oran from the south. Field Order No. 1 disclosed that the 3rd Platoon would accompany "A" and "B" Companies of the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, in a flying column against Tafaraoui. The remainder of the Company was to proceed against Oggas unassisted. With high morale, the next few days were used to busily prepare for the operation ahead.

The convey steamed past the Rock of Gibraltar on November 7th, and anchor was dropped off St. Leu at 0900 hours, November 8th. Lt. Whitsit and his platoon led off for the Company at 0600 hours when they disembarked with their vehicles from the Tank Landing Craft "Misea". They sped out in a "Flying column" at 0845 hours and were bound initially for Tafaraoui Airport. Under the command of Lt. Colonel Waters, the column also consisted of a company of the 6th Infantry and two tank companies of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment. The 503rd Parachute Battalion was unable to land at the airport at 0100 hours as originally planned. However, the column cut through local resistance to take the airfield. By 1400 hours paratroops and fighter planes were ordered in. Before these elements could arrive, French fighter and bomber planes swept down on the column. A 500 pound bomb scored a direct hit and

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completely demolished a half-track. The Company's first wounds were sustained by the enemy's fire. Shortly after sundown, long range fire of the 3rd Platoon neutralized an enemy seven gun mixed battery which had been shelling the field from the northeast. By this time planes had landed and many prisoners were taken. It had been a highly successful day.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the Company disembarked from the "Derbyshire" in LCIs at about 1000 hours. The vehicles were landed, one at a time, from water landing craft.

On the 9th, the 3rd Platoon saw more action. An enemy tank concentration was engaged and smashed at St. Lucien. Two tanks were destroyed by 3rd Platoon guns at ranges in excess of 2000 yards. After this encounter the Platoon withdrew to Tafaraoui.

The 10th of November found the 2nd and 3rd Platoons proceeding against La Senia from the south in the face of heavy sniping and artillery fire. An enemy shell struck a self-propelled and set it aflame. Sgt. Redison, Shelton, Dunham, Whipple and Laniry were killed; Stearns, the driver, was wounded but fought with outstanding gallantry throughout the day. The 3rd Platoon then bypassed La Senia and was among the first to enter Oran.

The 2nd Platoon was ordered to take La Senia, but was withdrawn when opposition proved heavier than expected. However, the command half-track did not receive the withdrawal message and proceeded alone into La Senia. Its crew was composed of Lt. Edson, Corporal James D. Petrie, T/5 Milton J. Russell, P/5 Gerald Weinberg, Pfc J.C. Gardner, Pvt. Wilbur H. Willis, a tankman who had just escaped from his burning tank, and an interpreter. The vehicle headed against heavy sniping and artillery fire through La Senia to a point three miles beyond. Here it broke down after being damaged by a road block. An enemy truck column had halted on the road and its occupants opened fire at the "B" Company vehicle from all directions. After a fight of several minutes, eight of the enemy surrendered and some forty others gave up shortly thereafter. Lt. Edson, assisted by the interpreter,

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arranged that four ~~conv~~ trucks would tow the half-track and carry the prisoners back to La Senia. Here Lt. Edison and his crew, without assistance, made arrangements for the surrender of some 300 French air and infantry personnel to Colonel Robinette when he later arrived.

With the fall of Oran, the campaign in Algeria ended. Combat Command "B" had proved itself to be an excellent tactical unit. General Oliver, by walking unconcernedly through heavy artillery fire south of La Senia, had won the ungrudging admiration of his men. "B" Company had established an excellent reputation for itself. Lt. Edison was awarded the Silver Star for "Gallantry in action", or out-Yorking Sergeant York. Colonel Waters secured a captaincy for Lt. Whitsit.

"B" Company assembled near Tafaraoui Airport on November 13th, and headed for Tunisia with "C" Company three days later. That night they bivouaced near Orleansville. The following evening found the bivouac area at L'Arba, south of Algiers. Cyclist Henry Kirscher was injured when he crashed into a railroad crossing bar. He was removed to a hospital at Algiers. On the evening of November 19th, the Companies were outside Setif and moved to the environs of Constantine by the following evening. Then, on November 21st the 1st Platoon of "B" Company went on to Feriana while the other proceeded to Souk Ahras. Here new orders sent "C" Company in the direction of Tunis and "B" south to Tebessa, which was reached at 2300 hours. A supply truck was lost enroute but, loaded with ammunition and personnel equipment, it continued to Feriana and rejoined the 1st Platoon.

After only an hour of sleep, the Company departed for Gafsa, which was to be attacked at dawn. The movement took place at 0300 hours on November 22nd, and missed the mines which were planted by the enemy at a road block. Except for sniping, Gafsa was occupied without resistance. In the afternoon the Company again attacked, this time against an enemy tank column moving on Gafsa from the east. Deployed at 1600 hours at El Guezzar, the enemy was met suddenly by our reconnaissance. Three enemy tanks were destroyed by the guns

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of the 2nd Platoon, one at a range measured to be 350 yards, before darkness ended the battle. One "peep" was lost but no personnel casualties resulted. The Company, minus the 1st Platoon, then moved back to Feriana.

After a few hours of rest on November 23rd, the Company left Feriana and met the enemy just before reaching Sbeitla. Led by the 2nd Platoon, "B" Company destroyed eight tanks, took 70 Italian prisoners and a considerable amount of equipment. The 75mm S/P, in which Lt. Edison was acting as gunner, accounted for three enemy tanks after it had been disabled by 47mm fire. Corporal Bonvenuti, severely wounded by mortar fragment, was the only "B" casualty. After the town was cleared of the enemy, the Company withdrew to Kasserine.

On November 24th, French artillery and infantry moved into Sbeitla as "B" Company returned to Feriana. The men were given a chance to rest up and hot cakes accompanied by cheers kept spirits high.

Lt. Colonel Raff was awarded the Legion of Honor by the French and was made a full Colonel by Allied Headquarters. Captain Ellmann and the entire company were awarded the Croix de Guerre with palm. 2nd Lt. Edison was promoted to 1st Lieutenant. "B" Company was pretty proud that day, November 28.

On November 29th, the 1st Platoon was recalled from Gafsa, where it had been retained since the fight at El Gattar. Lt. McKnight and his 37mm guns were sent out at night to reconnoiter enemy positions around Sidi ben Zid and Faid Pass, but the mission could not be accomplished; the roads were little more than trails.

The Company left Feriana on December 1st at 2200 hours as part of a Franco-American force, including a heavy weapons company and a machine gun company of the 26th Infantry, and a company of French Infantry, with the mission of taking the pass at Faid. At 0730 hours of December 2nd American P-38's strafed enemy positions. The 2nd and 3rd platoons led the attack, supported by 50 French riflemen. American infantry mistakenly moved into hills two miles west. Reconnaissance and 1st Platoon were deployed to guard the approach to the Pass on the east. Our heavy guns dealt with one anti-tank gun and two artillery pieces, and moved on into the Pass. They were taken suddenly by heavy machine gun fire

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from high ground on both flanks. Sergeant Foster and Klepp were killed. Lt. Edson, Sergeant Patrick, Corporal Mile, T/5 Turi, Pentille and Howard, all of the 2nd Platoon, were wounded. "B" Company withdrew from the Pass - the tank was that of the infantry. Reconnaissance and 1st Platoon had been attempting to locate machine gun and mortar fire east of the Pass. At 1020 hours four P-38's flew over and one fired a burst of machine gun shots. T/5 Cole, Bryant and Youngman were killed; Corporal Logan and T/5 Levine were severely wounded. This case of mistaken identity was inexcusable and highly demoralizing. The Air Corps claimed that these vehicles were outside the bomb line.

French and American infantry attacked the Pass all day, but, when Lt. Clarke returned at 1700 hours to recover two dead bodies, the Pass was still strongly defended. The Company prepared to bivouac in a cactus patch near the pass that night. The 1st Platoon, upon orders from Colonel Raff, moved out after dark to occupy its former position and was met at 2100 hours by anti-tank fire from the enemy who had moved down from the mountains. The Platoon fought all night out of contact with the rest of the company. T/5 Hawley and Davidson were killed, and T/5 DeLuzac was wounded; Frasier was last seen severely wounded, and could not be found the following day. Several casualties were believed inflicted on the enemy.

The 3rd Platoon moved to the assistance of the 1st on the following morning. The 2nd Platoon later moved out to deal with approaching enemy tanks and truck column, and succeeded in smashing two trucks. At 0900 hours seven enemy planes attacked bivouac positions with light bombs and 20mm gun fire. T/4 Patterson, Cpl. Petrie, and Pfc's Gooding and Caspers were killed. T/5's Wren, Patrick, Pfc. Upchurch and Baker were wounded. Small arms proved no good against aircraft when fired from a vehicle or other exposed positions. Strafing was extremely deadly; two half-tracks and one 3/4 ton were badly damaged. At 1300 hours the Company moved to a new bivouac at Sidi bou Zid. Meanwhile, 120 Germans surrendered at the Pass. Patterson, Petrie, Hawley, Cole, Gooding, Bryant, Youngman and Davidson were buried at Sidi bou Zid. Pfc. Caspers died at the Pass. 10

and was buried there.

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Lt. Clarke, accompanied by Privates Wetsel, Barga, and Decker, left in a half ton for the Pass to pick up the bodies of Fester and Klopp. En route, the vehicle was attacked on open road near Faid by four enemy raiders which strafed the truck four times. The vehicle could be listed as a total loss. In the afternoon of December 4th, Reconnaissance and 3rd Platoon took up security positions around Lesouda.

Fester and Klopp were buried at Sidi bou Zid the following day. By now the Company was being bombed and strafed daily. Men remained close to their fox holes and moved vehicles and supplies only by night. Our own aircraft, based at Yeuks-les-Bains, was too far in the rear to afford adequate protection.

Allied Headquarters clarified "B" Company's mission on December 8th. It was to protect Yeuks-les-Bains and to obtain information of the enemy in its sector. By December 10th, the Company had resumed its position in reserve at Feriana. It was raining hard and the return march was on roads made almost impassable by the mud. The next day 1st Platoon returned to Feriana as the Company established a bivouac in a large olive grove one mile south of town.

Lt. Clarke left by plane for Algiers to obtain mail on December 16th. Then Telergua, Bone, and Souk el Arba were visited; thence by truck to Guelma and Souk Ahras, but no mail. Lt. Clarke's return to the Company came on December 24th.

Christmas Day arrived, and thoughts were mainly of home a year ago. Services were attended at the "hotel" in town or in the olive orchard.

News that the enemy landed two gliders, carrying 16 men, and succeeded in blowing the bridge 20 miles south of Feriana came in December 29th. The shadowy figures of Generals Robinette, Ward, and Clark visited Feriana on successive days; this forgotten theater of operations was waking up.

The first mail received by the Company since leaving England was delivered January 2nd. The next day the Company was alerted. Attached to French forces, it left Feriana at 1330 hours for Jebitla, and at 2100 hours continued to Hadjeb

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of Alamein and 10 miles beyond. The enemy was not three miles to the front. The Platoon remained in this forward position for about days, without protection, but no camouflage. The enemy did not press any attack, however. Private Luri was accidentally killed the next day. He was buried in the Company plot at Sidi bou Zid.

On January 5th, the 3rd Platoon, with an attached anti-aircraft platoon, moved to a position just vacated by the 61st T. D. Battalion. From January 6 to the 17th, 2nd Platoon was out on six occasions to occupy the forward position, but the enemy attack never materialized. The Platoon then performed a new function; artillery fire, covering the advance of French infantry, was laid down. Enemy aircraft, with emphasis on fighter planes, were extremely active. Everyone took a personal interest in his fox hole or slit trench. These shelters seemed to miraculously grow deeper after every strafing and soon contained ingenious innovations such as magazine racks and "racks" for a cup of tea, whiskey - even if imaginary - and other prized possessions.

"Der Tag" finally arrived. On February 12th, "B" Company rejoined the Battalion and Lt. Smith's Platoon returned to Reconnaissance Company.

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## OPERATIONS OF COMPANY "C", 701st TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 3 October 1942 to 24 January 1943.

On the 30th of September 1942, Company "C", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Captain Frank J. Reddin, Commanding) moved from bivouac area at Camp Ballykinalar, County Down, Northern Ireland for destination unknown, via Macclesfield, England.

The Company arrived in Macclesfield on the 3rd of October, and for the next few days prepared for further movement by water transportation on a combat mission. The Company was a part of an organization of the 1st Armored Division termed "Combat Command "B". This command was split into Red and Blue forces for the coming mission, and the Company was a part of the Red force. Lt. Eggleston's Platoon (the 2nd) was made a part of a group under the command of Lt. Colonel Todd, said group being aptly named "The Flying Column". This platoon left Macclesfield to board ship at Woom's Bay, Scotland on the 13th of October.

The remainder of the Company left Macclesfield on the 15th, and boarded the S.S. "Batory" at the Liverpool Docks. The command sailed from Liverpool to the Firth of Clyde, Scotland, where the company, with other units of the command, practiced invasion landings for approximately one week. The convey then reformed and sailed for North Africa.

On November 8, 1942, landing began in the vicinity of Oran, Algeria; the Company beaching in the vicinity of Merza Bou Zedjar. No resistance was encountered on the beach. The "Flying Column" unloaded, removed water proofing, and moved toward Tafaraoui Airport. Lt. Eggleston's Platoon was the point of this column, and met resistance on the highway between Oran and Sidi Bel Abbas. Here Sgt. Mitchell's S/P gun accounted for two misplaced French 75's. There were no casualties within the Platoon. The following day, this Platoon moved

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to La Senia, and thence to Oran where they remained until the Armistice was signed. Three 37mm guns were unloaded and moved from the beach on November 10th; these guns were from the 3rd Platoon. They met resistance both on the way to Oran and also in Oran. Of the 1st Platoon, two guns of 75mm and one gun of 37mm (the latter from the 3rd Platoon) unloaded and moved, under the Command of Sgt. Weaver, to vicinity of Er Rahel to reinforce road block of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment.

After the Armistice with the French, the Company moved into a bivouac area immediately south of Tafaraoui.

"C" Company left for Tunisia on the 16th of November, and on the 21st arrived at Souk el Arba. The Company was placed under the command of the 11th Brigade (British), and Captain Redding reported to the Commanding Officer. The next day the Company was dive bombed and strafed while in the town of Souk el Arba, and one H/T M-2 was lost. Four men were wounded. The following day was spent on maintenance, the vehicles being in bad shape after the long road march across Algeria. The Company moved on the 24th of November and that evening arrived in Beja, where they were given the mission to secure the high ground west of Medjez el Bab (then occupied by German infantry and paratroops). Supporting the Company was one platoon of British Bren Gun Carriers.

The Company moved from Beja at noon in the direction of Medjez, order of march being the Bren Gun Platoon, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st Platoons of the Company. The column was mortared and strafed at intervals all during the afternoon, and in the evening the Company Commander assembled his company just outside of the range of German mortars. During the day's activities one man was killed (Corporal Glassman).

On the morning of the 25th of November, the Germans withdrew into

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On 26th Nov, and at 1930 Hours Captain Redding received orders to go into Medjez and neutralize German anti-tank guns which had been giving the British Lancasters and Cheshires trouble. These Regiments were advancing on Medjez from the North and South respectively. The Company arrived on the outskirts of the town at dusk, but it was fast getting so dark that a withdrawal was made to the hill overlooking the town. Here they spent the night. In the meantime, British artillery was shelling the town.

In the morning, Captain Redding received orders to join the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment (mission - to protect the right flank of the Battalion while it made a wide envelopment on the town of Medjez). While moving to join this Battalion the company was strafed by an American P-38 squadron of the 14th Pursuit Group of the 12th Air Force. It is presumed that the American fliers thought the vehicles to be German. At any rate, the results of the strafing completely immobilized and demoralized the Company as 75% of the combat vehicles were out of operation (only one 75mm S/P and one 37mm S/P were not made inoperative). Seven men were killed and twelve men wounded. Thus, the entire days of November 27th, 28th, and 29th were spent in rebuilding the destroyed vehicles, with the maintenance crew working day and night. By the 30th the Company was ready to go again (although the men had not yet recovered from the shock), and was assigned to the French for the perimeter defense of Medjez (40 German tanks were reported approaching Medjez from Tebourba). The following day, however, the Company was reassigned to the 175th Field Artillery Battalion (USA). One platoon stayed in position between Sloughia and Tesour, while the other two platoons were sent out between Beja and Sidi N'Sir. Thus, at this time, the Company was spread over an area of some 50 miles.

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On the 2nd of December the Company was ordered to join the 1st Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry, but was unable to contact this unit. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment was ordered to attack the town of Tebourba (then defended by several battalions of German infantry and one battalion of German medium tanks). The Company joined in the attack to support the light tank battalion. The attack, however, was a failure and the attackers withdrew to defensive positions south of Tebourba.

On December 5th, Company "C" was officially attached to the 1st Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment, and moved with the Battalion across the Madjena River into an olive grove near the main Tunis-Medjez road. Here the Company outposted the harbor of the Tank Battalion, going out on reconnaissance by day and withdrawing back into the harbor by night.

On the morning of December 10th, word came that a German armored column of some 55 mixed vehicles was proceeding down the Tunis road toward Medjez el Bab and was attacking the tank park of the 1st Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment (Col. Waters). Company "C" with "A" Company, 13th AR, immediately attacked. The light tanks, however, became stuck fast in the mud (it had rained ceaselessly), and a tank vs. tank destroyer battle resulted. Although due to weather conditions all of the fighting was done on the highway, after destroying four German Mark IV tanks and 1 anti-tank gun, the company was ordered to withdraw back to the orchard to reorganize.

In the evening, with the pressure of the German tank force ever increasing, the Company, with the other units in the area, moved back hoping to get to the Tebourba-Medjez road and return to Medjez; but when the head of the column arrived at the bridge across the Madjena, the Germans laid mortar fire down on the bridge. The column was ordered to turn around and proceed in the direction from whence it had come. The march was no cross-country, and one by one the vehicles fell from the column, mired in the mud. Finally the whole column was immobilized. The order then came to abandon vehicles and to return to Medjez on foot.

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The period from December 12th to 19th was spent in communication.

On December 15th, the Company was assigned to Military Police duties under Combat Command "B" (all combat equipment having been lost in action, with no replacements being available). The Company remained in these duties until rejoining the Battalion on January 24th.

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MOVEMENTS OF BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, "A" COMPANY, AND RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY FROM OCTOBER 3, 1942 TO JANUARY 30, 1943

After "B" and "C" Companies had left the Battalion under control of Combat Command "B", the remainder of the Battalion prepared for movement from Northern Ireland; and on October 27, 1942 Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company, "A" Company, and Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon) entrained at Tullymurry, County Down, under cover of darkness for Belfast. The unit then embarked at Belfast and crossed the Irish Sea, landing at Stranraer, Scotland, there entrained, and detrained at Stoke on Trent, England, and traveled by motor convey to Tytherington Hall, Macclesfield, Cheshire, England, where the Battalion was to be quartered. The wheeled vehicles crossed the Irish Sea, via Larne, to Stranraer, and then by convey to Macclesfield. At Tytherington Hall the Battalion assumed usual garrison duties, conditioned and prepared equipment for combat. Here the Battalion was again split into two groups (one group consisting of Headquarters Company, the other group of "A" Company and Reconnaissance Company).

On the 9th of November the Headquarters vehicles left for Liverpool, England, for shipment, via cargo vessels, to North Africa, while the remainder of the Battalion remained in Macclesfield for later shipment. Headquarters personnel followed on the 22nd of November and boarded the H.M.T. "Otrante". The ship lay anchored in the River Mersey until the 27th, when she set sail in convey for North Africa, at noon. Lt. Colonel King was appointed OG of all troops aboard ship.

The H.M.T. Otrante arrived in Gibraltar on the 5th of December, and remained there until the 8th (during the voyage she had developed motor trouble and had fallen behind her convey). On December 9th, the Otrante sailed again and arrived on the 16th at Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, Algeria. The Headquarters group moved to a new bivouac area in the vicinity of Salines D'Arzu on December 11th, and there awaited the arrival of the remainder of the Battalion from England.

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In the meantime, the group left in England had prepared for movement, and on 11th December sailed on the R.M.S. "Empress of Canada". The "Empress" sailed on the 11th for North Africa. The voyage was rough and the seas were high for almost the entire voyage, and there was much seasickness among the troops. The "Empress of Canada" arrived at Mers-el-Kebir on the 21st of December, disembarked, and moved into bivouac with the rest of the Battalion at Salines D'Arzu. Here the Battalion (minus "B" and "C" Companies) spent Christmas. The Battalion had a short alert on the 24th when Admiral Darlan was assassinated.

At Salines D'Arzu the troops spent perhaps the most miserable month of their lives. It was the rainy season in North Africa and the rains were incessant. The Battalion area became a sea of mud.

On January 8, 1943, to the delight of both officers and men (after such a miserable month), the track vehicles left the area for Oram, and there were loaded aboard Maracaibo boats for shipment to Phillipville. The vehicles loaded there on January 11th. On January 9th the remainder of the Battalion left Salines D'Arzu on a four day movement to Oued Segun area (near Constantine) by way of Orleansville, Affreville, L'Arba, Beuirra, Setif. Here they were re-joined by the track vehicles from Phillipville.

The Battalion moved from this area on the 18th of January, and in a two day movement arrived at Bou Chebka, Tunisia, in the 1st Armored Division Assembly Area.

"A" Company left Battalion control on the 21st of January and moved with elements of the 1st Armored Division (Combat Command "A") to Sbeitla, Tunisia, but the loss was balanced by the gain of "C" Company the following day. On the 25th, four new 75mm S/P's were received and assigned to Lt. Remani's Platoon of "C" Company. (Lt. Remani, ex-Sgt. Remani of "C" Company, had been commissioned for his good work near Mejez El Bab).

On January 30th, the Battalion (now composed of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon), and "C" Company (less one platoon)) was assigned to Combat Command "D" under the command of Colonel Maraist

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(Division Artillery, 1 AD) for an attack on Genoa which was to begin at 1000 hours the following morning.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (COMPANIES "A" & "B" COMPANIES)  
P. 10 - JANUARY 31 to FEBRUARY 3, 1945.

## RECOMMENDED

Orders from the 1st Armored Division to attack, with the initial objective as Seneel Station, and to proceed rapidly to Mahmassy, were received at 0300 hours. Colonel Karaist was in command of Combat Command "D" which consisted of the 701st TD Battalion (less "A", "B", one platoon of "C"), and one platoon of Reconnaissance Company), 3rd Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment (less one company), 68th Field Artillery (less one battery), Company "D", 16th Engineers, 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry, "B" Company of the 47th Medics, and one platoon of "B" Battery, 443rd G (AA). 81st Reconnaissance Battalion went past the IF at Bou Chebka and was followed by CC "D".

The Combat Command was in bivouac about 10 miles east of Gafsa on January 31st. Orders were issued at 0300 hours and all troops were ordered to move forward on a wide front. 81st Reconnaissance Battalion was to move out at 0500 hours on Division order. Combat Command "D" was to follow at 0700 hours in order: 701st TD Reconnaissance Company, 3rd Battalion of 13th Armored Regiment with one platoon of engineers, and one platoon of tank destroyers attached, Command Group, one platoon of tanks, artillery, and infantry with one platoon of engineers and one platoon of anti-aircraft attached.

81st Reconnaissance Battalion actually moved out at 0730 hours and made slow progress. At 0822 hours Reconnaissance Company of the 701st TD Battalion moved out but was held up behind 81st Reconnaissance. The entire column was creeping along the road by 1000 hours when 81st Reconnaissance reported that it was by-passing Station de Seneel. Orders were issued to Colonel Crosby, 13th Armored Regiment, and Colonel Patty, 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry, to carry out the following plans: The infantry would move forward on a wide front in trucks to a point 10 to 11 miles west of the objective, detruck, move forward and attack in column of companies. A guide (liaison officer) accompanied the infantry battalion. The area chosen by the CC "D" Commander, after his reconnaissance of the vicinity, would be attacked. The infantry was to attack south of the road and make a close envelopment of the town. The tanks

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to make a west hook to a point just east of the town. Artillery would support the attack from positions north of the road and west of Seneed Station.

By 1345 hours, tanks and artillery were in position with enemy artillery and targets of opportunity being shelled. The infantry was slow in coming up and proceeded too far in trucks which were not properly dispersed. Stukas appeared on the scene and bombed the column. The infantry suffered some casualties, but the artillery continued to fire on Seneed Station and the tanks were poised for the attack. At 1600 hours, the infantry still was not in position. Forty-five minutes later, 24 Stukas again descended to rain a few bombs down. At 1700 hours, a withdrawal of the tanks was ordered to secure positions after the shaken infantry was unable to make an organized attack. Orders were issued to outpost position along general line Y-42 and prepare to attack at dawn. Colonel Maraist went to Corps Headquarters for orders.

The following day saw orders issued at 0700 hours. Combat Command "D" was reinforced by one battalion of infantry. Colonel Drake was in command of the 108th Infantry, but only a small regimental group and about 60 officers and enlisted men actually arrived for the attack. The 175th Field Artillery and "B" Company of the 106th CA (AA) were also added to the strength of CC "D". A similar scheme of maneuver with a limited objective was ordered. The attack was ordered at 0900 hours to secure a line of departure for the main attack and to allow the artillery to displace forward. The 68th FA was to support the tank action, and the 175th FA would back the infantry. 81st Reconnaissance, now under control of Combat Command, was to protect the flanks and extend reconnaissance activity to the east.

The main attack met with stubborn resistance. The enemy used guns and mortars of all caliber and indulged in profuse sniping. The infantry progressed steadily but the tanks were held up by anti tank fire, and waited for neutralization by artillery before advancing. At 1600 hours, the town was reached by the infantry. Forty minutes later, a heavy Stuka attack followed and was followed by enemy tanks which drove the infantry out. However, by 1900 hours, the infantry rallied and retook the town. At 2100 hours, the

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of the town was expected and the tank harbor was protected to allow the tanks to be refueled and supplied with needed ammunition; then, they returned to the assembly area and prepared to attack in the morning. Colonel Drake reported that his infantry could hold the town, and "C" Company (less two platoons) of the 701st TD Battalion was sent in on military police duty.

Command Group spent a busy day warding off Stuka bombings and Messerschmitt strafings. There were slit trenches liberally scattered all through the area, and these proved to be very convenient.

Sniping died down, and the night of February 1-2 was spent in getting supplies and consolidating positions in town.

On February 2, orders were issued for an attack on the final objective to start at 0800 hours. Tanks were to precede infantry, and the artillery would support the attack from positions well forward. The 81st Reconnaissance Battalion would protect the north and south flanks.

The attacks progressed rapidly against machine gun fire and light resistance of enemy artillery. By 1000 hours, the first tank elements were reported 1/4 mile beyond the objective. Advance elements of the infantry arrived at the objective soon afterwards, and the infantry occupied the ridge in force at noon. The tanks then withdrew to an assembly position south and west, ready to meet any counterattack. The infantry dug in and the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion occupied positions to protect the flanks. Reconnaissance Company of the 701st TD Battalion extended its reconnaissance to a point five miles east of the ridge.

A bombing in the rear of the front lines by 24 Stukas took place at 2000 hours. Actual damage was slight, but it was a bit hard on morale. Command Group continued to be the object of Stuka and Messerschmitt affections through the day. Many planes, including several of our own, were destroyed, but it could not be ascertained which were brought down by ack-ack fire and which were shot down in dog-fights. Planes overhead had to step lively through the dense anti-aircraft fire and many a pilot was not agile enough to clear the puffs and tracers.

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At 1700 hours an enemy counter-attack was launched with 15 tanks against the right flank. Five enemy tanks actually penetrated to the rear, causing some confusion, but the tanks and TD's beat off this thrust. The 3rd Battalion returned to positions on the ridge once more, and tanks and TD's were posted in front. With infantry positions fully re-established, the tanks withdrew to their assembly area and there was no further activity.

As the morning of February 3rd dawned, tanks, TD's, and assault gun platoons moved to positions in front, and the artillery came up to forward positions. There was no activity until 1000 hours when five enemy armored vehicles appeared on the road and were fired upon by the 68th Field Artillery. They hastily moved out of range. Reconnaissance Company of the 71st TD Battalion moved up to a position six miles west of Maknassy. Throughout the afternoon numerous small enemy detachments would appear to the east and be driven off by artillery.

Enemy vehicles and infantry were reported at an olive grove at 1400h. A request for bombing this spot was sent to the Air Corps and at 1530 hours, the Maknassy area was plastered by the U.S. Army Air Force. Some bombs were released 200 yards south of our ground positions, but there was no damage.

At 1430 hours, orders from II Corps to withdraw to Gafsa and beyond were transmitted. 81st Reconnaissance left at 1600 hours. At 1900 hours the main body started to withdraw. Armored elements were followed by the 168th Infantry in trucks, as they, in turn, were followed by a light tank company and a TD platoon to protect the rear. By 0600 hours of February 4th, all was secure. A bivouac area was established at Bou Chebka, and the recovery and salvage crews were in Gafsa.

The casualty report, as of February 5th, revealed: five officers and 46 enlisted men killed, four officers and 111 enlisted men missing - most of whom were listed on the 81st Reconnaissance report as of February 1st. 81st Reconnaissance Battalion was later detached from Combat Command "D" and no further report was given. Evacuated wounded consisted of 14 officers, one warrant officer, and 145 enlisted men.

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**OPERATIONS OF COMPANY "A", 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION**

Period - 21 January to 16 February 1943

"A" Company was detached from the Battalion and attached to Combat Command "A" on January 4; the departure from the bivouac of the Combat Command en route to Sbaitla took place at 2300 hours. The Company arrived at the CC "A" bivouac area at dawn. Sbaitla was bombed and the column was strafed just as the troops entered. Fortunately, there were no casualties. The remainder of the day was spent digging in and arranging camouflage against enemy aircraft. Several air raids did occur, but once again no one was hurt.

On January 23, three enemy air raids took place, and the record of "no casualties" was kept intact. At 0230 hours, January 24, "A" Company, without the 3rd Platoon, moved from Sbaitla as part of a small combat team under the command of Lt. Colonel Egan to reinforce the French forces at Nadjeb El Aïoun. The team consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, "B" Battery of the 91st Field Artillery, and a detachment of the 16th Engineers. "A" Company occupied forward positions 12 miles northeast of Nadjeb El Aïoun toward Fendouk Pass, at G-7575, by dawn. Enemy planes came over, but there were no raids. It was dangerous to move any vehicles on the road between Nadjeb El Aïoun and Fendouk during daylight. However, patrols were sent out night and day.

The following day there was no enemy ground activity. Enemy planes were overhead as usual, but the Company was well dug in and camouflaged in a castles patch. Contact and liaison were established with French forces under the command of Colonel Mascier. Excellent cooperation was seen forthcoming from Colonel Mascier's command. Patrols continued to go out.

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For the next two days there was no enemy ground activity. A few shells

landed near French Artillery positions, and the road became known as "Passer-solitude Highway". On January 20th, the Company moved across the wall east of Djebel Trompa, through Pishan under the cover of darkness, and occupied positions at O-7121h. Laddan was seen established with French forces under Colonel Gaudryeur. There still was no enemy activity, and the following day "A" Company returned to former positions at O-7575 at 2000 hours.

On January 30th, French mortar shots were taken of "A" Company's positions with Colonel Maddox's staff, and of Company vehicles in combat positions, illustrating cooperation between French and American forces. At 1500 hours "A" Company moved out to rejoin Combat Command "A" at Korn's crossroad near Lannoula, T-5266. T/4 Plywood was seriously wounded by enemy aircraft at Soudia, and T/5 Lamrose was wounded by enemy planes at Lannoula when the 3rd Platoon was strafed. Two 75mm self-propelled guns were knocked out and several vehicles damaged. At 0300 hours of the following day "A" Company moved to Sidi Ben Zid and went into forward positions located at T-7253. The 3rd Platoon now rejoined the Company, and all were bunkered and strafed at dawn while passing through Sidi Ben Zid. There were no casualties. T/4 Plywood died in the morning and was buried in the United States Cemetery at Soudia.

"A" Company was then attached to the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment under the command of Lt. Colonel Righthor. The 2nd Platoon was attached to a team of tanks and artillery under Major Parsons and occupied forward combat positions at T-7253. There was some sporadic shelling and a great deal of enemy air activity but not casualties. The next day, February 2nd, "A" Company, less the 2nd Platoon, occupied forward positions toward Rabouil Pass and had the mission of protecting the 1st's (north) flank in a tank attack at 1100 hours. The Company moved out with the tanks and broke up an enemy tank attack which came south toward Rabouil Cran Field Pass. The enemy tanks were driven back by four of "A" Company's 75mm S/P's. The 37mm S/P's were completely out of effective range, but fired back for the "hull of it".

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... then centered on two 88mm guns dug in at Raboul Pass. These guns were out of range of the S/P's gun sights, but one was effectively silenced. At dusk the Company withdrew with the tanks to former positions. There had been no casualties.

From February 3 to February 7, "A" Company occupied forward positions at T-7556 before daylight and remained in position during the day, withdrawing to T-7203 during darkness. From February 8 to February 13, the Company was in position between Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Garet Hadid furnishing anti-tank protection to the artillery and tanks. During the period the Company was under enemy "counter battery" artillery fire daily. As the men dug in "six feet under", no casualties were sustained.

The Germans broke through the pass between Djebel Kralif and Djebel El Akrouta with tanks and artillery at 0730 hours. They swept around Laseouda from the west to surround the mountain, oasis, and all troops in the vicinity. The 2nd Platoon was overrun by tanks and driven from their forward positions, but not before they had destroyed three or more enemy tanks. Only two 75mm S/P guns and a few peeps were able to extricate themselves. Lt. Ambruster was wounded in action.

"A" Company, less the 2nd Platoon, moved out with the tanks to meet the enemy armor which was sweeping southwest from Laseouda toward Sidi Bou Zid. "A" Company was on the right flank of "I" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment and took up positions in the high ground east of the Laseouda-Sidi Bou Zid road. Here, an attack of about 30 Mark IV tanks, which had debouched from Faid Pass and were going west on the Faid-Saiguia road, was met. "A" Company opened fire at 200 yards with all guns, including small arms, as they emerged from the cactus. The German column of tanks moved to their left flank (south) and overran the Company. Three of our 75mm S/P's and two 37mm S/P's were hit by tank fire and exploded and burned. The Company withdrew and was reassembled south of the Sidi-Bou Zid-Maknassy road. A withdrawal south and west of Sidi Bou Zid toward Korn's crossroad was then begun, and the column

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was bombed and strafed just west of Sidi Bou Zid. The last 75mm S/P and maintenance trucks were lost in this incident. "A" Company then turned southwest and crossed the wadi some two and a half miles off. Six enemy tanks were sighted creeping across to the front. All fire power gone, the Company halted, and the men dispersed and were made to lie down in the green field. The enemy tanks passed by and attacked the main column which had just been left.

The courage and leadership shown by Lt. Colonel Hightower during the fight was superior and outstanding. His bravery in placing his command tank between the main retreating column and the six enemy tanks mentioned above was a notable feat deserving of the highest praise. The enemy tanks were knocked out and the remainder of the column was saved.

The "A" Company column, which had meanwhile collected vehicles and personnel from several units, continued to work its way toward Kern's cross-road. The Company's losses for the day consisted of two officers captured and one officer both wounded and missing in action, five enlisted men killed, six captured, and 42 men missing in action. Vehicular losses were six 75mm S/P guns, two 37mm S/P guns, four M-2 half-tracks, three 3/4 ton AA, 11 1/4 ton trucks, and one 2 1/2 ton maintenance truck.

On February 15 and 16, "A" Company was ordered to occupy the pass at T-4562 and protect the south flank. This position was occupied prior to daylight after the Company had moved out at 0400 hours. There was no enemy ground activity and no enemy tanks were observed in the passes.

The rest of the 701st TD Battalion joined "A" Company in its positions on the afternoon of January 16th, and "A" Company reverted to Battalion control. At 2000 hours the same day, an order was received to withdraw to a position northeast of Sidi Bou Zid. The withdrawal was made while furious fighting was taking place on the Lasseuda-Sidi Bou Zid road.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION AT SIDI BOU ZID-SBEITLA  
FROM FEBRUARY 14 TO FEBRUARY 18, 1943

After the operation at Sened the Battalion had withdrawn to the Bou Chebka area under orders from II Corps Headquarters. On February 9th Combat Command "D" (of which the Battalion was a part) was ordered to move from Bou Chebka to the Thelepte area, attached to the 26th Combat Team. But on the 11th of February the Battalion was relieved from assignment to CC "D" and was assigned to CC "C" under command of Colonel Stack of the 6th Armored Infantry. The Combat Command Headquarters was at Hadjeb El Aieum. "C" Company, 701st TD Battalion was assigned to the Kern force (12 miles from Sbeitla on the Faid road). This left the Battalion with Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance Company, and "B" Company ("A" Company having been previously assigned to CC "A" at Sbeitla). The Battalion moved and arrived at Hadjeb El Aieum on the 12th where it was rejoined by "B" Company for the first time since October of 1942, N.I. ("C" Company dropped en route to the Kern force). The Battalion took positions opposite German positions at Fendeuk el Okei and OP's were established. On the evening of February 13th, word arrived that a German attack was to be expected the following day at either Pichen, Fendeuk, or Faid. Thus, the Battalion was alerted to meet any attack across the valley from Fendeuk. No attack materialized. Around 1300 hours, however, reports arrived of a German attack against CC "A" in the vicinity of Faid Pass and Sidi Bou Zid. This attack was a definite success, and CC "A" was decisively defeated. Many American infantrymen and tankers had been surrounded on Dj. Lasseuda. It was expected that the Germans would continue their drive in the direction of Sbeitla to further press the retreating CC "A". Thus, CC "C" was alerted and was ordered to attack from the north to flank the Germans at Sidi Bou Zid. CC "C" moved from Hadjeb El Aieum and arrived at an assembly position two miles north of Dj. Ilma from whence they expected to launch their attack the following day. Reconnaissance Company, 701st TD Battalion,

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furnished night patrols surrounding the Combat Command bivouac area. At 0700 hours the Combat Command column, with Reconnaissance Company of the 701st TD Battalion in the lead, moved out in the direction of Sidi Bou Zid (Reconnaissance Company had the mission of providing reconnaissance for the entire Combat Command - an impossible mission). "B" Company was ordered to follow the attack of our tanks closely. Lt. Col. King and elements of the staff moved forward to establish an OP to follow the battle. The Germans had not pressed their tactical advantage of the previous day, but had withdrawn and remained in the Sidi Bou Zid area, presumably to annihilate the American forces trapped on Dj. Lasseuda and Dj. Ksaira. Thus, the attack was launched by CC "C" directly east across the plains towards Sidi Bou Zid. The attack was launched at 1300 hours with Reconnaissance platoons of the 701st TD Battalion protecting the right and left flanks of the Combat Command. In the vicinity of Sidi Bou Zid our armor was taken under extremely heavy artillery and anti-tank fire, and could not advance. Thus, during the afternoon, the situation was static, with our troops under continual heavy fire.

At 1700 hours the Germans counter attacked from three directions (from the north around Lasseuda, from the south in the direction of Maknassy, and from Faid Pass) and forced a withdrawal of the entire Combat Command. The German attack gathered momentum and a large portion of the forces withdrew without regard for order or discipline. By Combat Command order a defensive position was established about 12 miles east of Spetla in the vicinity of Dj. Mzara. The defensive line held here, and by dark the Sidi Bou Zid area was "No Man's Land", shelled by the artillery of both forces. The entire area was lighted by the fires of many, many burning tanks. One "B" Company 37mm /P and one Reconnaissance Company half-track had been lost in the day's activities. The day of February 16th was spent in organizing and correlating the defenses of the position. "A" Company rejoined the Battalion, and with the re-assignment of "C" Company (all due to the ab-

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serption of CC "C" by elements of CC "A", General McQuillan in command) the Battalion was again to operate as a complete unit. The Battalion was assigned the mission of the protection of 7 miles of right flank of the Combat Command in the vicinity of Dj. Hamra (again an impossible mission for with the number of guns remaining in the Battalion at this time, it was impossible to adequately protect such an area). "A", "B", "C", and Reconnaissance Companies moved out and took positions around 1800 hours. At 1205 hours, "B" Company reported the approach of enemy tanks, and took the necessary action - the tanks withdrew. In the afternoon, the command group moved from the bivouac area northwest of Sidi Bou Zid to Dj. Hamra. The Column was strafed en route but there were no casualties. About 1900 hours German columns again began to attack. One armored unit attacked from the northeast and another straight from Sidi Bou Zid towards Sbeitla, into the mouth of the valley below Dj. Hamra (another enemy armored group moved forward on the right flank of the 701st TD Battalion, was observed, and the platoon of Lt. Anani, "C" Company, was sent forward to engage armor which had turned from the column toward the Battalion area. These tanks withdrew, but the large enemy column moved into the hills to the south). The enemy was engaged in the fire of our tanks and artillery, but continued to advance. Lt. Col. King reported to CC "A" for orders. The Battalion had not yet engaged the enemy from this position and darkness soon closed cutting down all observation. Seen machine gun fire (identified to be German) was heard in the valley, and the tempo of the artillery fire increased. By now the 105 Hows. were laying direct fire on the advancing enemy tanks. The attack was a success and our units in the valley were driven to the rear. The 701st TD Battalion had received no orders, and the situation had now become so obscured that it was not possible for the Battalion to engage the enemy.

Splists, Murphy and Enat, Battalion guides on the Sidi Bou Zid-Sbeitla road, returned on foot at 2200 hours and told of the advance of German tanks up the valley - their cycles had been overrun and they had escaped and made their way back to the Battalion area and reported. Thus German troops were on three sides of the Battalion, and on the left flank had penetrated

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many miles past the Battalion area up the valley in the direction of Sbeitla. Lt. Col. King had not returned from the Combat Command Headquarters (and it was now impossible for him to do so), and therefore Major Tardy, Battalion Executive, took charge and upon his orders units were ordered to move separately in a general northwesterly direction, avoiding the tank battle now in progress between our tanks and the enemy to our rear, in the direction of Sbeitla. As the night was so dark, and the situation so obscure, Major Tardy felt that it would be impossible for the Battalion at that time to assist in the battle, and he deemed it necessary to get the remaining guns safely behind our own lines. "B" Company could not be contacted by radio and "A" Company column was ordered to warn "B" Company patrols of the withdrawal. It was necessary for "A" Company to destroy one half-track, which was minus a track. At 2250 hours a last attempt was made to warn "B" Company by radio, but without success. Command Group moved out with Lt. Morrison in the lead, and the column proceeded some miles in a westerly direction avoiding the tank battle on the right flank. The S-3 half-track, with Lt. Waters, led the second column, following the "A" Company column. This group skirted the foothills following an almost due north direction with enemy action and movements about 1000 yards to the right. A third group, led by Lt. Smith of Reconnaissance Company, approached even closer to the battle ground. The S-3 half-track became inoperative and was destroyed, with files transferred to the Chaplain's vehicle. The "A" Company column reached Sbeitla as the enemy began shelling the town. There was much confusion on the road, and Major Tardy and enlisted men of the Battalion attempted to establish order among the retreating vehicles as they passed through the town. Then, Major Tardy and Capt. Gray went on through the town to select a Battalion assembly area for the re-grouping of the elements. "A" column pulled into this assembly area at 0110 hours on February 17th, and a thin line of tanks and 75mm S/P's were strung across the valley for a last ditch fight, should the enemy break through Sbeitla. At this time the ammunition dump in Sbeitla was on fire. Lt. Col. King reported to CC "A" for orders.

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"A" and "B" Companies guns under Captains Gray and Mitsit with Lt. Col. King and Major Tardy re-entered Sbeitla at 0215 hours, and took up defensive positions on the right flank.

In the meantime the column under Lt. Morrison had joined with the "C" Company column under Captain Redding. This group reached a point some three miles south and east of Sbeitla. There the column halted in order to attempt to contact friendly units (the column commanders knew nothing of the situation, they were out of radio contact which had not been regained, and did not wish to endanger the column by entering Sbeitla until it had been ascertained whether the town belonged to the Americans or the Germans. Also, this column was for all purposes still in the rear of enemy lines, and as the night was dark, and as they had no contact with friendly units, it was felt that taking the column further in the direction of friendly troops would result in bringing them under fire of friendly guns). Lt. Morrison and Capt. Redding attempted to contact Division Headquarters offering the services of the remaining six guns (75mm S/P's), but were told to "get off the net". They then contacted Combat Command Headquarters and received orders to take up defensive positions on the far side of the valley (it was impossible for the guns to assume these positions for it would necessitate the entire group passing directly through the German positions). Thus, it was decided to set up a static defense in the present position and await the developments of the morning. With dawn the column again moved in the direction of Sbeitla, and entered the town, finding it deserted. There, the group contacted Lt. Col. King and was led into the Battalion assembly area.

On the morning of the 17th, CC "B" of the 1st Armored Division moved up to cover the defenses of Sbeitla, and CC "A" went into a defensive position some three miles west of the town. 701st TD Battalion was again attached to CC "C" to cover the withdrawal of the Division. By 1600 hours an artillery duel was in progress. Enemy aircraft bombed and strafed the American positions and traffic on the main Kasserine-Sbeitla road was strafed throughout

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the morning. By 1200 hours enemy artillery was firing at our battery on American positions in the vicinity and a general withdrawal was ordered. 701st TD Battalion was assigned the rear guard mission. At 1345 hours the last of the Battalion withdrawal columns of the night before (Lt. Smith's and Sumner's platoons of Reconnaissance Company) were reported safe. Throughout the afternoon CC "C" withdrew. The guns of the 701st covering the withdrawal by leap-frogging. The Combat Command withdrew to positions some 12 miles west of Sbeitla, but at 1840 hours orders were issued for a further withdrawal (the town of Sbeitla was now in the possession of the enemy and German Reconnaissance patrols had pushed forward some nine miles out of Sbeitla). CC "C" began further withdrawal at 1930 hours with the 701st again in rear guard. At 2400 hours the Battalion went into bivouac 10 miles north of Kasserine. Further move was made at 0615 hours on February 18th when the Battalion left the bivouac area heading north toward Ghala in a slow moving column, and thence southwest to Tebessa and into bivouac 15 miles south of Tebessa on the Feriana road. This day Lt. Cox's platoon of "A" Company, believed lost in the first day of fighting at Sidi Ben Zid, returned to the Battalion after hiking 40 miles (platoon suffered complete loss of equipment).

Thus, ended the Sbeitla affair.

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depending upon the outcome at Kasserine. The 701st remained attached to CC "A" in division reserve (mission - to defend the southern and eastern approaches to Tobessa), and CC "B" moved out for Kasserine.

On February 22nd CC "A" was alerted for movement in any required direction and at 1900 hours received orders to move to Thala area (although word had just come through of CC "B's" successful counter-attack against Rommel's forces at Kasserine). It was an extremely difficult march, lasting 14 1/2 hours over muddy and treacherous roads, but the Battalion arrived in bivouac in the Thala area at 0930 hours on February 23rd (mission - security and reconnaissance).

At 1800 hours the Battalion was again alerted and moved out under Combat Command orders (no mission or destination had been given). On February 24th, the Battalion again pulled into the El Ma El Mied area, south of Tobessa. It was thought that the enemy had pulled back along the Sbeitla - Masfaa line. Thus, all was quiet for the next week, except for patrols to the southeast by Reconnaissance Company and the two remaining guns of Capt. Whitsit's platoon of "B" Company.

On March 4th, Reconnaissance Company was assigned the mission of reconnaissance to the south in the Meulares - Tamerza - Negrine area, maintaining contact with the French Headquarters at Cheria. This reconnaissance was of note in that it was perhaps the longest distance coverage of any reconnaissance mission assigned to any American unit in the North African Campaign. The company established its own supply base at Bir-el-Ater, Algeria, and Company Headquarters at Meulares, Tunisia, and initiated reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding areas. One such patrol, under Lt. Summers and Lt. M. Smith, reached as far south as Kefta, then to Tezeur (which had been evacuated by the Italians some two hours before hand). The patrols ranged as far to the southeast as the Chett Djerid, where they found the road to Kibili impassable. Returning to base, they turned eastward to Met-laoui and Phillippe-Thomas. Here too, they entered the same area

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after evacuation by the enemy.

Reconnaissance Company was recalled to the El La El Abied area on March 12th. It is of interest to note that the communications set up of the 701st was adequate for long range reconnaissance mission to which it was assigned. Total distance from the Battalion to Reconnaissance Company was 102 miles, with several intervening mountain ranges, and the Battalion Commander was at no time out of communication with his Reconnaissance Company.

The Battalion was assigned to Combat Command "C" under Colonel Stack, C.C., 13th Armored Infantry Regiment, on March 13th, and moved to a new bivouac area at the western end of the Kasserine valley (Tunisia map coordinate 3076). Here the long awaited equipment arrived, for 26 new 75mm SP's were allotted the Battalion. Unfortunately, due to blackout driving, and the slippery, muddy mountain roads, two of the new guns were overturned, but the remaining 24 were assigned upon arrival.

II Corps was ready to resume the offensive, and on March 14th "A" Company was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (Benson Force) and moved to an area about 3 miles west of Sbeitla.

On March 15th the Battalion was relieved from assignment to the 1st Armored Division, and temporarily assigned to the U.S. 9th Infantry Division. This terminated an attachment dating back to the activation of the Battalion at Fort Knox, Kentucky. "A" Company was called back to the Battalion and the 701st moved from the 1st Armored Division area on the 17th of March en route to defensive positions in the vicinity of Tholepte airport (mission - to offer defense for the airfield. As a secondary mission the Battalion used this period to allow personnel to adjust themselves to their new weapons).

On March 19th the planned II Corps defensive began. The 9th Infantry Division remained in reserve. On the 23rd of March the 701st was assigned to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, in the vicinity of El Guettar. The Battalion was to replace the 601st TD Battalion, whose ranks had been depleted in the recent battle with the German 10th Panzer Division.

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## OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 24 March 1943 to 11 April 1943: El Guettar

The 701st T.D. Battalion was now detached from the 9th Infantry Division and attached to the 1st Infantry Division, and the march to Gafsa began. A nuisance raid by two enemy twin-engine bombers halted the column for a while. Flares were dropped and the road was bombed and strafed about 1 1/2 miles west of Gafsa. There were no casualties, however, and the Battalion arrived in an area three miles east of Gafsa. Here, at 0210 hours, March 24th, the 701st Tank Destroyers bivouaced for the night.

By 0910 hours, all, except for the trains, were ready to move again. Lt. Col. King led the column in his half-track. The companies fell into line and left as was most convenient from the bivouac points. The Battalion rode approximately ten miles to the destination five miles east of El Guettar. Here the 701st relieved the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and took up their vacated defensive positions in the Djebel El Ank area. At 1045 hours, enemy guns started shelling the 701st positions but there were no casualties.

Division ordered Reconnaissance Company to function as forward observers. This had been requested personally by General Roosevelt of the 1st Infantry Division. Lts. Smith and Sumner went out and spotted an enemy position of 6 mortars. This information was quickly sent to Lt. Clarke, relayed to Lt. Col. King in his half-track Co. P., and then passed on to a 155mm battery assigned to this fire mission. The mortars had been shelling anything coming through the pass which led to the enemy held valley beyond. After several rounds, the enemy mortars were reported effectively silenced.

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A supply dump was next reported, and it turned out to be an ammunition dump as there was a terrific explosion when one of our shells dropped in for a clean hit. Another gun position, containing three or four enemy mortars, was then uncovered. This was a very unfortunate occurrence for the occupants. A few shells were directed into this target and all was quiet in this position.

Under the cover of darkness, infantry tanks, and some artillery moved through the Battalion area to take up new positions. This movement was covered by fire from the heavy guns in the rear. During the night, an enemy plane dropped flares and tried to draw fire, but the ground troops outfoxed him by refusing to open up.

Through the early morning hours of March 25th, Division Artillery kept up a barrage to cover the forward movement of two battalions of infantry, one battalion of Rangers, and a battery of artillery. Artillery duels and forward infantry action broke out in the afternoon as a message was received warning the Battalion to be alert for possible enemy armored attacks.

From 1615 hours to 1715 hours, Battalion positions were shelled by the enemy. The deep wadis and gullies provided excellent protection for the troops, but four casualties were sustained and one jeep was destroyed; Pvt. Jensen and Menine were killed, and Roberts and Peters were wounded; all these men were from "B" Company.

Due to the excellent work and results of our reconnaissance elements and perfect functioning of our communications system of relaying information to higher headquarters and artillery batteries, the C.P. became a miniature clearing-house of information throughout the day.

On March 26th, our forces were shifted during the morning hours to consolidate positions. Little activity was noted. While light winds created a mild sand storm, Lt. Col. King traveled to Division for orders. On his return the C.P. hummed with activity as officers of the Battalion were called to receive instructions. Information was to be obtained for units of the 1st Infantry Division. At 2000 hours, enemy artillery shells

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were peering the road about 100 yards to the right of the C.P.

News that the Battalion was now a part of the 1st Tank Destroyer Group, to operate under its direction, was received on March 22nd. However, our status with the 1st Infantry Division remained unaffected. The Command Group moved as directed by 1st T.D. Group, and the whole Battalion, with the lone exception of tanks, was dispersed through the area of Dj. El Ank valley. The following morning, before dawn, Lt. Col. King, Lt. Morrison, and some of the officers of T.D. Group, and others reached a forward observation post and set up communications prior to the infantry attack which was to be launched on this front by American forces. The mission of the 701st T.D. Battalion was to protect Division's left flank from attack by enemy armored forces. Artillery activity flared up during the day and large formations of Allied bombers were observed overhead. Reports of satisfactory progress by American forces fighting on all sectors of the front came in as Lt. Col. King returned from the OP that evening. American troops renewed the offensive on the following day. Again Lt. Col. King and others went to the OP. At 1455 hours, Me-109's, Focke-Wulfe's, and Stukas swooped down to bomb and strafe the Battalion area, concentrating near the Command Group road. 20mm shells and machine gun fire damaged three ambulances and a truck. A wounded man was killed and a driver was wounded in one ambulance while eight others were wounded in the other vehicles. Allied fighters interrupted the raid and dogfights resulted. One Focke-Wulfe 190 and an Me-109 were downed in a trail of smoke. No Allied planes were lost. Lt. Col. King returned with his assistants, and it was learned that enemy tanks had attacked and attempted to break through the pass southeast of the Command Group location in the south valley. The area was held by the 9th Infantry Division and 1st T.D. Group, and the attack was repulsed. In the meantime, "B" Company had been detailed to provide patrols and a listening post for the 18th Combat Team.

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On March 30th. Lt. Col. King and his party changed the locality of the OP to a spot more forward. At 0810 hours, a flight of enemy planes roared overhead and cut loose with machine gun fire. No one was injured, but slit trenches were kept busy as air activity continued through the day. "C" Company had moved forward with advancing American infantry to protect their flank. Lt. Lewis' Platoon shelled enemy artillery and infantry in Sakkot Valley, west of Sakkot, as it also observed for the rear artillery. "A" Company also became active when it was given the detail of patrolling and acting as a listening post for the 18th Combat Team. Enemy planes renewed their activity in the morning of the following day. Flares and bombs were dropped to the rear of the Battalion area, but no one was injured. Lt. Col. King and the observation group continued to visit the OP during the day. With "A" Company being shelled and intense air activity all afternoon by the enemy seeking to ferret out American artillery positions, the Battalion had an exceedingly busy time. However, no damage was sustained. At 1910 hours, eight Ju-88's attacked the neighboring artillery area. Twelve Spitfires came sweeping out of the clouds and sped along to chase the fleeing Junkers into a flight of patrolling P-40's. In the resulting dogfight three enemy planes were sent down in flames without loss to the Allied fighter craft. Our observers and reconnaissance mission officers returned to give the tallies for the Battalion's day. Two enemy gun positions had been silenced and one vehicle was destroyed. Another vehicle had been damaged.

At 2245 hours, a message was received from 1st T.D. Group informing the 701st that 100 enemy vehicles, including two batteries of field artillery and tanks, were observed moving northwest on the trail leaving the Gabes-Gafsa road at Y-5363. One Company and an attached platoon from Reconnaissance Company were sent to the vicinity of Y-3968 for coordination with the 16th Infantry. Its mission was to protect the right flank of the 1st Infantry Division against armored attack. Another company/less a platoon was moved to the vicinity of the crossroad at Y-2373, while the platoon went into position on the high ground in the vicinity of Oued El Keddab.

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## OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - April 19 - May 9, 1943: North Tunisian Sector

Lt. Col. King returned from II Corps Headquarters, newly established near Beja, on April 19th, where he had, on the previous day, reported after the Battalion had been alerted for a move. Ben Ghobka was left behind in a trail of dust as Reconnaissance Company led the march followed by Headquarters, "A" Company, "B" Company, "C" Company and trains. An accident en route resulted in my injury to Lt. Romani of "C" Company, and he was removed to a hospital. At dusk the Battalion pulled into the bivouac area, a green cow pasture, six miles south of La Calle, a Mediterranean port on the Algerian coast. The night passed without incident, although unidentified planes flew overhead during the night. The Battalion was now attached to the 1st Infantry Division after being detached from 1st TD Group.

The following day an advance detail travelled to II Corps and 1st Infantry Division Headquarters with Lt. Col. King and there received instructions for a move of the Battalion and preparation for the all out attack. Thus, the Battalion moved out that night and arrived at a bivouac area approximately nine miles northeast of Beja at 0500 hours. Trains fell out to bivouac two miles east of Beja, and "C" Company was attached to the 26th Infantry Regiment which preceded them to front line positions north of the Battalion area. Lt. Col. King and others in the advance detail rejoined the Battalion and a further move was made at 1900 hours to the Dir Ben Escha area, approximately 13 miles northeast of Beja. The gun companies took up their positions, and the entire Battalion was ordered to camouflage and dig in. In the meantime, the trains had moved into the vacated wheat field.

On April 21st the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, and one platoon of the 16th Armored Engineers were attached to the command of Lt. Col. King, and all were attached to the 1st Infantry Division in support of the 13th Combat Team. The following morning a tragic incident occurred when the

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At 1200 hours, three company commanders of the 13th Armored Regiment were killed while reconnoitering in two "peeps". The Executive Officer was severely wounded and the three company commanders were killed. In the evening, British V Corps opened heavy artillery fire to our southeast. Enemy air superiority was noticeable all day as American bombers and fighter bombers ranged over the front. There was no sign of enemy planes.

At 0800 hours of April 23, all II Corps Artillery went into action with a terrible barrage. The infantry moved forward to attack Hill 350 under the withering fire of the artillery, and an: company of tanks; the 701st's Reconnaissance and "A" Companies supported the assault. Lt. Sumner of Reconnaissance was in liaison with the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment, and he reconnoitered in this capacity. Lt. Col. King and his observation post party were on the newly established OP on Hill 337 early that morning to watch the proceedings. "A" Company was located by the enemy, then moving forward into position, and came under shell fire. The 13th Armored Regiment then reported that their tanks were pecketed and under enemy shell fire in the valley between Hills 350 and 407. Artillery support was requested and the resulting fire was directed through the 701st OP with Lt. Sumner of the 13th Armored Regiment as forward observer. Nine out of the 17 tanks were rescued by this means. Later in the day Hill 337 on which the OP was located was shelled by the Germans.

At 1630 hours, Colonel W. J. Thompson, Army Ground Forces Observer, who had been sent from Washington, D.C., arrived to note the progress and action of our own front. An hour later Major Patterson of the British Royal Artillery came to observe the function of our Battalion G.P. A few rounds of enemy aircraft added a lively note to the proceedings. Shortly afterwards the first enemy planes seen by the Battalion in this sector dropped flares southeast of the Battalion and attacked with machine guns wide area. Our machine guns chattered back, and the Nazis "shagged" back to safety.

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Colonel Gibbs, G-3, 1st Infantry Division req. "of the company" the 701st to accompany the 16th Infantry Regiment at dark. "A" Company was then alerted and contacted the 16th Infantry guide. The 16th was able to push ahead before the retreating enemy infantry, and "A" Company moved up to take position in support.

April 28th Capt. Morrison established an OP he had chosen the previous day. There was obvious interference with the OP and communication by plane only could then be used. Infantry advances by the Americans were reported from the OP, and an advance by these units up the slope of Hill 444, while the summit was being shelled by our artillery, was reported.

Combat Command "B", composed of the 2nd Assault Battalion, 77th ID Battalion, the 2nd Assault Artillery Battalion, and one company of the 16th Engineers, with the 1st Battalion of the 1st Assault Regiment in reserve, was now assigned to the Battalion.

Reconnaissance Company of the 701st was quite active and instrumental in securing information of considerable value. Lt. Smith, Brown and Kennedy reconnoitered the enemy fire from the enemy in order to locate their guns. They also observed enemy movements and troop concentrations, and relayed their information through Lt. Glavin to the Battalion C.P.

Messages from G-3, 1st Infantry Division were received and sent on to the companies to the effect that the enemy was staging several counter-attacks, and that 40-50 vehicles and some tanks had been located at 244. "B" Company was informed by our infantry that enemy infantry was in front of "B" Company positions. Artillery fire on the road adjoining their area was then reported by "B" Company, and the Company moved to the vicinity of 500562

The American advances on this sector had resulted over almost impassable roads, narrow, winding, and gutted with enemy mines. Our engineers immediately after removing the mines, set to work widening the roads and filling the holes, and the roads started to show marked improvement.

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On April 25th, 1951, 1st Infantry Division...  
...the 16th Infantry...  
...conducted the 16th Infantry...  
...able to push ahead before the retreating enemy infantry...  
...to take position in support

April 28th saw Lt. Harrison established on...  
...previous day. There was static interference with...  
...by phone only could then be used. Infantry advances by the Americans  
...were reported from the... and an advance by those units up the slope of  
...Hill 444, while the summit was being shelled by our artillery, was re-  
...ported.

Combat Command "B", composed of the 13th Armored Regiment, 776th TD  
Battalion, the 27th Field Artillery Battalion and one company of the 16th  
Engineers, with the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment in reserve,  
was now adjacent to the Battalion.

Reconnaissance Company of the 701st was quite active and instrumental  
in securing information of considerable value. Lts. Smith, Sumner and  
Kennedy reconnoitered to draw fire from the enemy in order to locate their  
guns. They also observed enemy movements and troop concentrations, and  
relayed their information through Lt. Glavin to the Battalion C.P.

Messages from G-3, 1st Infantry Division were received and sent on  
to the companies to the effect that the enemy was staging several counter-  
attacks, and that the 50 vehicles and some tanks had been located at 5164.  
"B" Company was informed by our infantry that enemy infantry was in front  
of "B" Company positions. Artillery fire on the road adjoining their area  
was then reported by "B" Company, and the Company moved to the vicinity of  
509552.

The American advance in this sector had stumbled over almost impass-  
ible roads, narrow, winding, and pitted with enemy mines. Our engineers  
immediately after removing the mines, set to work widening the roads and  
filling the holes. As the roads started to show signs of improvement

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The Company held the American tank and a jeep under enemy shellfire on the night of 2 April 1945. Our reconnaissance elements went out, but had nothing of importance to report. German linguists of Battalion S-2 went on radio intercept effort to intercept enemy messages. These intercepts were sent immediately to S-3, 1st Infantry Division. Text of one message revealed that the 2nd Barenthin Battalion was moving into the line between the 755th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Barenthin Battalion. Lt. Col. King inquired of S-3 whether the intercept of enemy messages had proven sufficiently important to continue. He was told that due to these interceptions two enemy attacks had been repelled. Without this information of enemy plans, on the other hand, a withdrawal of our forces in these sectors might have been necessary.

Air activity, both friendly and enemy, was at a high point during the day. Large formations of American bombers were observed winging their way toward enemy lines.

Reconnaissance patrols went off again on April 30th, and Lt. Clark acted as relay station to send their messages to the G.P. Lt. Kennedy reported the elimination of one of our 155mm guns by an enemy shell. Lt. Smith sent in the location of three Mark III tanks at 473607, and a little later six American tanks were reported around Hill 219. He continued with a report of three enemy planes over "B" Company positions. One "B" Company man was injured by the anti-aircraft fire. Lt. Kennedy gave a general picture of the situation in the sector. He stated that Hills 490 and 491, and the east area were held by U.S. troops forming a ring around Hill 490. The enemy still was in possession of the east end. Then American lines continued to the bitterly contested 523, now held by the 16th Infantry Regiment, and included up to the west slope of Hill 476 on Djebel Chankoura. The southern part of Djebel Anz was also held with the intention of taking more and pushing out to 502605. The 18th Infantry Regiment was in a static position on the left of 52 line. In addition, one tank company of the 1st Armored Regiment was holding at 455385.

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The CP had reported that the Germans had captured Hill 323 at Djebel Aza and Djebel Gharra after a long and hard fight. The German flag flew from Djebel Aza. Our planes were ordered to attack the German lines at Hills 545 and 550. Beantville, the enemy position on Hill 323. German intercoms were being used to talk to our planes all during the day.

21 enemy planes came over during the evening. They were identified as Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts, and engaged in air combat with our planes. In the afternoon, "C" Company reported that 20 Go-109's were flying over the north slope of Sidi Mefrah.

May 1st dawned with a heavy fog obscuring visibility. The CP reported that vision was too poor to see Djebel Aza. Heavy bombings by aircraft were heard, but it was impossible to ascertain the location due to increased haze. As the fog lifted later in the morning, the CP announced that American artillery was pounding Hill 55.

The 18th Infantry reported the taking of Hill 609 at 0905 hours. In the afternoon, 16th Infantry mentioned a counter-attack formation at Hill 545.

Lts. Ben McLeod and John T. Deegan were assigned and joined the battalion. Capt. Redding sent "A" Company a coded message to move to positions 455601, 455612, and the approaching road (suitable for heavy AT) for gun positions. Alternate gun positions were also to be provided.

"C" Company reported that four unidentified planes dropped bombs to their left on the northwest slope of Hill 609.

Visibility was again poor on the morning of May 2nd. Djebel Teuta could not be seen at all. Later on our artillery was reported to be shelling Hill 558.

A report from the 16th Infantry declared that their patrol had found that the Germans had mined Hill 529 and then vacated it. It was believed

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The east slope of Djebel Badger was still in enemy hands.

Reconnaissance and the line companies sent out to reconnoiter. "B" Company sent to the vicinity of 456051 reported no enemy activity at the edge of the nearby village. The 813th T. D. Battalion and heavy tanks were found in the area.

The 26th Infantry Regiment now revealed that three or four enemy tanks were forward of Djebel Badger and shelling Djebels Ans, Tauta and Badger. An air reconnaissance was requested. "B" Company of the 701st subsequently reported that these tanks were out of sight of their observation.

Lt. Smith reported the fall of enemy shells near his observation post. He then left for further reconnaissance and discovered a S/P and "peep" destroyed by mines at 455595. The possibility of a field of 300 mines was mentioned, and the results of the day's reconnaissance given. The 2nd Battalion of the 168th Infantry Regiment was perched on Hill 609. The 1st Battalion of the 133rd Infantry Regiment was at 450612, and the 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment was at 443603. One battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment was on Hill 523 with a company out of the 26th Infantry on Hill 531. "A" Company of the 813th T.D. Battalion was situated at 438598. A German OP had been located near the railroad at 495615.

Lt. Clarke had reported that all elements north of the 62 line were hostile, and a message to all stations announced that 100 enemy vehicles were approaching 5560 from the east.

A G-2 report from 1st Infantry Division came in the following morning to place the location of the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry on Hill 558, the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry on Djebel Ans, and an element of the 18th Infantry on Djebel Badger.

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A section of the Pioneer Platoon was ordered to "C" Company, and "C" was to push reconnaissance up to the 60 line. At location 6060 Lt. Childs was fired on by the enemy. He called in and informed the OP that the road was impassable past 598577.

The Battalion OP was called in, after being operated by Lt. Morrison for five consecutive days, because the American advance in this sector and the German retreat made further observation of the enemy impossible. Lt. Col. King left with part of the Command Group to set up a forward CP.

An accident occurred directly in front of the Command Group when Capt. Redding of the 1st Engineer Battalion and his "jeep" driver were blown up by a mine. The Capt. was very seriously injured. Capt. Kahn, the 701st Medical Officer, rendered immediate first aid and had the injured man rushed to the nearest hospital. Command Group then continued to move up. The forward C.P. group, after going 8 1/2 miles, left the road and parked the vehicles at 525595, a creek north of Djebel Marfa. It was later learned that the group had narrowly escaped injury because, in leaving the road, they had traveled through a minefield, some mines of which were straddled by our vehicles. In the evening, forward and rear C.P.'s joined and completed the move to 561607. A call, shortly thereafter, by Lt. Smith reported his location as 576598. He added that he was coming under shellfire.

Lt. Morrison got information that a large number of tanks and guns of the 776th TD Battalion were moving east of 565590. Some battalions of the 26th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 18th Infantry were reported in new positions. G-3, 1st Armored Division, asked for a reconnaissance east and north to the hills, river, and road on the 65 line, if possible.

"A" Company reported in that the road to Kintour was now clear. All during the day fighting units on this front moved steadily forward into enemy evacuated territories. Reconnaissance patrols forged ahead to probe

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It was reported that the road had been damaged or abandoned.  
A bridge at 66598 was also reported.

Reconnaissance of "C" Companies were informed that enemy tanks were  
observed across the valley. An hour later a message from Colonel Cook  
located enemy tanks at St. Joseph's farm just south of the road. However,  
Lt. Clark reported that Lt. Kennedy had just observed St. Joseph's farm  
which was being shelled by American artillery. Nothing was to be seen,  
and a later report from the infantry declared that their patrols were  
working around St. Joseph's farm and to the north.

All the Companies of the 701st had moved up, and their positions were  
checked by Lt. Col. King, who advised "A" Company to improve their positions  
by digging in and camouflage. Although enemy planes had been active  
during the day, and had bombed and strafed the vicinity of the positions,  
there was no damage. Enemy shells whistled over the forward area  
during morning and afternoon, but landed on the road south and eastward of  
our positions.

Lt. Dugan and Pvt. Lengwerth, part of a "C" Company patrol, had  
disappeared at one point and had not returned by 1800 hours. At night  
fall, as they were still missing, Captain Redding, the Executive Officer,  
set out in an attempt to locate them. Nevertheless, the search revealed  
nothing. B Company moved during the night and took up positions at 66598  
and vicinity under cover of darkness.

Reconnaissance alerts set out at dawn, May 5th. Five reconnoitering  
were reported overhead as Lt. Clark gave his position at 66598. He  
reported contacting the 1st Battalion, 13th Americal Infantry, and  
enemy was observed digging in along the line from 66598 to 66599. A  
bridge at 66577 was discovered blown up. Lt. Clark reported enemy  
fire in the path of the northern objectives, making it impossible to be  
reached even if dismounted.

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1st Infantry Division phoned in to inform the 2nd Division that a minefield had been found on the road west of the river between 64560 and 64566. Another minefield at 600701 had been detected by the 1st Reconnaissance. Reports of friendly troops at 64560 and 64566. Artillery also came in.

Enemy planes bombed and strafed the area of the 13th General Hospital three times during the day. The raids were made with flights of 10 to 12 Focke-Wulfes and Messerschmitts.

OP Company reported that a battalion of American infantry was advancing through heavy shellfire to 650585. An artillery OP sighted two enemy gun positions at 675605. There were spasmodic bursts of enemy and American artillery throughout the afternoon, but there was little action otherwise.

In the evening, Command Group completed its move north to 583642, and a new Command OP was set up at Hill 21, during the night for early morning use. The drone of unidentified aircraft could be heard overhead all night.

A heavy barrage on enemy positions due east by all artillery in the sector opened May 6th. Under cover of this barrage, the 1st Infantry Division attacked and headed for the hills in the general vicinity of the 70 grid line. The ultimate objective was the Command area. The 701st mission in this assault was the same as previous, to give anti-tank protection to the Division, and also to assist the advance of the 18th Infantry Regiment. One each reconnaissance platoon, and one each section of Pioneer Platoon were attached to "A" and "B" Companies, while another section of Pioneer Platoon was attached to "C" Company. The C.O. of Reconnaissance Company and the remaining platoon were to establish a forward O.P. All gun companies were to hold forward and establish.

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... 300 hours, the 10th Infantry 1st Battalion that they had taken Hill 121 and were proceeding on to Hill 232.

Lt. Clark reported that a Battalion of the 26th Infantry was under heavy mortar fire at 656675. Another battalion of the 16th was on Hill 139, and one company from the 26th was under enemy machine gun fire. A coded message from Lt. Clark followed with this information: "Boys of the 18th suffering heavy casualties".

Six waves of Allied bombers, 15 to 18 in each wave, were observed from the Command Group area. They came in on the enemy positions and cut loose their bombs. One plane was seen to fall, victim of the intense enemy anti-aircraft fire.

Lt. Edson reported that he was pinned down by shellfire and could not proceed further. A reconnaissance was then ordered forward in search of new gun positions, and "B" Company moved northeast while "A" and "C" Companies proceeded to the east. The attached reconnaissance parties were to go forward as far as possible. The reconnaissance party of "B" Company was unable to advance beyond the vicinity of Sidi Mansour due to shelling and machine gun fire. The "C" Company party reached 636641 where very heavy artillery fire caused two casualties, Opl. Iivak was killed and S/Sgt. Smith wounded. The "A" Company reconnaissance advanced to 6467 where heavy shell fire killed Opl. Hanley and stopped the party. However, new gun positions were located for "B" and "C" Companies, and one platoon from each of the latter was placed forward.

Lt. Clarke reported again of an artillery due along the line. Otherwise, there existed a lull as indicated by the 1st Infantry Division report. The liaison report from the 3rd Infantry Division sector mentioned that the 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry Regiment had captured Hill 295 and that the 3rd Battalion had occupied Hill 321.

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1st Armored Division was reported to have advanced to Perryville. A report from Lt. Olney, Liaison Officer, stated that the 18th Infantry Regiment did not hold Hill 232, and that the enemy was between the Hill and a battalion of the 18th. After repulsing a counterattack, the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment held Hill 129 and the 2nd Battalion was near Hill 129. The 1st Battalion attack had been repelled and Hill 189 was still in enemy hands. Enemy infantry was also reported to be dug in at 639863. Due to strong and repeated enemy counterattacks during the night, our infantry withdrew to the west side of the stream. The ground lost had been taken earlier only after difficult fighting and heavy losses.

"C" Company sent word to the C.P. that it was unable to move another platoon forward until certain that the flank had been cleared. Reconnaissance told of heavy machine gun fire at 670590.

During the late hours of darkness two platoons of "A" Company moved to 642646 and 632646. The "C" Company C.P. shifted to 608635.

At 0800 hours of May 7th, Lt. Clarke delivered information gained in reconnaissance of the 1st Armored Division sector. Colonel Crosby's tanks had met resistance in an attempt to ford at 6284 a stream; but one company made the crossing. Counterattacks by enemy tanks and anti-tank guns forced his battalion to fall back to 6280. The 6th Infantry Regiment controlled the outer fringe of hills south of Perryville. Colonel Howe's battalion had advanced to the vicinity of RJ 7080 and held all opposition. The objectives of the 1st Armored Division for the day were Perryville, the ground northeast of Mateur, and reconnaissance to the east.

Reconnaissance missions were assigned to the companies by Lt. Col. King. "A" Company was to reconnoiter to the east of the road between the 66 and 68 north coordinates. "B" Company had to reconnoiter northeast to the road between the 69 and 71 north coordinates, while "C" Company was assigned to reconnoiter to the east to the road between the 63.5 and 65.3 north coordinates.

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24 German prisoners had been captured that morning and were questioned by a II Corps interrogator on the hilltop of an Arab farm in the Command Group area. S-1 Officer, Lt. Morrison, was on the scene and received important information through the II Corps interpreter. The information was revealed by one prisoner, and parts of his testimony were corroborated by the others.. This material was immediately wired to G-2 of the 1st Infantry Division by the 701st C.P. Speed was needed to give the proper units the use of this information before the enemy could shift positions to make this knowledge useless, and forward observers of units informed were sent out immediately to take action.

The information extracted from the prisoners of war revealed that four 75mm howitzers were in a draw at 699691, four 20mm dual-purpose guns in a gully at 701692, two 88mm guns behind Hill 266, two 88's or 150mm guns in a wadi on the eastern slope, the C.P. of the 1st Battalion Barentkin Regiment on Hill 202, the Regimental C.P. for the Barentkins at Farm St. Jeanne, and approximately 1000 Hermann Goering SS Troops on Djebel Salkak.

Lt. Clarke reported in that vehicles, possibly tanks, were observed coming up a trail about 800 yards south of 672678. "A" Company got the information to the C.P. that the road and crossing from 642674 to 653674 were clear, but the sides were found to be mined. There was no confirmation on the road north and south.

Intercepts from the 1st Armored Division mentioned enemy tanks at 740770, and an 88mm gun in position at 7676. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Armored Division were said to be entering Ferryville with 9th Division reconnaissance troops engaging the enemy on barges east of the town. An enemy foot patrol was fired on at 665650 and a German gun battery was observed at 675599. New booby traps were discovered by 1st Armored Division troops in this area. One type was a "Paris" marked chocolate bar form consisting of a chocolate coating over a steel case. The

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poor quality due to  
the poor quality of  
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explosion would take place seven seconds after unwrapping. Another type of beehy trap was a first aid pouch with Red Cross markings. There was a seven second delay, after lifting, for the explosion. This information on enemy beehy traps was immediately passed on to all stations.

1st Infantry Division reported that Allied troops had the high ground looking down on Tunis. Massicault and Tebourba were cleared of the enemy except for stragglers.

A report from Lt. Morrison declared that there was no action in the 1st Armored Division sector. The S-2 half-track and personnel had departed at 0100 hours the previous night to act as liaison with 1st Armored Division Artillery. At 0155 hours, Lt. Morrison reported as follows: "OP" A was at 803903, 51st Reconnaissance Battalion at 708707, and had not contacted the enemy as yet. The German 15th Panzer Division was last reported on the road in the vicinity of 813734, and the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment was to swing left from its position to encircle the enemy. The 34th Infantry Division positions were at 609603 with British Forces at 905706.

This message was followed by another disclosing that the 1st Armored Division was drawing fire with an enemy OP believed to be at 676682.

"B" Company had reported all quiet in its area. It was then ordered to move forward until some kind of contact was made with the enemy. Reconnaissance Company patrols were ordered to comb the roads and vicinity, using the route leading north and northeast. Minesweepers were sent to "A" and "B" Companies and their reconnaissance patrols were to go forward either to contact the enemy or reach the 1st Armored Division sector.

A British radio message was intercepted and forwarded to 1st Infantry Division. The text read "Tunis water supply good. Harbor blocked by two ships. Sub cable demolished. Air fields on north of city good. No action in suburbs."

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explosion would take place seven seconds after untrapping. Another type of beehy trap was a first air push with Red Cross markings. There was a seven second delay, after lifting, for the explosion. This information on enemy beehy traps was immediately passed on to all stations.

1st Infantry Division reported that Allied troops had the high ground looking down on Tunis. Massicault and Tebourba were cleared of the enemy except for stragglers.

A report from Lt. Morrison declared that there was no action in the 1st Armored Division sector. The 3-2 half-track and personnel had been ordered at 2200 hours the previous night to act as liaison with 1st Armored Division Artillery. At 0755 hours, Lt. Morrison reported as follows: OC "A" was at 803903, 81st Reconnaissance Battalion at 708707, and had not contacted the enemy as yet. The German 15th Panzer Division was last reported on the road in the vicinity of 813734, and the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment was to swing left from its position to encircle the enemy. The 34th Infantry Division positions were at 609603 with British Forces at 905706.

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A British radio message was intercepted and forwarded to 1st Infantry Division. The text read: "Tunis water supply good. Harbor blocked by two ships. Sub cable demolished. Air fields on north of city need to be used in suburbs."

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Lt. Morrison reported at 1030 hours that two platoons of U.S. Infantry were on Hill at 739718 with the rest of the valley clear. An hour later, he told of the enemy not manning anti-tank guns which were in good condition. The Germans were more than willing to surrender and were giving themselves up in droves. Colonel Kay's outfit had been told not to stop, but to continue on. The enemy was trying to evacuate 12 miles east of Disorte.

Lt. Edson's "B" Company patrol, out with the infantry, reported picking up two prisoners of war. He had been informed by Arabs that the enemy had withdrawn 30 kilometers. "C" Company was clearing the road of mines to the 70 grid line, and reported that area 6667 was heavily beehy trapped. In addition, it stated that the 135th Infantry Regiment was at 730610.

Lt. Kennedy reported from the CP that our infantry patrols were all through the area on Hill 121 and to the south. As no resistance had been met, they were going to reconnoiter to the objective.

Lt. Morrison relayed a 1st Armored Division message to the Battalion C.P., mentioning that Division was moving to the vicinity of 7177. The tanks were engaged in mopping up as there were too many enemy troops in the rear for them to push ahead before pockets of resistance could be controlled.

"C" Company reported 30 enemy troops at 695627 and contacted British 46th Reconnaissance of the 46th Division at 724634. It then had to move its command track and relay station to maintain British contact. Proceeding cautiously because of mines, "C" Company discovered a new type of beehy trap near some German slit trenches; this was a black metal wash basin which exploded when moved.

On entering Tebourba, the British 1st Army found a prisoner of war cage in which Pvt. Ben Longworth, missing from "C" Company since May 4th, was incarcerated. He told of being captured when Lt. Hegman and he were reconnoitering on foot after leaving their vehicle. An enemy tossed hand grenade had injured the Lieutenant. It was later reported that Lt. Hegman

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was found in a hospital with injuries on his face, side, and leg when the British 8th Army entered Tunis.

At about this time, information was received telling that Lt. Burghardt, missing at El Quettar, was now a prisoner of war in a hospital in Italy. The nature of his wounds or injuries was as yet unknown.

On May 8th, Lt. Kennedy left for the Battalion OP at dawn. 1st Infantry Division had informed that enemy vehicles were seen at 815730 going north. II Corps added that plenty of men and arms were available to take care of them. Street fighting was reported in both Tunis and Bizerte. The 18th Infantry Regiment was dispersed west of the river between the 67.5 and 69.5 lines and the 26th Infantry Regiment was between the 65 and 67.5 lines west of the river. At 1650 hours, G-2 of the 1st Infantry Division reported that the British 6th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division were entering Tunis.

Thus, the last few days had been marked with Allied attacks on all fronts in Tunisia. Casualties were heavy, but gains had been made and great losses were inflicted on the enemy. Reports were pouring in of enemy defense lines buckling, and of the enemy retreating and trying to evacuate. Late reports showed that advance elements of French Corps Franc d'Afrique and the 9th Infantry Division were in Bizerte, the 1st Armored Division was in Ferryville, the British 1st and 8th Armies were in Tunis, and the French had pushed in to take Pent du Fahs. The U.S. 1st Infantry Division had made some advances in their sector but were held up by strong enemy rear guard resistance. Allied aircraft played an important part in these advances.

Lt. Olney, Liaison Officer, informed the Battalion that the 26th Infantry Regiment had attained its objectives. No resistance was met on Hill 189 that day, and it was continuing on to Hill 250. Lt. Morrison sent in the location of the 1st Armored Division Artillery at 7183. He later added that the Barenthin Regiment was reported on Hills 374, 226, 304, 234 and 393. In addition there were 1000 enemy troops and 200 vehicles

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airfield with five planes at 9085  
Reconnaissance Company reported considerable abandoned equipment at  
7075. Lt. Smith was said to be with friendly people. The enemy left  
toward the northeast at 2100 hours the previous night. Originally between  
1000 and 1500 men they left in groups of 50 and 100. Everything including  
machine guns and an undestroyed 88mm gun was at 67778.

"A" Company reported that two of its jeeps blew up in a minefield.  
Lt. Nelson was killed and Lt. McLeod and Sgt. Woolsey were injured.

"B" Company had reported their reconnaissance patrol at 67278. Later  
later "B" Company had reached a point from which they could see the  
Mediterranean Sea. The "B" Company reconnaissance patrol meanwhile found  
large amounts of enemy equipment at 678710. Everything that could be  
carried had been abandoned by the enemy.

Lt. Bondi was on a reconnaissance mission for "C" Company in the area  
of the first reconitered north to Matmur, and then he headed east to  
Sidi Errah. Proceeding southeast along the Tunis road for one kilometer  
he was hit by the fire of an 88mm gun at 773'6, at about 1630 hours. He then  
returned, going west on the road to about the 56 line and south to the O.P.  
at 794770 he had found two dual purpose 88mm guns lacking sights, but un-  
der a farm house at 735765, he discovered three tracks.

Lt. Kennedy left the O.P. at 1615 hours because his reports all day  
were being given. Lt. Col. King that evening ordered all companies to call  
their reconnaissance parties into the vicinity of the gun positions. In  
addition listening posts were to be established for the night.

Lt. Smith's report on arrival with the O.P. had discovered great  
amounts of equipment throughout the area of 65 to 70 north-south lines and 60  
to 71.5 east-west lines. A minefield was located in the west at 674770  
and there was a heavy booby trap concentration in the north. In the  
area of 60 north-south lines and 70 east-west lines an undestroyed 88mm gun was located.

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ci at 700095 Another 88mm gun was destroyed on May 8th. Smith added that the best route to this segment of the front was of Cheuigui.

Throughout this eventful day, the Battalion Command furnished all important information to 1st Infantry Division. This information only consisted of 701st reconnaissance reports, but also the information picked up by the Battalion Command half-track and message center, which was functioning perfectly.

Late reports showed the Allied Forces pushing on from Faria and Ricardo II Corps units entered Ferryville at 1600 hours and Allied Forces captured much ground and captured many prisoners, the enemy retreating into the mountains. In pursuing the bulk of the retreating enemy, our forward elements usually bypassed scattered pockets of the resisting enemy. Allied Air Forces continued their excellent work, cutting enemy avenues of escape which they had previously concentrated on the destruction of enemy supply lines.

On May 9th, Lt. Olney reported that the 3rd Infantry Division was making a push north and the 1st Infantry Division was driving south. 100 prisoners were reported taken by CC"3".

Lt. Morrison sent in the news that 22,500 prisoners were taken at the base Zebid Feninsula. Hundreds of prisoners of arms, ammunition, and other material were already taken here. The enemy was retreating into the mountains at 925000. At 1110 another call from the 701st reconnaissance group. German General turned in at CC"4" and was captured. The 701st reconnaissance group was in that sector. Firing north of the 701st reconnaissance group at 1110 hours.

Other reports of surrender came swiftly from the rear of the attacking groups of Germans wanted to give themselves up. The 701st reconnaissance group has certain sectors will consist of the 701st reconnaissance group. The 701st reconnaissance group was in that sector. Firing north of the 701st reconnaissance group at 1110 hours.

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and readily join their fellow "Supermen" in Allied prison camps.

It was May 18th when the 701st mission in the campaign ended, and the news of the tremendous successes scored brought rejoicing throughout the Battalion. A II Corps order that day detached the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion from the 1st Infantry Division and reverted the tank busters back to Corps supervision.

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The period from 10 May until 9 July was spent in a rest area 8 miles South of Mateur, and on the latter date the Battalion moved to a new bivouac area on the Mediterranean coast to await movement back to Oran, Algeria (or vicinity) to be re-equipped. This contemplated move finally came on the 2nd of August when the Battalion left this area. The wheeled vehicles made the trip overland, while tracked vehicles moved in series by train shipment. The wheeled vehicles arrived in the new bivouac area at Sebou, Algeria ( Fifth Army Tank Destroyer Training Center ) on August 6, and tracked vehicles arrived during the next few days. The now-obsolete 75mm SP's were immediately turned in to Ordnance, and training M-10's were drawn. The next month was devoted to training in this new equipment and in learning indirect artillery fire.

On the 5th of September the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion rejoined the 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of St. Barbe du Tholat, Algeria to prepare for further operations in combat.

In this area new M-10's were drawn and made-ready for action.

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TABLE 1      REPORT

OPERATIONAL REPORT  
A F O C S I, U S ARMY

OPERATIONAL

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Total.....13

OPERATIONAL

.....	36
.....	45
.....	20
.....	85
Total of Wounds Received	
.....	2
.....	2

Total.....178

TOTAL CASUALTIES.....191

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13 MAY - 31 OCT 43

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 251, c/o Postmaster, N. Y., N. Y.

18 November 1943.

**SUBJECT:** Operations Report  
TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. (thru channels).

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 13 May 1943 to 31 October 1943 is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is on file in the records of this Battalion.

JOHN G. ERSKINE  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn,  
Actg. Adjutant

\*\*\*\*\*  
OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - May 13 - Oct. 31, 1943.

With the end of hostilities in Tunisia in May 1943, the Battalion went into an administrative bivouac in the vicinity of Gasset et Tachia area, approximately 8 miles south of Matour. On May 11th a limited training schedule was published, and on May 15th four M-10 tank destroyers were borrowed from the 776th T.D. Bn. for the purpose of instructing all officers and men in the new weapon (the Battalion Commander had received information that the Battalion was, in the near future, to travel to Casablanca or vicinity to re-equip for coming operations).

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The next 6-8 weeks were spent in this area. Officers schools were conducted in indirect fire for artillery, several night problems were conducted, and general training was carried out. Much time was allowed for athletics, and Battalion teams made a creditable showing against teams from other units.

On July 9th the Battalion moved to a new area 11 miles east of Bizerte (Metline area). In this area, most of the time was spent in rest and relaxation on the beach. On July 21st the Battalion Commander received orders that the 701st was attached to the 5th Army, and would move back to FERROUJ, some 130 miles south of Oran, to receive its new equipment. On July 27th, 8 officers and 197 enlisted men left for Bizerte to escort L's back to Oran, and on August 1st 1 officer and 30 enlisted men were detailed for a similar mission. On this latter date tracked vehicles of the Battalion left for Mateur under Major Hedding for rail shipment to the new area, and wheeled vehicles departed in road convoy the following day under the command of Lt. Col. King.

The wheeled vehicles arrived at the new area (5th Army T. O. Training Center), some 10 miles south of Seboua, on the evening of August 6th. 36 M-10's were immediately drawn from the 636th T. O. An. (training equipment), and the 75mm SP's were turned in at Oran upon arrival. A strenuous training schedule was established, and the next month was spent in driver instruction, range firing (direct and indirect), maintenance instruction, and in Officers and NCO's Schools.

On August 27th the Battalion was dropped from assignment to TDTC and assigned to the 1st Armored Division (in bivouac at St. Barbe - near Oran). On September 7th, all M-10's in possession of the Battalion were turned over to TDTC. The next day, September 8th, movement was made to St. Barbe where

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an administrative bivouac was established. While in this area, new M-10's and M/T's and numerous wheeled vehicles were drawn. Here, as far as possible, the training was continued. Numerous schools were conducted, and several F.A.-T.O. cooperation problems were fired on the range at St. Barbe.

Effective October 8th, all training periods were devoted to preparation for movement to the new theater of operations, and on October 13th vehicles began to move to ports of embarkation (as both Battalion and Division vehicles were well spread on many ships in several convoys, all vehicular movements were small. By October 24th, a total of 63 vehicles had departed). The largest shipment was on the HMF Crater, which consisted of 24 officers and 256 enlisted men. This group arrived at Bayoli, Italy, on the 28th of October, disembarked, and moved into bivouac area 1/4 mile east of SUGGIVO, Italy. Thus, at the end of October 1942, half the Battalion was located in the new theater of operations, Italy; while the other half was still in the old Theater, Africa.

*Albert B. Howard*

ALBERT B. HOWARD  
Capt., 701st Tank Bstyr. Bn.

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 251, c/o Postmaster, N. Y., N.Y.

1-30 Nov 1943

4 December 1943.

**SUBJECT:** Operations Report  
**TO :** Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 November 1943 to 30 November 1943 is herewith submitted.
2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is on file in the records of this Battalion.
3. Previous operations report submitted to and including 31 October 1943.

**DOWNGRADED TO:  
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BY AUTHORITY OF TAG JES

*Wm H Bateman Jr*  
WM. H. BATEMAN  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant

----- \* \* \* \* \*  
Date Initials

**OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION**  
Period - 1 Nov. - 30 Nov., 1943

November 1943 opened with the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion in a period of transition. Approximately half the Battalion had arrived in the new theater of operations, Italy, while the remainder was either in Africa or in the process of shipment.

Persomel in Italy were in bivouac approximately 1/4 mile east of SUCCIVO, and there awaited arrival of equipment and the remainder of the persomel. Physical conditioning was the order of the day.

On Nov. 7 vehicles began to arrive. Seven wheeled vehicles arrived on this date followed on the 8th by 15 wheeled vehicles, 12 M-10's ("B" Co.), and 3 motorcycles. These vehicles were accompanied by 2 officers and 111 enlisted men. Again on the 11th, 25 wheeled vehicles and 10 trailers arrived with one officer and 30 enlisted men.

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The 1st Tank Group held a CPX on 12 November, the 701st participating; all staff vehicles moved north of CAPUA on the problem, returning to the area at 1700 hours.

All "B" Company vehicles, except for one T-2 retriever, being present, the company was alerted on the morning of the 13th for further movement with CC"B" of the 1st Armored Division. This movement began at 2200 hours this date, and the company closed in bivouac in the Pignatara area(1st Armored Assembly Area north of the Volturno) at 2350 hours. One officer and nine enlisted men also arrived in the Battalion area this day with 7 wheeled vehicles and 11 trailers.

The following day, Sunday, Church Services were held in the area. Two officers and 42 enlisted men with 34 wheeled vehicles and 6 trailers also arrived this day.

During the following week a total of 28 wheeled vehicles, 16 M-10's, 1 T-2 retriever, 10 motorcycles, 3 officers and 73 enlisted men arrived in the Battalion area.

On the 22nd of November the Battalion moved from the SUCCIVO area to the 1st Armored Division forward assembly area in the vicinity of PIGNATARO, where "B" Company was already in bivouac. On the following day another CPX was held by the 1st Tank Group, the Battalion again participating. Seven M-10's and 15 enlisted men arrived this day, followed by 1 M/T and one enlisted man on the 24th. Thus, all vehicles, except two T-2's, were present and available for duty.

Mud had been holding front line operations on the 5th Army front to a minimum, but on the night of the 24th information came from Division Artillery (of 1st Armored Division) of a proposed allied offensive of a local nature (MT. CAMINO and vicinity - map coordinate G 953081, Map - Italy 1/50,000, sheet 160 II) to be undertaken simultaneously by the British and American troops. The Battalion, attached to Division Artillery, was

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to be in support of elements of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division. Thus, on the morning of the 25th the Bn. C.O. and Exec., Company Commanders and Platoon Leaders of "A", "B", and "C" Companies left in a party to choose gun positions in the vicinity of LE CAVE (coordinate H-0005, Map-Italy 1/50,000, sheet 161-III). Said party returned in the evening of the same day.

On the following day, Capt. Morrison and one officer from each line company left for the forward area (vicinity LE CAVE) for the purpose of preparing gun positions, roads to gun positions, and laying of telephone lines for proposed operation in artillery role. All work to be in coordination with 1st AD Artillery (In the coming operation, although the gun companies were to be under control of the Bn. Commander, all fire missions of an artillery nature were to be fired through the FDC's of the 1st AD Artillery Bns. "A" Company was to be attached to the 91st F.A.Bn., "B" Company to the 68th F.A.Bn., and "C" Company to the 27th F.A.Bn.).

The 27th and 28th of November were spent in preparation for combat and in loading the M-10's with 2 units of fire. Also, on these days details of men were sent to the LE CAVE area to assist in the preparation of gun positions (all positions were dug into the side of the hill to offer the greatest possible security for personnel against expected heavy enemy counterbattery). On the night of the 28th 13 ~~2 1/2~~ truck loads of 3" HE ammo were sent to the forward area, and the ammunition dumped near the gun positions under cover of darkness (the intensive rains of the preceding days made this mission a difficult one).

The two T-2 retrievers of the Battalion arrived on the morning of the 29th from Africa. This brought the Battalion to full combat strength (all vehicles, men, and equipment having been shipped from Africa to Italy without loss due to enemy sea action). Seven more truck loads of ammunition were sent to the forward area and unloaded this night; also the Bn. Commander's H/T, the S-2 H/T, two company command H/T's, and 3 M-10's (the latter, one

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M-10 from each company for registration purposes). Due to the bad condition of the area inlet road, and the intense rains of the preceding days, the M-10's were left in front of positions to be moved in as soon as possible after daylight (during the whole preparation for the operation all work and vehicular movement was at night as far as possible, due to the fact that our positions were in full view of the enemy).

The following morning the M-10's of "A" and "B" Company were placed in the prepared positions (a "C" Company M-10 became mired in the soft mud, and was thus unable to register this day). Visibility was poor and the artillery FO's were unable to observe in the morning, so registration of guns was postponed until late in the afternoon.

At 1800 hours (Nov. 30th) the Battalion (A,B,C Co's. and Command Group) moved from bivouac in the PIGNATARO area (Bn. trains and Rcn. Co. were left in rear area), and arrived at LE CAVE at 1200 hours, midnight. The movement was made in complete blackout, and the roads were muddy and slippery. After leaving the main road, it was necessary for personnel to dismount from vehicles to lead the way. Two M-10's of "B" Company threw tracks coming into the area, and blocked the road for some time.

At dawn, the guns moved into their prepared positions.

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Company locations on 1 Dec. 1943 were as follows:

- 1st Platoon - 00313 - 05069
- "A Company - 2nd Platoon - 00408 - 05481
- 3rd Platoon - 00339 - 05282
- "B" Company- 00543 - 08836
- 1st Platoon - 00883 - 06229
- "C" Company- 2nd Platoon - 00853 - 06049
- 3rd Platoon - 00808 - 05862

Map - Italy 1/50,000, sheet 161-III.

*Albert B. Morrison*  
ALBERT B. MORRISON  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
S-2

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**701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION**



1 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Operations report

TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 December 1943 to 31 December, 1943, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is on file in the records of this Battalion.

3. Previous operations report submitted to and including 30 November 1943.

**DOWNGRADED TO:  
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BY AUTHORITY OF TAG JES

*William H. Bateman Jr*

WILLIAM H. BATEMAN, JR.  
Capt., 701st TD Bn.  
Adjutant

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Date

*HSJ*  
Initials

**OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION**

Period - 1 Dec. - 31 Dec., 1943

Active operations were to take place in the Mt. CAMINO - MEDIANO area of Italy, in which the 701st Tank Destroyer Bn. was to take part. The Battalion was to be attached to Div. Arty., 1 AD for the operation in support of the 36th Infantry Division. Each company of the battalion was to fire its missions through the FO's and the FDC's of 1 AD artillery battalions ("A" Co. through the 91st F.A. Bn., "B" Co. through the 68th F.A. Bn., and "C" Co. through the 27th F.A. Bn.).



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The area was mountainous, the terrain difficult. The frequent rains had made all vehicles roadbound. The area assigned to the Battalion was to the right and left of the small unimproved road running generally north from the village of LE CAVE (map Italy 1/50,000, sheets 160-II and 161-III) (009-062 to 006053), and all positions were along a narrow ridge line. Howitzers could have occupied the ravines below, but due to the flat trajectory of the 3" gun, it was necessary to place all guns near the crest of the ridge; this gave our guns no 'flash' defilade and little protection. The counter-battery of the enemy was expected to be heavy, thus the Battalion Commander deemed it necessary to dig all our guns into position. The entrance road also needed improvement in order to withstand the 32 ton load of the M-10. The latter days of November were, therefore, spent in the preparation of this area for our guns, and in building up a supply of ammunition near the gun positions (all this was satisfactorily completed in time to receive the guns, in spite of the fact that the prospective area was in full view of the enemy).

The Battalion moved forward to occupy the new positions on the night of 31 Nov. - 1 Dec., and arrived in the Le Cave area at 2330 hours. All "E" Company M-10's satisfactorily proceeded down the entrance road and halted near their positions (due to the heavy rains and the blackness of the night, the company commander decided to keep his guns on the road until first light of dawn, then move into position). "B" Company's guns proceeded down the entrance road, and the company commander began taking his guns into position. The last two M-10's of "B" Company, however, threw tracks on the road, and for some hours blocked the road so that "A" Company could not enter. Pioneer

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construction work remained this, and by 0800 hrs. 1 Dec. all but three of the Battalion's 36 guns were in position (the "B" Co. registration gun was wired, and although "A" Co. succeeded in getting one of their two M-10's with thrown tracks into position, another gun became wired in the mud).

The 1st of December was spent in camouflage of guns, further preparation of positions, and in getting the wired guns out. By evening 35 of the 36 guns of the Battalion were ready to fire (one "B" Co. gun was still out of action), and the gun positions had become veritable "pill boxes". The guns were so well dug-in, and reinforced with sandbags, that only the turrets of the M-10's were in any way exposed.

On the night of the 1st, the Battalion Commander informed all company commanders that the first artillery fires by our guns were to be laid down at 1030 hours, 2 December ("D" Day). The British and Canadians to our south and west had moved forward on 1 December (D-1).

Registration of base piece had not been completed for either "A" or "C" company. A further attempt was made to do this on the morning of the 2nd, but was not a complete success. This proved something that we had long suspected - the need of a smoke shell for the 3" gun. If Tank Destroyer Battalions are to be called upon to perform missions of self-propelled artillery, they must be provided with an adequate smoke shell (this especially holds true in mountainous country).

On December 2nd the "B" Co. gun was finally placed in position at 1600 hrs. Thus, by 1030 hrs. 2nd date, all guns of the Battalion were ready to fire.

Artillery missions by all companies began at 1030 hrs., and during the next 24 hours the Bn. fired a total of 5367 rounds in support of the Infantry attack (more than the total expended throughout the entire Tunisian Campaign when the Battalion was employed as a T. D. unit).

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Ammunition and supply trucks made roads through the area impassable, and as the severe rains continued, Recon. Co. was used for the continuing repair and upkeep of the roads. Yet, the roads through "C" Co. remained impassable, and it was necessary to requisition mules and oxen from the nearby village to haul ammunition to the gun positions.

Both the rains and fire missions continued for the next several days. On the 4th of December the road between La Cave and the main highway washed out, and remained so for a day. On the same day all bridges on entry roads to Battalion Trains washed out. Thus it was necessary for the same supply trucks to remain <sup>IN</sup> the forward area over-night.

All fire of our guns being directed by the 1st Armored F.A. Bn., difficulty was experienced by the Bn. Hq. in securing facts concerning the fire missions or the results therefrom. Most of the Battalion Missions, however, were on pre-arranged concentration areas; a few counterbattery missions were fired.

Rains continued on the 5th, and this day it was necessary to put all available personnel working on the road system. More oxen and mules were requisitioned for use by "C" Co. Fire missions continued through the day.

Movement to new forward positions, vicinity MICHARD, was contemplated. The company positions were surveyed by the respective F.A. Bns., and gun emplacements were constructed with the use of a Bulldozer.

On the night of the 6th, the 1st Platoon of "A" Co. moved forward into their new positions (Base Piece 99336-11423; sheet 168-III, Italy 1/50,000). One M-10 of 1-A threw a track in the old area, and could not

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move with the balance of the platoon. The remainder of "A" Co. moved the following night. A new infantry attack was planned for the 8th, and at 0530 hrs. the artillery preparation began, and during the day the Bn. expended 1832 rounds.

"C" Company's new positions were as follows: Base piece locations, 1-A-95347 - 111224; 2-A 99520 - 109824; 3-A 99590 - 110794.

During the next 24 hours some 3002 rounds were expended by the Bn. On the 10th, the 2nd and 3rd platoons of "C" Co. reconnoitered for CP positions, and early the next morning an CP was established by Lt. Rithman, 2nd "C", at 996145. On this date "C" Co. prepared for movement to the forward positions, and at 1630 hrs. began movement (new positions vic. 996145).

On the 11th the "C" Co. located several enemy guns, and acted as CP for the fire missions. Only 1141 rounds of ammo. were expended during the 24 hour period.

Again on the 13th, little fixing was done. Five rounds were expended in registration. At 1530 hours the 1st platoon of "A" Co. was shelled by enemy artillery, 10 rounds falling in the area. Personal equipment was damaged, but there were no casualties.

On the 14th, Lt. Rithman established an CP at 992217 to direct the fire of "C" Co. (said company now being fired under Bn. control). At 1710 hours this date the "C" Co. area was shelled by enemy artillery - 25 rounds landed in the area. Two men were killed and 12 wounded.

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The next day the Aca. Co. acted as F.O. for two missions fired by the 68th A.A. Bn. and one mission fired by "B" Co., 701st. This mission by "B" Co. was the last firing to be done by the 701st in the operation, for orders from II Corps prevented any more firing due to the shortage of 3" ammo, and the desire to conserve existing ammo.

The Aca. Co. nevertheless remained out the following day, and Lt. Withman directed 5 fire missions for the 68th A.A. Bn. - 4 on enemy guns, and one on enemy troops.

At 1100 hours on the 17th the "C" Companies moved back to old positions in the La Cava area. This day Lt. Withman directed one fire mission for the 68th on an enemy gun position.

The operation had been extremely hard on the equipment of the Battalion. The guns, however, had held up extremely well. An average of around 400 rounds per gun were fired, and only a minor maintenance and part replacement was needed. The weather had taken its toll on the vehicles, though, and on the 19th a check-up on all vehicles began. This continued for the next several days.

On the 19th, Lt. Withman attempted to establish an O.P. on Hill 1205 at 981178, but was unable to do so because of heavy enemy shellfire. He was still unable to do so the following day.

A forward ammo. dump for coming operations was established at 7-901119, and by the 20th some 4750 rounds of 3" ammo. had been placed in this dump.

The Aca. Co. on Hill 1205 was tentatively established on the 21st, and Lt. McKnight relieved Lt. Withman on the 21st, but rains on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd prevented any observations due to the poor visibility, and on the afternoon of

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the 23rd the CP was relieved, pending better weather. The rains continued through the 24th.

Church services were held in the Battalion area on the 25th (Christmas Day) and Great Britain was served for the noon meal in the Company kitchens. Guard duty and other necessary duties were performed during the day.

On the 26th of December, the Battalion Commander was ordered to report to Headquarters, Combat Command "B", 1st Amer. Division. Upon his return a meeting was held of the company commanders and the Staff officers. The following information was given: The 701st was to be attached to Task Force Kilo, commanded by Brig. General Allen, for a coming operation - the mission of the Battalion to be essentially anti-tank. Details of the operation were explained to the company commanders.

On the 29th the Bn. C.O. and Company Commanders of "A" and "C" Companies went to vicinity of 9443 to reconnoiter for routes and gun positions for the coming operation. The reconnaissance, however, was incomplete and was continued on the 30th. On the latter date, the "B" Company Platoon Leaders reconnoitered for positions vicinity 950165.

On the night of the 29th a message was received which notified the Bn. of activation of TFA, the 701st being included among the troops of the organization. A Liaison Officer was sent to HQ, TFA.

On the 30th, gun positions and an assembly area for Hq. Co. were selected. Lt. Boerning was sent to the 15th Inf. Regimental C.P. for the purpose of accompanying the infantry night patrol on reconnaissance.

Lt. Lewis conducted a survey of the proposed "C" Company positions to establish an orienting line on the 31st, and "C" Co. gun positions were dug with the aid of a Bulldozer. There were heavy rains throughout the day

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changing to snow during the night of 31 Dec. The month ended with the Bn. occupying identical positions it occupied at the beginning of December with preparation being made for movement forward for future contemplated operations upon receipt of orders from IV.

*Albert B. Morrison*  
ALBERT B. MORRISON  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
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APPENDIX -

Total Anno. expenditure for month of Dec. 1943 - - - - - 15625

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Battle Casualty Report -

Farovick, Chas. I	Sgt.	36022518	KIA
Branett, James E.	Pvt.	34281734	KIA
Rice, Frank A.	Sgt.	6661048	MIA
Kietl, Charles E.	Opl.	32033603	MIA
Silvan, Gordon B.	Col.	35003525	MIA
Jokerst, Leonard L.	T/S	37132139	MIA
Bradley, George T.	Pfc.	25213392	MIA
Bushkie, Alfred J.	Pfc.	30204611	MIA
Holl, Arthur F.	Pfc.	2471716	MIA
Mullen Sr., John F.	Pvt.	32044111	MIA
Wounded, and returned to duty			
Olson, Carl	T/S	6850203	MIA
Ferris, William	T/S	13061298	MIA
Dixon, Robert	T/S	31089101	MIA
Smith, Robert	T/S	33067362	MIA

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701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 251, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

1 February 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 January 1944 to 31 January 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 31 December 1943.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Jesse B. Wray*  
JESSE B. WRAY  
Capt., 701st TD Bn.,  
Actg. Adjutant.

\*\*\*\*\*

OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 Jan. - 31 Jan., 1944

Company locations, at beginning of period:

- "A" Company: 00100-00202.
- "B" Company: 00513-00636.
- "C" Company: 00650-00750.

Map - Italy 1/50000, sheet 161 III

The year 1944 opened with the Battalion in position in the vicinity of LA SAGE, ITALY. An offensive was brewing for the sector, and for this operation the Battalion was attached to the recently organized Task Force Allen, whose mission was to be the capture of the German strongpoint Hill Perchio (21410 - map 1/50000, Italy, Sheet 160-III).

January 1st being New Year's Day, and also marking the beginning of the 20th consecutive month of overseas duty for the Battalion, the day's activities were

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at a minimum. A turkey dinner was served in the mess. The morning was a black one, with a high wind and heavy rains which later changed to snow, and a continual maintenance of the road was necessary. This job fell mainly to the Reconnaissance Company, who for lack of a suitable mission during the past operation had been serving as a semi-service company for the Gun Companies.

Positional areas for the gun companies were chosen from the available maps. All positions were such that the guns could support the advance of the Infantry on Porchie. A and B companies were for direct fire, while the C company positions were chosen for indirect fire. Reconnaissance parties from each company went out in the morning of the 1st, to make an actual choice of these positions. The next day construction parties went out from each company to prepare positions in the chosen areas, and the Bn. Survey party began a survey of the 'C' company batteries. The base piece of each Platoon of 'C' company moved into the new positions on the night of the 2nd, and registration began the following morning ('C' company surveyed positions: C-1, 96602-11706; C-2, 96365-11603; C-3, 96404-11403. Base point registered on - 91681555. All coordinates from Sheet II). On the 3rd Recon. Company began an infiltration movement from the LE CAVE area to a new bivouac in the vicinity of 000108. In the afternoon all construction work was discontinued on the B company positions, the fact that the new 'B' company area was in the 34th Infantry Division sector being the cause. Plans were altered, and it was decided that B company would follow the advance of the 753rd Tank Battalion along Route #6, and would occupy direct fire positions at 942160 and 942157. The area still being in enemy hands, a reconnaissance was impossible; and areas chosen were only approximate.

On the night of the 3rd-4th, the remainder of 'C' company moved forward. The Command Group moved on the 4th, closing in bivouac at the area 969121. 'B' and 'A' companies moved on the night of the 4th. Bad weather made it impossible for 'A' company to get into their positions that night, so they pulled into an inter-

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mediate assembly area just off route #6 at the forward end of Mt. Lungo. Here they spent the entire day of the 5th, unable to move in the daylight hours. On the night of the 5th, with the aid of construction crews, 'A' company was able to get two platoons into position, the other platoon going into an assembly area in the vicinity of the company CP.

CP's were manned by Lt. McKnight and Capt. Morrison for the TFA operation, and on the 5th, 'C' company expended 515 rounds in indirect fire. During the same period 'B' company expended 87 rounds in direct fire. On this day the 'A' company area was heavily shelled and 10 casualties were inflicted on the company. On the 6th 'C' company expended 908 rounds in indirect fire, and 'A' Company fired 58 rounds in direct fire at targets at the base of Porchio. Capt. Whitsit, C.O. Co. 'B', was wounded and evacuated; Lt. Neeleman assumed command of the company.

On the morning of the 7th, Lt. Hudson's platoon of 'A' company fired in support of British units attacking Hill Cedro (Approx. 1000 yds to the South of Porchio), and took enemy pillboxes and self-propelled guns under his fire. A few minutes later the platoon fired on an enemy anti-tank gun at the base of Porchio. At least two self-propelled guns were destroyed, and in addition, a number of enemy pillboxes were known to have been damaged. As a result of this fire, the platoon drew heavy enemy counterbattery from a battery of Nebelwerfers and several direct fire guns. No damage was done to the platoon, however. A total of 66 rounds of HE and 6 rounds APC were expended. During the day, 'C' company fired 551 rounds in indirect fire.

The following morning, the 3rd platoon of 'B' company occupied positions at 932161 (They were to occupy these positions during hours of daylight only). During the day this platoon was attacked three times by enemy aircraft with no damage. In that period 'C' company fired 645 rounds HE and 9 rounds of smoke.

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On the morning of the 9th, the 2nd platoon of 'B' company moved to new positions vicinity 932104, occupying the area under the same plan as that for the 3rd platoon. A 'C' company party left early in the morning to reconnoiter for positions in the vicinity of 928151 (Positions were to be chosen for 6 guns, said positions to be occupied at dawn 10 Jan). 'A' company was ordered to move back into an area near 'C' company for indirect fire, and spent the day in preparing their outlet roads for the movement. The Battalion survey party surveyed the proposed positions. The 'A' company area was shelled intermittently throughout the day, but no damage was done. During the period 'C' company expended 1077 rounds of ammunition.

Road conditions made it impossible for 'A' company to move back as scheduled that night, so road maintenance continued throughout the night, continuing into the next day. The 6 'C' company guns moved into anti-tank positions at 928151 as scheduled. On the 10th, 'C' company expended a total of 244 rounds.

'A' company closed in bivouac in the vicinity of 965120. The movement out of the anti-tank positions had been so difficult that two full nights were required to prepare a route. Positions were prepared for an artillery role, and a bulldozer, furnished by the engineers, did much of the work. That afternoon, 'C' company fired 33 rounds of smoke in a test of the 3" smoke shell. Officers of the 602 Ordnance were on hand to report the results. On the following day, 'C' company expended 106 rounds of HE and 33 smoke shells, while a survey of 'B' company was begun for use as artillery.

January 12th saw the completion of a survey of 'A' company positions, and their occupation by the company. Two OP's were established on Mt. Porchia by Lt. Summers, Recon. Company, at 917163 and 915157 while Lt. McKnight shifted his OP on Mt. Maggiore from 936134 to 945147. 'C' company continued to fire ~~ammunition~~ with 177 rounds of HE and 23 rounds of smoke <sup>expended</sup> for the day with 'A' company expending 66 HE shells. In general, however, things were quiet on the TFA and 34th Division sectors.

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TFA was dissolved and its units passed under the command of the 36th Division on the morning of January 13. The 701st was attached to 1st Armored Division Artillery to support the fire of the 34th Division. One 'C' company M-10 went to the rear for repair. 6 'C' company guns and 6 guns of 'B' company pulled back to artillery positions from their anti-tank locations. The survey of 'A' and 'B' companies had been completed by noon, and the preparation of 'B' company's position was continued. In the day's firing, 'C' fired 211 HE shells and 8 rounds of smoke while 'A' company shot 135 rounds of HE.

Captain Clarke was out on a reconnaissance of the 135th Infantry sector in the morning of January 14. One 'A' company gun moved back to the service echelon to have the radiator repaired. The Battalion expended 687 rounds of HE that day. At 1700 hours, a letter from Headquarters, II corps, was received, dated 12 January 1944, detaching the 701st T.D. Bn. from 1st Armored Division and attaching the Battalion to II Corps.

The Battalion armorer inspected the guns of 1st Platoon, 'A' company, and found a small adjustment necessary on one gun. All the others were in satisfactory condition. A Recon. company patrol worked to the 139th Brigade (Br.), 141st Infantry Reg't., 135th Infantry Reg't. Headquarters, and got within a mile of Cassino. The Battalion fired 339 rounds of HE for January 15th.

The following day, the 36th F.A. Battalion Chaplain held Catholic Church Services in the immediate area of the Battalion CP. Lt. Kennedy, Recon. Company, established and manned an OP on Hill 780 at 919231. A reconnaissance was carried out for an OP on Mt. Trocchio, but the post was not established. Another reconnaissance was made of routes from the present positions to a contemplated position, northwest of Mt. Porchia, off Highway #6. The routes were marked but the area needed sweeping. Maintenance was emphasized through the Battalion that day.

Lt. Lewis and his survey party ran control points to a contemplated gun posi-



tions between Porchia and Trocchio on the morning of the 17th. The Company Commanders proceeded to the vicinity of 903167 on a reconnaissance for gun positions while maintenance of vehicles and equipment continued throughout the day in preparation for the move. 'B' company expended 16 rounds registering. Maintenance and preparation for the movement continued through the following day. A reconnaissance for a Battalion CP site proved unsuccessful, but Recon. company reported that CP positions had been chosen on Porchia and Trocchio. Despite slow progress, preparation of gun positions were carried out through the day. Recon's Pioneer Platoon was occupied with sweeping the area for mines.

A successful reconnaissance for a Battalion CP was made on the morning of January 19, and the location picked was on the San Vittore road at 934165. Preparation of gun positions continued and the survey, except for one platoon of 'C' company, was completed. The Porchia and Trocchio OP's were established, and Lt. Kennedy went to the 139th Brigade (Br.) as liaison for their operations. At 0200 hours the next day, 'A', 'B', and 'C' companies moved into their new areas, and OP's were established and manned on Porchia at 913157, Trocchio at 883174, and Cedro at 902145. Vehicles of Command Group moved by infiltration, one vehicle every 20 minutes, to establish the new CP.

One 'A' company M-10 received a direct hit from enemy shell-fire at 0200 hours of January 21. There were four enlisted men casualties. A reconnaissance party covered the Rapido River area seeking approaches to and across the river. During the day the Battalion sent 3584 rounds into enemy positions.

A heavy smoke screen, which had been laid over the valley for the past three days, made visibility and, consequently, OP operations exceedingly difficult. Lt. Kennedy was out on reconnaissance to the Rapido River area. During the day of January 22, the Battalion expended 4228 rounds. Only 616 rounds were directed at German lines the following day, and there was a general shelling of the valley by enemy guns. Slight damage resulted to some light vehicles in the Battalion CP area,

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but there were no casualties.

Visibility from CP's continued to be poor on January 24th due to the smoking of the valley by the engineers. Lt. Kennedy was out on a reconnaissance of routes in the forward area but there was no firing during the day. The 701st Trains moved up to the area of '999105. Lt. Kennedy continued his reconnaissance activities the following day when he attempted to locate a route from Highway #6 to the area northwest of Mt. Trocchio. However, his efforts were unsuccessful and it was concluded that no such route exists. A total of 4178 rounds were fired at the enemy that day by the Battalion guns.

On January 26, for the first time since the Battalion had moved into its present area, the valley was not smoked and the OP's could observe for registration of the companies. All the companies registered and 99 rounds were fired that day. Lt. Kennedy made contact with the British in X Corps sector. 1732 rounds were expended the following day, and Reconnaissance patrols contacted the British on the left of the 36th Division sector and the 34th Division troops to the right of the 36th Division sector during the day. 3026 rounds were fired at the enemy on January 28, and this dropped to 465 rounds the following day. Lt. Kennedy contacted the British in the Vandra sector.

Church services were conducted by Chaplain Strevig in the Battalion CP area on the morning of January 30. 1354 rounds were fired that day as 5th Army attacks brought good results. All companies prepared to move forward in support of "CC" B should a bridgehead be established across the Rapido River.

The positions of the Battalion on 31 January 1944 were as follows:

Bn. CP - 934105  
Recon & Trains - 000108  
A-1 - 91309 - 16268  
A-2 - 91240 - 16392  
A-3 - 91182 - 16504  
B-1 - 90830 - 16276  
B-2 - 90650 - 16218  
C-1 - 91602 - 16673  
C-2 - 91404 - 16678  
C-3 - 91609 - 16471

*Albert B. Morrison*  
ALBERT B. MORRISON  
Capt., 701st T. D. Bn.,  
S-2

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Appendix \*\*\*\*\*

Total ammunition expenditure for the month of January 1944 -- 25733 rounds.

Casualty Report -

WHITSIT, Robert	Captain	MIA
RITHEMAN, Charles	2nd Lt.	SWA
HEISBERGER, Chas.	S/Sgt.	SWA
OLSON, Henry A.	Sgt.	LWA
DWORSKI, Frank A.	Corp.	LWA
GLYNN, James A.	T/5	LWA
RHOTERS, William	Pvt.	SWA
COPE, William R.	Pvt.	SWA
KEENAN, John R.	Pfc.	SWA
FARBER, Daniel	Pvt.	SWA
KEEN, Edwin G.	Pvt.	SWA
BUHRMANN, Louis	Pvt.	SWA
REPKA, Loleslaws	Pvt.	LWA
WILCOXON, John L.	Pvt.	LWA
NIELMAN, Raymond	Pfc.	LWA

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Month of Mar 44

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1 April 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 March 1944 to 31 March 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 29 Feb 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Jesse B. Gray*  
JESSE B. GRAY  
Capt., 701st TD Bn.,  
Adjutant.

*W. A. ... Col. L. H. ...*  
14 Nov 43

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 March - 31 March 1944

Location of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy 1/50,000, Sheets  
158 I II III IV GSOS  
4229

Bn. CP:	867227
Bn. Co:	867224
"A" Co:	865229 (9 guns in assembly area)
"B" Co:	978172 (12 guns anti-tank reserve)
"C" Co:	943269 (10 guns in anti-tank reserve)

Beginning of the month the battalion continued its operations in VI Corps reserve. The morning of the 1st March "C" company was attached to the 601st TD Bn. to strengthen the anti-tank defenses in the 3rd Infantry Division sector. "C" company was held in reserve in indirect fire positions. The dispositions of the guns were 2 guns 949296, 2 guns 972288, 2 guns 941239,

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supervised by the 69th AFA Bn. Rcn. company set up an OP in the vicinity of 007201 to observe the fires for "B" company in the SSF sector.

Rcn. company on 7 March moved the CP in SSF sector from vicinity 007201 to vicinity 007188.

"A" company after 12 days of maintenance, rehabilitation, and training was placed in Corps reserve on 7 March. Plans were formulated to relieve "B" company 645 TD Bn. in direct fire positions by "A" company 701st TD Bn. in vicinity of 876283. The relief was planned to take place on the night of 8-9 and 9-10 March. A night reconnaissance was accomplished by Rcn. company on the night 7-8 March of forward direct fire positions to be occupied by "A" company. Capt. Clarke of Rcn. company made the reconnaissance and recommended that guns can reach houses in vicinity of 876283 and 883283 to occupy direct fire positions in the houses.

The night of 7-8 March "C" company operating with the 601st TD Bn. in the 3rd Inf. Div sector relieved one platoon of "B" company 601st TD Bn. The anti-tank position consisted of night and day direct fire positions; night positions 2 guns at 983298; day positions 2 guns at 985302. Two guns were held in reserve in the vicinity of 974287.

8 March battalion contacted the British Recce, 6th Armd. Infantry, and 645th TD Bn. in conjunction with "A" company's TD guns occupying direct fire positions in vicinity of 879283 and 883283 on night of 8-9 March. After sundown on 8 March on night of 8-9 March the pioneer platoon moved out to build a road and fortify positions to be occupied by the "A" company guns in the vicinity of 879283 and 883283. The work by the pioneer platoon was completed by 2200 hrs and 2 guns of "A" company closed into direct fire positions at 2345 hrs without an incident. The following morning, 9 March, 6 guns of "A" company closed in indirect fire positions in vicinity of 862253 and 4 guns remained in vicinity of 865229 held their position

in preparation to occupy direct fire positions in vicinity of 878275, 878273, 872209, and 876209 on the night of 9-10 March.

At noon 9 March "C" company and 3rd plat. "B" company attached to 001st TD Bn. reverted back to the control of 1st Arm. Division. "C" company was notified and alerted for movement at 2000 hrs on night of 9-10 March. The relief to be effected by 001st TD Bn. and to begin at dusk.

Liaison was established with 001st TD Bn. and preparations were made for the relief and movement of "C" company and the 3rd platoon of "B" company. The 3rd platoon of "B" company was moved to an assembly area in vicinity of 973195. The following morning the 3rd platoon was moved into indirect fire positions in vicinity of 976218. "C" company, upon relief by 001st TD Bn. moved to assembly area in the vicinity of 954214 where it spent the following ten days on maintenance and rest.

The following three days, 10th through 13th March, were quiet and not much activity transpired in the battalion. The whole extent of the activity was firing of 18 guns in indirect fire positions; 6 "A" company guns, 12 "B" company guns, and manning of OP's at 908272 and 876267. The OP at 908272 observed a mission for 938 FA Bn (155 Hows) on enemy artillery battery. The area was well covered and battery neutralized.

The afternoon of 13 March liaison was established with 5th (Br.) Inf. Division by Capt. A.B. Morrison, equipped with radio and messenger. Capt. Morrison worked with the British R.A. coordinating the fires of 6 "A" Co. guns and 12 "B" Co. in support of the 5th (Br.) Inf. Div.

Night of 13-14 March "B" company moved from indirect fire positions in vicinity of 909158 and 976218 to vicinity 806247. "B" company put in position 2 six gun batteries in vicinity of 861000-24560 and 861000-24568 to support the Br. R.A. of 5th (Br.) Inf. Div. "B" company's FDC coordinated

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and handled fires for their two 6 gun batteries, and one 6 gun battery of "A" company.

Rcn. company set up OP's in vicinity of 903270, 876267, and 883283 the morning of 15 March. The OP's and "A" and "B" companies worked in FM channel of Rcn., receiving sensings on observed targets direct from forward observers. Fire missions requiring heavier caliber guns were relayed from Rcn. company command half-track via telephone to 938th FA Bn. (155 Hows) or 91st AFA Bn. (105 SP Hows). Lt. Boemming supplemented the ground OP's by arranging for air OP flights with 1st AD artillery Piper Cubs. The ground OP's remained in same vicinity through the close of the period.

Six guns of "A" company and 12 guns of "B" company remained in indirect fire positions from 13 March through the close of the period. The night of 20-21 March the 6 guns of "A" company which were in direct fire positions moved to the vicinity of 861249 into indirect fire positions. The move of these 6 guns of "A" company into indirect fire positions made four 6 gun batteries in indirect fire positions. The guns of "A" and "B" company were tied-in with the 91st AFA Artillery. "A" and "B" companies remained in indirect fire positions through the end of the period.

Night of 18-19 March the 1st platoon of "C" company moved out from vicinity of 954214 to SSF sector to support a contemplated attack by our troops. Before the platoon reached the assigned rendezvous in the SSF sector prior to attack, the attack was called off and the platoon was ordered back to company assembly area in vicinity of 954214. The following morning 19 March "C" company reconnoitered the SSF sector for artillery positions. Positions were found in vicinity of 975190 and plans were made for occupation of those positions the night of 19-20 March. The movement was made without incident, closing in reconnoitered areas at 2100 hrs. The company split into 3 four gun batteries, one at 975187, one at 975220, and one at 975190. Lt. Lewis surveyed "C" company's guns the follow-

ing morning and with the aid of 69th AFA Bn. the guns were registered and tied-in with the 69th AFA FDC. on the 22 March, Lt. Edson of "C" company established an OP in SSF in vicinity of 014443.

The gun companies of the battalion remained in artillery roles until the 25 March when "C" company was alerted to relieve "B" company, 601st TD Bn. in direct fire positions in 3rd Inf. Div. sector. Preparations and plans were made with 601st TD for the relief during the night of 25-26 March. Movement began at 2200 hrs and "C" company closed in direct fire positions at 2400 hrs; one gun at 008288, 1 gun at 011282, 1 gun at 006282, 1 gun at 004287, 1 gun at 989279, 1 gun 989282, 2 guns 005293; the 3rd platoon with 4 guns remained at 973196 in reserve. The company CP located at 991248.

The 25 March was a red letter day for the battalion. At approximately 1400 hrs Lt. Col. King was seriously wounded and Captain Whitsit, "B" Co. commander, lightly wounded from a 3" shell fired from gun of 894th TD Bn. Col. King, Col. McPheters and Capt. Whitsit were having a conference outside of "B" company's CP at 866247 when the accident occurred. The 3" shell hit a branch of a tree directly above them causing an air burst. Lt. Col. McPheters of 91st AFA Bn. died in route to the hospital.

Capt. Bowden, company commander of Hqs. company and senior officer, assumed command of the battalion. At 1700 hrs 25 March, Capt. John S. King, Bn. S-3, assumed command per authority contained in letter 1st Armd. Division, dated 25 March 1944. Capt. John S. King appointed Capt. Wray, Bn. S-1, as executive officer in addition to his S-1 duties, and Lt. Cady, "B" company assumed command of "B" company.

"A" and "B" companies continued in an artillery role, with Rcn. company manning OP through close of period. "C" company, in direct fire positions, working with the 34th Inf. Div., harrassed the enemy nightly by coordinated "shoots" with the infantry. Night of 31 March a "shoot" was coordin-

ated with 168 RCT, 34th Inf. Division. Two guns from 1st platoon, "C" company moved to within 600 yards of an enemy strong point, (house #14). At a prearranged signal the infantry illuminated the target by means of flares fired from mortars. The two guns fired 77 rounds, about half HE and half APC BDF in 3 minutes. The "shoot" created a bedlam in enemy sector with the enemy retaliating with MG and mortar fire. Despite the heavy MG and mortar fire the two guns moved back into their direct fire positions without any casualties or damage to the M-10's.

At 1100 hrs 30 March, Major F.M. Doran, executive officer of 68th AFA Bn. assigned to the battalion by 1st Armored Division, assumed command of the battalion. The new battalion commander appointed Capt. J.S. King, executive officer, Lt. Cox of "C" company, S-3, and Capt. A.B. Morrison as survey and special services officer.

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. at end of period:

Bn. CP - 867227. Bn. Trains - 875218. A Company CP - 860252; A-1 (6 guns) - 861249; A-2 (5 guns) - 862253. B Company CP - 866247; (B01 (6 guns) - 864247; B-2 (6 guns) - 862245. C Company CP - 991248. C-1 - 018274; 019268; 014267; 991248. C-2 - 989279; 989282; (2 guns) - 005293. C-3 - 008288; 011282; 006282; 004287. Rcn Company CP - 867225. OPs - 876267; 851290; 918295.  
Bn Medical Detachment with Trains - 875218.

APPENDIX:

Ammunition expended from 1 March to 31 March:

Shell, HE, M42, FPD M48	- - - - -	-10878
Shell, HE, M42, FPD M54	- - - - -	24
Shell, APC	- - - - -	70
Shell, Smoke	- - - - -	<u>298</u>
TOTAL	- - - - -	-11270

CASUALTIES:

KING, Harrison	Lt. Col.	SWA
WHITSIT, Robert J.	Capt.	LWA
NEELEMAN, Leonard J.	1st Lt.	SWA
KENNEDY, Joseph G.	1st Lt.	LWA
Outlaw, Ernest L.	Sgt.	KIA
Simmons, Russell W.	Sgt.	LWA
Arant, Henry L.	T/4	LWA
Scott, Charles H.	T/5	LWA
Smith, Chester A.	T/5	LWA
Bednarz, Edward	Pfc.	SWA
Staggsdill, Harold	Pvt.	LWA
Clarke, Carroll J.	Pvt.	LWA

HEADQUARTERS 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, N.Y.C., N.Y.

1 April 1944

COMBAT LESSONS LEARNED FOR PERIOD 1 MARCH - 31 MARCH

1. The M-8 and M-20 vehicles with any prolonged usage for radio communication are presenting excessive amount of electrical maintenance. The weakness lies in the generator and voltage regulators in the M-8 and M-20. Due to the type of electrical equipment used in these vehicles, repair and regulations is almost out of question, leaving the only alternative of complete replacement of the generator and voltage regulator. This means of maintenance is presenting a problem because of the limited amount of electrical parts available for the M-8 and M-20 vehicles.

2. High velocity gun tubes, namely, the 3 inch TD gun, can be preserved and maintained very satisfactorily by using diesel fuel as a solvent and cleaning agent. Tubes in this battalion have fired an approximate average of 2200 rounds each and in a recent ordnance inspection were classed in good condition without any signs of excessive deterioration.

3. Recently this battalion started to use weather corrections on all unobserved fires with excellent results. We get the Meteorological messages from Corps Artillery Net. A relatively short time is required to figure a Metro and it is well worth the trouble. A powder thermometer would be extremely useful. At present we have to call on a nearby artillery unit to get the powder temperature.

4. Replacements, both officers and enlisted personnel, received in the past month by this battalion show considerable lack of TD training. Noticeable weaknesses are radio procedure and general knowledge of FM radios. Map reading, gunnery, and general knowledge of the capabilities of the M-10 are lacking in many cases.

5. There are no direct sights equipped with night lighting devices in the battalion. Our night lighting device for the panoramic sight is a home made contraption which works with limitations but it is still not good enough. It is imperative that we get both a direct sight with night lighting device fixtures and a night lighting device for the panoramic sight.

6. When making large shifts we have found that an error occurs as high as 20%. To correct for this we have two or more check points in addition to the base point. In each case the check point deflection is recorded in the gun so that when a target located in the vicinity of the check point is to be fired the shift is given from the check point.

When figuring MFMIF's, the data for each check point is computed and that gives us Metro corrections for an area 100% each side and 1500 yards over or short of the check point. Following this method, we are sure to have applied the proper Metro corrections to unobserved concentrations fired in each check point area.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Charles H. Cox*

Charles H. Cox, Jr.,  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn.,  
1st Div., 7th Army, APO 464



HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1-30 APRIL 1944

1 May 1944

Subject: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 April 1944 to 30 April 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the unit journal and the Battalion diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 31 March 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

*James B. Gray*  
JAMES B. GRAY  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 April - 30 April 1944

Location of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 150 I, II, III, IV  
Grids 4229

- Inf. Co - 867227
- Adj. Co - 867228
- A1 Co - CP 860252; A1 - 861219 (6 guns); A2 - 862253 (6 guns)
- B1 Co - 866217; B1 - 864217 (6 guns); B2 - 862215 (6 guns)
- C Co - CP 991218 (Attached to 601 TD Bn); C1 - 991218; C1a274;  
C1b208; C1c267; C2 - 989279; 989282; 885293 (2 guns);  
C3 - 888218; C11212; 886282; 884287.
- Gr's - (A-Reg) - 851290; (Tele) - 876287; (Zebra) - 918295
- Bn. Medical Detachment (with Trains) - 875218

Beginning of the month the battalion minus one company ("C" Co.) continued its operations in VI Corps reserve. "C" company attached to 601st TD Bn. operating in the 34th Inf. Div. sector in anti-tank role in support of the 34th Inf. Div. Reconnaissance company continued manning three

1400

CP's in vicinity of 851290, 876267, and 918295. "A" and "B" companies in Corps Reserve occupied artillery positions reinforcing the artillery fire of 91st AAA Battalion.

The period from the 1 April to 5 April was inactive. The battalion firing "A" and "B" companies as artillery and "C" company in a static anti-tank positions. With the aid of the newly set-up FDC in the battalion Hqs, the proficiency of our artillery fire was greatly improved. The battalion FDC in no sense operated a regular Field Artillery FDC. The battalion FDC aided the company FDC's by supplying metro corrections, plotting of initial data to observed targets, assigning fires to batteries, coordinating the registration of batteries with Hon. Co. observers, and also, plotting and calculating of all massed fires for the battalion.

The inactive period on the Anzio Beachhead presented an ideal opportunity for training of the battalion in artillery methods. On 4 April Major Moran, the battalion commander, organized a forward observation school to teach the officers in the battalion the finer points in Aerial Bracket and Aerial Precision Fire. The school was held for 10 days at "Yoke" CP in vicinity of 875268.

"C" company on the night of 5th April in cooperation with the 108th Inf. Regt. harassed the enemy by direct fire on personnel, flankwagons, known MG positions and strong points. The results of "Shoots" on night of 5-6th April are unknown, but the M-10's crews enjoyed pouring 336 rounds of HE out of 7 guns at the enemy. One of the M-10's from "C" company, while enroute from the "shoot" back to regularly occupied anti-tank position received a hit from enemy mortar shell; wounding two enlisted men and damaging the breechblock of the gun. Despite the retaliation by the enemy after each of these roving gun direct fire harassing missions, the crews enjoyed the role.

The 7th April the battalion received three officers from replacement depot attaching them to the battalion for duty and combat training. 2nd Lt. Rudolph G. Anderson was attached to "B" co., 2nd Lt. Carl B. Greene to "A" company, and 2nd Lt. Samuel Kendall to Recon. company.

A relief of "C" company in direct fire position in the 34th Inf. Div. sector was planned by the battalion. The move was planned for the night of 11-15 April. On night 10-11 April "A" company was ordered to reconnoiter in 168th Inf sector in preparation to relieve "C" company on night of 13-14th April. Reconnaissance by "A" company of "C" company's anti-tank positions was successful and without incident.

Morning of 13 April the 2nd platoon of "B" company was alerted for movement to the 34th Inf for raid in that sector planned for the 15 April. At 1930 hrs 2nd plat. under Lt. Williams left the company area in vicinity of 062245 and moved to assembly area at 904100. The platoon closed at 2135 hrs without an incident.

Night of 11-15 "A" company moved from in vic. of 062252 as planned to relieve "C" company in an anti-tank role in 34th Inf. Div. sector. Due to road restrictions and movement of troops in the 34th Inf. Div. sector movement by "A" company had to be staggered; 1 platoon leaving at 1930 hrs another at 2100 hrs and the last at 2230 hrs; the company trains at 2100 hrs. Route of march - Ft Padiglione Ct, Ironside, Truscott, Le Marzocco, Conca, and up Conca - Cisterna road to positions. The relief was completed without incident, "A" company closing in anti-tank positions at 0200 hrs. "C" company's movement from 34th Inf. Div. sector to "A" company's anti-tank positions was also made without incident, closing in area at 0400 hrs.

The 34th Inf raid in which the 2nd platoon "B" company was taking part,

jumped off at 0500 hrs 15 April. One section of 2nd platoon "B" company was attached to Co. "G", 1st Armd. Regt. and the other section attached to a platoon of Light tanks from 1st Cav. Bn. to protect 1st Tank at 033317L. The one section of 2nd platoon under Lt. Anderson in role of protecting the left, recouped by Tank lead leading the Light tanks. At 0231L a large crater was encountered in middle of road. An attempt was made to get across crater but due to its depth and soft bottom the M-10 bogged in the crater. The second M-10 following closely behind the lead- ing gun came to the rescue and made an attempt to pull out the bogged gun by hooking a cable to the rear jungle and bracing down the road. This attempt failed and a decision was made to bypass the bogged gun. A wide sweep was made off the road in the by-passing maneuver. The maneuver was not successful for M-10 hit an AT mine, blowing a track and crushing a bogie which immobilized the gun. A call for help was radioed back to the 1st Cav. Bn. and maintenance section of the 1st Cav. Bn. came up with a T-2 rolled over the bogged gun and opened the road for the Light tanks to continue with their mission. The section operating with the medium tanks from Co. "G", 1st Armd. Regt. proceeded down Grand lead covering the advance of the medium tanks. The sections encountered AT mines which had to be cleared by the M-10's crews as they advanced. The maneuver of the section with the medium tanks was successful without any loss of personnel or equipment. The raid terminated at 1030 hrs with the raiding party returning to their bases with 61 prisoners.

The Debaltien maintenance crew with the aid of 1st Cav. Bn. anti- tanks and two LVT's returned the two disabled M-10's in the following 48 hours.

Major Young returned to the Debaltien from absence since 20th April. He returned with him in command of the battalion. The following

changes were made in the battalion staff, Major Moran, executive officer, Capt. King, S-3, and Lt. Cox as assistant S-3.

"B" company and "C" company remained in artillery positions for the remainder of the month supporting the fires of 91st AFA Bn. Majority of fires consisted of unobserved TOT fires. To fill out the program between lulls in our artillery missions "B" and "C" company concentrated on maintenance of equipment, 100 hr. checks of M-10's and training.

Major Moran battalion executive held schools in forward observation methods for all battalion officers and use and adjustment of 3 inch shell M10, M10A1.

ANNEX:

Total rounds fired for month:

M1 - 10485  
 M1A - 368  
 M1C - 356  
 M1D - 12  


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 TOTAL 11221

Casualty List:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Ser. No.</u>	<u>Co.</u>
2 Apr.	Kempelman, Elmer H.	Sgt.	37131810	LWA "C"
2 Apr.	Perry, Ralph L.	T/5	31117316	SWA Non
11 Apr.	Carlson, Carl L.	PFC	37290774	LWA "B"
11 Apr.	Kielbasoick, Andrew P.	T/5	33247390	SWA "B"
11 Apr.	Slair, Joseph H.	Pvt.	33113712	KIA "B"
11 Apr.	Digallia, Fred D.	Sgt.	36130686	SWA "A"
13 Apr.	Fields, William T. Jr.	Pvt.	38017906	LWA "C"
13 Apr.	Myers, Bernard H.	Pvt.	6990517	LWA "C"
5 Apr.	Ulman, Kenneth H.	Pvt.	38017962	LWA "C"

Awards:

Bronze Star

1. S/Sgt. Aurelius (MM) Geist - 6856283 - "C" Co. - Gen. Ord. #24, 4 Apr.
2. T/5 Victor J. Phillips - 6959998 - Hq. Co. - Gen. Ord. #25, 6 Apr.
3. 1st Lt. John H. Wright - 0419084 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #26, 8 Apr.
4. S/Sgt. Peter (MM) Kary - 39675568 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
5. T/4 George L. Baldwin - 15047931 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
6. T/5 Oscar H. Swanson - 36165161 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
7. Pfc. John H. Walter - 31088129 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
8. Pvt. Herbert H. Stamba, Jr. - 32261828 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
9. Sgt. John H. Foster - 31117012 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
10. T/5 David H. Staff - 31088676 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
11. Pfc. Harold H. Hudson - 35137405 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
12. S/Sgt. Peter (MM) Kemp - 39675568 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
13. Pfc. Arthur H. Kusan - 31036307 - Non. Co. - " " " " "
14. Pfc. Sylvester H. Weinmayer - 37183134 - Non. Co. - " " " " "

Oak Leaf Cluster to Purple Heart

1. Sgt. Fred B. Dayillie - 36130686 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #19, 12 Apr.
2. Sgt. Frank A. Lawrence - 32203428 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #27, 19 Apr.
3. Pfc. Frank S. Lonzal - 37111075 - "B" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28, 26 Apr.

Purple Hearts

1. T/5 Charles H. Boett - 33090791 - "B" Co. - Gen. Ord. #23, - 1 Apr.
2. Pvt. Gerald D. Benfield - 31037054 - Non. Co. - Gen. Ord. #23 - 1 Apr.
3. T/5 Ralph L. Perry - 31117316 - Non. Co. - Gen. Ord. #26 - 6 Apr.
4. Pvt. Eugene A. Lukana - 31347102 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28, 26 Apr.

Purple Hearts (cont'd.)

5. 1/5 James L. Stewart - 31172082 - "C" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.
6. Pvt. Frederick L. Brown - 11000210 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.
7. Pvt. William H. Rogers - 15012533 - "B" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.
8. Pfc Carl L. Carlson - 37290774 - "B" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.
9. Pvt. Howard (Bill) Deak - 0015686 - Hq. Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.
10. 1/5 Raymond W. Huffman - 36301891 - "A" Co. - Gen. Ord. #28 - 26 Apr.

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**1-31 May-44**

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1 June 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 May 1944 to 31 May 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 30 April 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

JESSE B. WRAY  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 May - 31 May 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 158 I, II, III, IV  
GSGS 4229

Bn CP - 867227  
Rcn Co- 867224

"A" Co - 991247 (atchd to 691 TD in support of 133 RCT) - guns in posn as follows:

A-1 - 008238; 011281; 006281; 001281  
A-2 - 005293; 005293; 004285; 004282  
A-3 - 032273; 031272; 024282; 022277

"B" Co - 869252; B-1 861249 (6 guns); B-2 862253 (6 guns)  
"C" Co - 860247; C-1 864247 (6 guns); C-2 862245 (6 guns)

Bn Trains - 875218. Bn Medical Detachment - 875218  
Rcn CP's - 851290; 876267 and 918295

The period from May 1 to May 3rd was generally without incident. "B"

and "C" companies continued in the role of supporting artillery with Recon

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Reconnaissance company manning its three OP's. "A" company remained in static anti-tank positions in the 34th Div. sector. They received the usual amount of shelling but no casualties.

Our tubes were changed by Ordnance. "B" company received first priority. Guns were sent a few at a time so that there is always a six gun battery in firing position.

Reconnaissance company continued school on radio maintenance.

Plans for relief of "A" company by "B" company in the 34th Inf. Div. sector were put into effect May 4th. "B" company officers established liaison with "A" company to facilitate relief and conducted reconnaissance in the area, without incident. "B" companies' guns have all been retubed. "C" company to get their guns retubed next.

"A" company returned to artillery positions night of 5-6 May, movement began at 2145 hrs. Relief was by platoon. Upon completion "A" company returned to Battalion control and occupied artillery positions vacated by "B" company. "B" company attached to 601 TD Bn. upon closing in anti-tank positions. Relief was completed with incident, None.

On May 5th Major Doran started a school for platoon commanders in forward observation. Everyone took great interest because, while learning the finer points of Forward Observation, they were also shooting Krauts.

From May 7th to May 12th the gun companies worked with the First Armored Division on Tank-Infantry-Tank Destroyer problems in preparation for future operations. Recon Co. reconnoitered routes to assembly areas in the La Ferrier area for future operations. Pioneer Platoon also worked

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with 1st AD sweeping areas for mines. During this time FO school, 100 hrs. checks on MLO's and maintenance of vehicles continued. The usual number of TOT's were fired. Generally, everyone was devoting all available time for the future operation. "B" company was relieved from anti-tank role in the 34th Inf. Div. sector the night of 11-12 May without incident. It was returned to Battalion control at 0315 hrs. in the Padiglione Sector.

May 12th "A" company fired on the anti-tank West Coast Range. "B" company occupied artillery positions vacated by "C" company which moved to assembly area vicinity 977195 in preparation for the drive out of the beachhead.

May 13th - Reconnaissance by "B" company for indirect fire positions and also by transportation section for routes of supply for coming operations. "C" company used terrain plot at 1st AD headquarters to study terrain to be fought over.

May 14th - "C" company prepared forward positions in conjunction with coming operations. Transportation platoon began laying down ammo in "B" company's reconnoitered positions in vicinity of Le Ferrier.

May 15 - Work continued on forward positions by "C" company. "A" company fired on the West Coast Anti-Tank Range. Two new MLO's drawn to be used as command vehicles in coming operation. Usual TOT's and maintenance continued.

May 16 - Work on forward positions. Continued maintenance check of all vehicles. All MLO's to duty and in excellent shape. Wire laid to units from proposed Bn. CP for coming operation. Usual TOT's fired.

May 17 - Plans "Buffalo" and "Grasshopper" were studied by the

the Battalion and preparations made to carry out either one as the case might be. Maintenance check continued on vehicles.

May 18 - Road reconnaissance from Bn assembly area at Le Ferrier made. Preparations made for plan "Buffalo".

May 19 - Lt. Edson, in conjunction with 10th Engrs. made bridge rcn. Tank-Inf.-TD exercise with one platoon of "B" company held in 1st AD training area. Maintenance of all vehicles continued.

May 20 - "B" company alerted for movement on order of 1st AD. Preparation for plan "Buffalo" continued.

During the night of May 21-22, "B" company moved to indirect fire positions in vicinity 942294 without incident. Bn. Hq., stripped down, moved to new CP located at 971271. Rcn. made morning of May 23 to area in vicinity of Bn. CP, also "B" Co., 636th which was attached for the operation "Buffalo".

During the hours of darkness "A" and "C" companies moved to prepared positions. "C" company in vicinity 969303 with CC "B", 1st AD, and "A" company to vicinity 9031 with CC "A", 1st AD. May 23 the attack jumped off. During the attack the first day "C" company had eight TD's knocked out by mines but even with that KO'd 2 enemy tanks. "A" company had a field day by knocking out 11 tanks and one 88. The platoon of "B" Company that was attached to "C" company accounted for a "flamer". "B" company fired artillery preparation and supporting fires with excellent results.

Crews of knocked out TD's reported back to trains to pick up their new M10's and went straight back to the fight. So ended the first day of our all out attack with Rome and beyond as the objective. The Corps took all their objectives the first day; everything went according to plan although

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resistance was plenty stiff.

The attack continued at dawn May 24th; all gun companies detached. Rcn. Co. manned OP at 936294 covering flank of the attack. Reported enemy counter-attack in 45th Div. sector at 2140. SP's, MG's, and Inf. was used.

"C" company's disabled M10's were almost all replaced by morning of 24th day. The spares of TD's in Corps are exhausted. Attack progressed with resistance slackening. "C" company took a few prisoners also fired a round into a dugout erasing 10 Germans. No tanks reported knocked out today. So far the companies have claimed 12 tanks, one "88" towed, 2 SP's, 2 47's, and 1 Ferdinand damaged. Morale was never higher. Recovery of M10's continued.

During the night of 24-25 May a counterattack on the 130th Inf. (our left flank) was repulsed with no penetrations.

On May 25th the Beachhead is no longer. The 91st Rcn. Squadron and the 30th Engrs. met along coast west of Littoria. Lt. Loveless of "A" company wounded today - seriously; second time on the beachhead for him. The CP is moved forward as the attack progresses beyond the railroad to the left of Cisternia. "C" company reports getting a "probable" Lk. VI. Nothing else reported. Our forward elements were at 902302; 903303; 907307; 973356; 980308 in the 45th Div. sector. In the 1st AD sector the 6th Infantry secured Red Line (See Overlay inclosed). Retrieving of M10's continues. Maintenance is having a tough job on this operation.

May 26 - The companies have the following TD's for duty - "A" Co. - 12; "B" Co. - 12; "C" Co. - 13. 4 TD's in maintenance repairable; 3 salvaged.

The attack continued toward Velettri with resistance light. Col. Howse with his task force reported in Artena.

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"C" company knocked out battery of dual purpose 88's. Caught them while the men were working on their guns; also got 2 tanks and 2 vehicles.

Battalion alerted to move to assembly area in vicinity 970275. Back to our old CP. Battalion will perform maintenance for at least 24 hours.

May 27 - Orders are received that companies are still attached to same Combat Commands. Maintenance of all vehicles and radios. Shower trucks and general clean up.

List of equipment knocked out by companies from 22 to 26 May inclusive. Some of it hadn't been reported before - everyone too busy working over the enemy to worry about how much damage we had done:

"B" Co. - 2 Mk. VI's, 1 tank towing a gun, 1 AT gun & 4 Mk. IV's.

"C" Co. - 1 Mk. IV; 1 Mk. VI, 1 MG; 2 vehs., 8 A/T guns; 5 arty. pieces (220 Hows.)

"A" Co. - 12 Tanks; 3 SP's; 3 A/T guns.

Received information that there would be no move tonight except in emergency.

May 28 - Maintenance continues today. Bn. CO reported to General Harmon to discuss reconnaissance made during morning. Attack planned for morning 29 May. Routes of approach and Field Order to be out as soon after 1800 hrs. as possible. It is understood that the 45th Division is to follow the 1st AD in trucks.

39 MLO's for duty. Bn. maintenance has done a fine job.

"A" company in assembly area in vicinity 935300.

May 29 - The Bn., less "A" and "C" companies, detached from Division Reserve and attached to CC "A" with mission of maintaining contact with the 34th and 45th Division and furnishing A/T protection for the right flank of

- 6 -  
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CC "A".

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"C" company reports armor has crossed line Wolf and is meeting little resistance.

The Bn. CP moved to 913375 without incident.

1 MIO hit by enemy shellfire - 5 enlisted men wounded.

May 30 - Attack progressing satisfactorily. "C" company reports that they are 300 yards past phase line Oscar. "B" company reports that they are with the right people and that everything is going OK.

Major Redding, Battalion Cmdr., was injured in an automobile accident and evacuated. Major Doran assumed command.

May 31 - The attack continued. Resistance was pretty stiff. Jerry was using more artillery and anti-tank fire than usual. The companies said it looked like our stuff coming in instead of German.

1st AD is going to reshuffle troops tonight - some that should be in CC "A" sector are in CC "B" and vice versa. Tanks will initially be out in front of infantry but will pull back after infantry has dug in, altho some will be left well forward in direct support of the Infantry. CO of CC "A" asked if we would be able to stay where we were without extra help; also to submit request for defensive fires and give accurate location of our elements. All this was done. There was no counterattack during the night.

The period ended with companies detached and in position:

(Bn - "A" & "C" Co's.) reinf. by Rcn Co. 1st AR - Attached to CC "A"  
Bn. CP - 880379  
"B" Co. - 873386. B1 - 868404; B2 - 873392; B3 - 872403  
Rcn Co. - 872383. Fwd elements - 861389.  
OP - 868389. Rcn 1st AR - 872383. Fwd  
elements - 868403 and 861403.

"C" company attached to CC "B"  
"C" Co. - 859401. C1 - 857402; C2 - 854403; C3 - 857402

"A" company attached to CC "A"  
"A" Co. - 913373; A1 - 873403; A2 - 913373; A3 - 913373

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**ANNEX:**

**Ammunition expended during period:**

HE - - -	11187
Time - -	143
Smoke - -	111
APC - - -	<u>857</u>
Total	12598

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1 June 1944

LESSONS LEARNED IN COMBAT

Gun Companies:

1. In the recent operations it was quickly learned that a 13th LHO proved of great value to the company commander for the close command of his platoons which would have been impossible without the use of a command vehicle containing the same degree of mobility and fire power.
2. There were conflicting views as to whether the liaison officer should be sent to Combat Command or the Battalion with which the company is working when a TD company is attached to other units. However, it has generally proved to be more effective when the company liaison officer was placed with the Combat Command.
3. High ranking officers of supported units have often tried to use TD's as tanks. However, a destroyer cannot be used as a tank; we cannot fire while moving, and we do not have the machine guns and maneuverability of tanks. The TD's should employ their own methods of destroying targets even when located by some tank officer. One excellent opportunity was lost because a company commander of a tank unit told one section when to fire and when not to fire. The TD's, themselves, should know better just when and at what to fire than other units.
4. The platoon should always be employed as a unit. One gun, by itself, is not effective protection for tanks. Always use two guns or more together so that they have mutual support.
5. TD's can support M-4 and M-5 tanks at supporting distance usually between assault and reserve companies. You cannot support anyone from 400 or more yards back in the usual terrain encountered in Italy. Neither can it be done right in among the supported units, for then you are neutralized by the same fire. A supporting unit should never allow itself to be brought under the same fire as the unit supported. Enough room must be kept for sufficient maneuvering and still offer efficient support.
6. Tanks will sometimes storm ahead and seemingly forget about their supporting TD's. However, this need not occasion any worry among the TD's; the tanks will always be glad to send back a guide as soon as the TD's are needed.
7. Supported units often do not disseminate sufficient information of friendly troops and locations. On more than one occasion our TD's drew friendly artillery fire. One conclusion drawn was that the headquarters of the supported unit must advise the artillery of our locations, as they had the responsibility of placing the TD's in that location.
8. The TD 3" gun is fine and drew many commendations from infantry, tanks, and other supported units for its power and speed, but, with a TD more lightly armored than a tank, it is highly vulnerable to anti-tank fire. When moving against anti-tank guns across an open field, enough infantry

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should be provided to move ahead and overcome such obstacles upon call. The point cannot be overemphasized that a Tank Destroyer gun is even more vulnerable than a tank itself when encountering enemy anti-tank guns.

9. The 3" gun, while lacking the velocity of one or two German weapons, is very capable in dealing with these so-called "superior" weapons of the Germans. This is due to a large part to good construction of the vehicle, fast operation of the gun, aggressive crews, and excellent ammunition. Past experience has taught us not to rely on the fire of one gun when the massed fire of many guns can be concentrated on targets such as heavy armor and SP guns. Since the principle of massed fire was adopted in the battalion, results have shown a marked improvement.

10. While the M10's were not quite fast enough to keep up with the light tanks, they gave a surprisingly good performance in operating in cross-country and in difficult terrain. An expert driver is of prime importance in getting where you want to go. In proper condition, an M10 could go anywhere a light tank could except in extremely narrow defiles. TD's should attempt to outmaneuver enemy heavy armor, to try for side shots or where armor is thinner whenever possible. Teamwork by a gun section or larger units is necessary to derive the maximum benefits from the employment of TD's against enemy heavy armor. A single TD is almost helpless when sent alone against German heavy armor such as the "Ferdinand."

11. Either infantry security should be provided or the TD's should pull back and consolidate with the tanks at night for protection against enemy infantry.

12. A power traverse would be a great asset for the M10. In a fast moving situation, it is of utmost importance to get on a target to the flank, and even rear, rapidly and accurately. Driver's hatch should be hinged so turret may rotate with the hatch open.

13. Vision slits are needed in the M10 turrets. The battalion lost a number of men during the past operations because of snipers. When operating with tanks, enemy infantry is often by-passed, yet the only way the platoon or section leader can observe is by raising his head out of the turret.

14. A Sponson machine gun is badly needed in the M10 to emphasize a repeat in "Lessons Learned". When operating with tanks where the M10's are well out in front of our own infantry, a Sponson or Lap gun is an absolute necessity.

15. Home light sets are one of the biggest fuel savers the army has, but M10's are not equipped with them. Instead we must run two engines about 35% of the time just to keep the batteries charged so that the radios might be operated. In a static defensive position, the waste of fuel is practically 100% for the sole purpose of keeping the batteries charged.

16. Gunners should be instructed not to shoot at the middle of the target but always at the base. When shooting down hill, shoot less than the judged distance if you are quite some distance above the target.

17. Disabled destroyers should not be towed over great distances by T-2's to Battalion Maintenance; rather, they should be placed on retrievers and transported back. Too much time was lost by T-2 towing disabled vehicles back.

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18. The firing celonoid circuit box should be placed in a well in the interior of the fighting compartment. It seems to always be in the way. Also, it is much safer for the crews to sleep in their destroyers when the MLO's are in a "hot" position. If the firing celonoid were in the compartment, four men could sleep across the floor of the vehicle quite comfortably.

19. Three trucks attached to each company should improve the supply system. Supplies should go along with company headquarters and should include sufficient fuel for 200 miles of operation. However, this would depend more or less on the situation.

20. It is an old maxim of war that in any case where a unit is attached to a larger unit, the latter supplies all common items. In such tactical situations as those just concluded, it is imperative that this principle be mandatory for all units so attached. This has been found the most pragmatic means of supply, and only one unit to which we were attached even suggested such a plan. The larger units should furnish guides for such articles as fuel and ammunition when the company is broken down to platoons or less. A still better plan is to carry a limited bulk supply in the train of the supported unit.

21. Communications sergeants should have a blacked out vehicle, preferably an M-20 or an M-3 H/T to carry out radio maintenance at night in forward positions. If possible, our MLO radios should all have the tankers' crystal. Communication to the platoon leader only is not of sufficient benefit as such. Since the battalion crystal isn't used, why not take it out and substitute the tankers' (if available). M-20 radios should be carried for all platoon leaders' MLO's. If a 13th MLO is adopted as a command destroyer, it should have one 608 radio, one 610, and one 510 radio.

Reconnaissance Company:

1. The Battalion Commander of a Tank Destroyer battalion does not have sufficient use for a Recon. company in an armored attack to justify its use only for that battalion. In fluid warfare, some six officers and 120 enlisted men are often wasted because of lack of a suitable mission.

2. The present organizational setup of the Recon. Co. does not provide for its effective use in forward Recon. This applies especially to Tank Destroyer battalions assigned to Armored Divisions. In this past operation, the Recon. company of this Battalion was assigned the mission of forward and flank reconnaissance for a tank-infantry combat command in the attack. The predominance of vehicles in the company are 1/4 ton trucks and these 1/4 ton vehicles preceded the actual tank attack by some 1000 to 1500 yards. Due to the knowledge by the reconnaissance personnel of their extreme vulnerability, it was impossible for them to assume the aggressive spirit so necessary in successful reconnaissance work.

3. Unlike Africa where the 1/4 ton truck provided the best Recon. vehicle, the same vehicle is no longer so valuable in Italy. This is due both to the nature of the terrain and to the nature of the combat involved. The M8 armored car is a satisfactory vehicle for Recon.

4. If the Recon. Company is to be detached from the Battalion for reconnaissance missions for the Division or combat commands, the organization of the Recon. platoon must be so changed as to provide a sufficient weapon in that platoon to accomplish the mission. A platoon of 5 M8 armored cars or 3 M8's and 2 M20's would be a satisfactory organization.

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5. An assault gun from the combat command or Division should be attached to the Rcn. company if it is to precede tanks in the attack.

Headquarters:

It is recommended that Battalion Headquarters be authorized two MLO's to relay more and better information to higher headquarters and to provide excellent control over the guns of all companies.

Trains:

1. During the last operation it was found to be very difficult if not impossible to supply all the line companies every day while the companies were detached from the battalion and operating on different axes of supply and advance.

2. Companies must cooperate with Trains to the fullest extent in furnishing guides and advising their locations.

3. Selection of Trains location should be flexible and far enough forward to maintain good communications with Battalion Headquarters.

Battalion Maintenance:

1. It is important that maintenance knows the exact location of the companies and that the companies are aware of the precise location of maintenance. Maps should be distributed to the maintenance crews for the location of road nets and the men should be constantly briefed on the enemy situation.

2. When a TD is disabled, its exact location must be reported. Maintenance can then quickly find it and either repair or retrieve.

3. During a fast moving operation such as the last action, the Division should have a Maintenance Radio Net, and this applies particularly to an Armored Division. It would facilitate our locating units of the Maintenance Battalion and helps them to locate supporting units. When emergency parts are needed, they can be secured more rapidly. Locations of abandoned or destroyed equipment can also be given quickly.

4. The equipment supplied by the Army for the handling and towing of tanks and TD's are not heavy enough. Tow clevis, pistles, rings, and chains are, in general, too light. Tow bars are not strong enough to tow TD's over rough country without failing. The Germans have a very good heavy constructed tow bar which is made of solid steel. Every effort should be made to improve our equipment. Correct information as to company needs would speed up all maintenance and recovery.

Communications Officer:

1. The present method of changing crystals in the 510 radios of the platoon leaders' MLO's as they change assignment from tank company to tank company is too slow. Radio maintenance is unable to change the crystals rapidly enough to keep the platoon leader in radio contact with the tank company. The only remedy for this is to assign two TD cooperative channels for the tanks to have in all their 508's. The TD's could then operate on one or the other of their 510's. To install 508's in the destroyers would take up too much room in the present MLO. If the future tank destroyer has a place for a 608 or 508 in the turret, the problem could be solved much more satisfactorily.

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 144, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1 July 1944

**SUBJECT: Operations Report**

**TO: Assistant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)**

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AF 315-145, dated March 18, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 June 1944 to 30 June 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 31 May 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Joseph Wray*  
JESSE B. WRAY  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant.

DECLASSIFIED TO:  
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED  
BY AUTHORITY OF TAG F-44

27 Mar 46

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Initials

OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 June - 30 June 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of periods

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 153-1, IV, 0805 1429

- Bn. CP - 860579 (adv).
- Bn. CP - 713283 (rear); Bn. Trains - 875218
- A Co CP - 863103. A-1 - 860103; A-2 - 863373; A-3 - 866351.
- B Co CP - 871394. B-1 - 863102; B-2 - 869399; B-3 - 873105.
- C Co CP - 863390. C-1 - 862101; C-2 - 863396; C-3 - 857399.
- Ren Co CP - 870401. Base Station - 865100. CP - 868103.
- AFORD UNIT:  
Ren Co, 1 AF - 87283. fwd elements - 862111 and 864111.

June 1, 1944 - Upon relief of 1st A.R. in the Caspeloone sector the 701st T.D. Bn. was attached to the 45th Inf. Div. and remained in positions except for slight changes to better the field of fire. Ren. Co, 701st, maintained AF warning CP at 868103. Ren. Co, 1st A.R. (stand), maintained contact with elements on the right, with forward elements at 862111 and 864111.

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72 1400

The attack was progressing slowly with the enemy resisting bitterly. One of our CP's reports enemy arty. a little heavier but otherwise everything was OK. "A" Co reports that some of our arty dropped a little too close to them for comfort.

Re: 1st A.D., CP reports all secure at 2300 hrs.

June 2, 1944 - Message received at 0015 hrs. from 015th T.D. to be prepared for C/A from vic. of 860116. Companies alerted but nothing developed.

Battalion, less "C" company, relieved from attachment to 14th Div. and attached to CG "A"; moved to assembly area vic. 9234. "C" company alerted to move to assembly area as soon as relieved by 015th T.D. Bn.

Message from CG, 1st A.D., to the effect that the Div., less Howzer Force, is placed on one hour alert. "D" company moved to assembly area with CG "A".

Battalion relieved from attachment to CG "A" and attached to Div. Reg.

June 3, 1944 - Message from CG, 1st A.D., to the effect Div. is placed on 1/2 hour alert. "A" company moved to assembly area vic. 9335 and is attached to CG "B". Bn., less "A" & "B", moves to area 895315. Attack progressing satisfactorily.

June 4, 1944 - Message from CG, 1st A.D., (see 2-3 Journal). "A" company reports that they are moving rapidly. The division is moving toward Rome at a rapid pace. We are out of contact with the companies by radio so it is decided to find ourselves a new CP.

When moving into the new CP Capt. Childs captured 23 prisoners. They had been cut off by our tanks and seemed to be of a pretty good class of Grant, much better looking than what we have seen recently.

At 1730 hrs "B" company reports they are in the outskirts of Rome.

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Company is detached from Battalion and attached to CO "A".

June 5, 1944 - I am reports that they are sure they should be. They failed, but cannot give exact location because they have no maps. Maps are scarce, Army is having trouble keeping ahead of us with maps.

All companies have crossed the Tiber and are perching the enemy to the north. There was an open city, the only resistance being from a few scattered snipers which were quickly taken care of.

AT's company reports knocking out eight vehicles just before crossing the river. A couple were also struck; the rest were firing toward pulling "Dark weapons".

The Battalion CP remained on the outskirts of Rome until about 2400 hrs waiting for orders.

June 6, 1944 - Battalion CP moved at 0300 at 0800. At 1030 news came that the Division had started and that the Allies had landed between Chiusi and Florence. This news was broadcast to the Bn. on both the FM and AF radios.

ACM Co. was detached from Bn. and attached to 3rd Bn, 1st AF, and will act as liaison for Task Force Cole. There is only Bn. HQ. July's all companies have been detached.

June 7, 1944 - In command group moved to 02058. All companies still outbacked. The enemy is still retreating; very little resistance except for occasional fire and snipers. Our biggest worries are demolitions. The enemy is a fast runner.

The AFJ tank-trucks broke down and while waiting for repair, the driver captured a German officer who was dressed in civilian clothes. He was turned over to the AFJ's.

**SECRET**

June 8, 1944 - Major Doran took over Major Tiel's Force which had been providing road blocks for CG "A" in area north and northeast of 8493. Bn. CP moved to 190939. Major Doran's force consisted of the 701st T.D. Bn. (- "A", "B", "C", & Bn) with "E" Co 1 AR, "G" Co 6th Inf, 1 platoon "B" Co 701st, 1 platoon "F" Co 16th Engrs., 1 platoon "H" Co 1st AR (light trk), 1 platoon Bn Co 1st AR. Alerted to move to assembly area vic. of Vetralla.

Upon arrival at Vetralla orders were received from CG "A" to attack and secure the town of Viterbo. The attack jumped off at 1930 hrs. CG of CG "A" had orders to take town night of 8-9 June.

At 2035 hrs a message from Major Doran to CG of CG "A" stated that he had tried to take the town but needed some more infantry to clear out the town. The 1st Bn 135th Inf., 3rd Div., was alerted to move by truck to assembly area about 2500 yds outside the town of Viterbo.

June 9, 1944 - The Infantry jumped off at 0100 and armor at 0500. The attack moved forward swiftly and the town was secured by 0930; road blocks set up and run sent out to reconnoiter routes to the north and northeast and to contact the French.

The force was relieved at 1100 hrs and moved to assembly area prior to moving to rest area at Lake Bracciano.

"B" company reverted to Bn control at 1800 hrs and movement to new area started at 2000 hrs being completed at 0110 hrs.

June 10, 1944 - Bn (a "A" & Trains) closed at 0110 hrs. Trains closed at 0430, "A" company enroute to assembly area. "G" company had closed previously to Command Group and reverted to Bn control upon arrival of Bn, in Bracciano area.

The period from June 10 to June 17 was devoted to maintenance of

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while on and rehabilitation of personnel and passage to home for as many of the personnel as possible.

June 18 orders were received attaching the 1st Lt. to the 10th F.A. Brigade. This was later changed on verbal order of CG 9th Army and was attached with the 1st Lt.

June 17, 1944 - Operational instructions received from 1 A.S. giving march table for movement of division to forward assembly area vicinity Alstria via (S 703). 70th company attached to 60th and march with them.

June 18, 1944 - The movement (-70) marched at night to assembly area via 703th crossing at 0100, 19 June 1944.

June 20, 1944 - 70th company was attached to 60th PA. The day was spent in maintenance and preparation for the coming offensive.

June 21, 1944 - 60th and 70th jumped off at 1500 hrs and the 70th (-70 & 70) attached to div. and started for movement.

June 22, 1944 - 70th company attached to 2nd Bn, 13 Inf. and moved into bivouac via 703 to await further orders.

Last platoon of 70th company plus a light tank company was cut off by AF/3 and the 70th. All four platoons were cut off and then knocked out.

Commander took the plot. He was wounded, killed badly injured and wounded, was all wounded and turned. 3 - 1st

Following lighter bombers bombed and overcast and via. 0100 getting direct hit on the 1st, destroying, killing 1 officer and 4 men. The following tank platoon between 0 & 7 thousand yards behind line of contact.

70th company has mission of reconnaissance for Tank Force 1000. They have been doing a fine bit of work.

June 23, 1944 - 70th, under command of CG of Div. 900, continued to recon-

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June 29, 1944 - Resistance spasmodic with the usual small scattered groups with AT/G's and an occasional tank. The advance held up mostly by road blocks and demolitions. "A" company reports knocking out SP AT/G towing AT/G.

One EM KIA and 2 WIA when shell exploded prematurely.

June 30, 1944 - The division attacked again; each Combat Command in its zone. The same resistance as reported previously being encountered. Recn. Co. had fire fight with enemy infantry. The only other report was from "B" Co. which reported the one MIO hit land mine and that one EM was wounded in action.

Report by Lt. Coogan "A" company is submitted covering action of 1st platoon from June 23rd to June 28th Incl.

Location of 701st T. D. Bn. at end of period:

Bn CP - 527127. Bn Trains - 594035  
"A" Co - CP - 512122; A1 - 508161; A2 & 3 - 512122  
"B" Co - CP - 604122; B1 & 2 - 602172; B-3 - 624167  
"C" Co - CP - 480110; C1 & 3 - 398220; C2 - 448176  
Recn Co - CP - 513125; 1st Recn Plt. - 599090 (w/Co Ln);  
2nd Recn Plt. - 508162; 3rd Recn Plt. - 504168.

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**ANNEX:**

Total Ammunition expended during period month of June 1944:

APC	942
HE	1698
Time 154	20
Smoke	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2672</b>

**Casualties:**

See attached annex.

**SECRET**

BATTLE CASUALTIES (ALL CATEGORIES) - PERIOD 1 - 30 JUNE 1944

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
1.	EDWARDS, JAMES D.	15045762	TEC 5	"A"	LADERARIA	2 JUN 44	LIA
2.	BLANKENSHIP, WILLIAM A.	6935393	S/SGT.	"B"	AN. IO	3 JUN 44	LIA
3.	STAINAKER, ERNEST O.	6894860	PVT	"A"	ABBIO	4 JUN 44	SEA
4.	WHITNEY, ROBERT J.	0418880	CAPT	"B"	CASOLA	8 JUN 44	LWA
5.	WRIGHT, JOHN M.	0449084	CAPT	"A"	TUSCANIA	9 JUN 44	SEA
6.	TUNBER, MILTON R.	34088236	S/SGT.	"A"	TUSCANIA	9 JUN 44	LWA
7.	PERIES, LAVERNE J.	36078989	PFC	"A"	PESCANIA	9 JUN 44	LWA
8.	FUSKILL, JULIUS J.	34208886	SGT	"C"	GRONFIO	21 JUN 44	LIA
9.	SMITH, HARRY (NMI)	02046704	1ST LT	"C"	RAVI	22 JUN 44	SWA
10.	STEWART, CALVIN J.	34803747	PVT	"C"	RAVI	22 JUN 44	SWA
11.	GRECO, ANTHONY S.	0473160	CAPT	REG DET	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	KIA
12.	DALLEY, MELVIN F.	32033802	S/SGT	REG DET	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	KIA
13.	HOWARD, HILLAND (NMI)	6964319	PFC	REG DET	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	KIA
14.	CYMBRAK, MICHAEL (NMI)	12054813	PVT	REG DET	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	KIA
15.	MOORE, JAMES H.	34172231	S/SGT	RON	LA PESCAIA	22 JUN 44	KIA
16.	LAWRENCE, JR., JONAS A.	17067847	PFC	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
17.	PREISSER, JR, EDGAR A.	38213236	TEC 5	"C"	GAVORRANO	22 JUN 44	KIA
18.	KEENER, RICHARD K.	35386472	PFC	"C"	GAVORRANO	22 JUN 44	KIA
19.	WARB, WILLIAM E.	7040392	PVT	RON	LA PESCAIA	22 JUN 44	KIA
20.	ALLAN, FRANK G.	33126411	SGT	"C"	RAVI	22 JUN 44	KIA
21.	RICHSON, ARNOLD W.	36803500	TEC 5	"C"	RAVI	22 JUN 44	KIA
22.	ANDERSON, CARL C.	36457419	PFC	"C"	RAVI	22 JUN 44	KIA
23.	GRAHAM, THOMAS E.	34172128	TEC 5	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
24.	CASPARA, GUIDO	31020913	PVT	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
25.	STOLIBY, BILL B.	34134114	PFC	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
26.	LEWIS, JOHN R.	01821884	2D LT	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
27.	PATTERSON, JOE W.	34147351	S/SGT	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
28.	BURGH, FREDERICK G.	6662947	PVT	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
29.	STEARLE, GEORGE (NMI)	34088760	TEC 5	RON	PESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
30.	BEZIATY, WALTER H.	15098205	SGT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	SWA
31.	DEBOTO, ALBERT N.	37328369	SGT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	SWA
32.	KERN, ROY E.	20714473	SGT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	SWA
33.	KNOHR, ALLEN E.	35230761	CPL	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	SWA
34.	RIGGS, LA RENEE F.	34333008	SGT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
35.	URBAN, EARL L.	35029497	S/SGT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
36.	UHL, RICHARD S.	36302153	TEC 5	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
37.	MCNAIR, JOHN L.	38018181	PVT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
38.	NOVAK, WILLIAM J.	35320783	PVT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
39.	JACKSON, ROBERT J.	01822010	1ST LT	"C"	GOVORRANO	22 JUN 44	LWA
40.	BOWMAN, TODD C.	37088877	PFC	"B"	PAGANICO	22 JUN 44	LIA
41.	SCOTT, EDWARD E.	6988943	TEC 4	"B"	PAGANICO	22 JUN 44	LIA
42.	MCHORTER, JESSIE F.	7040412	TEC 5	"A"	MONTEPESCALI	22 JUN 44	SWA
43.	GRUBBARD, IRVING (NMI)	32058908	S/SGT	HQ	MONTEPESCALI	22 JUN 44	LIA
44.	PLANKETT, EARL H.	36051971	TEC 5	HQ	MONTEPESCALI	22 JUN 44	LIA
45.	TALLEY, ROY O.	34147322	PFC	HQ	MONTEPESCALI	22 JUN 44	LIA
46.	LAWRENCE, JR., JONAS A.	17067847	PFC	RON	MONTEPESCALI	22 JUN 44	KIA
47.	WIFI, JOHN M.	35168871	PFC	RON	MONTEMASSI	23 JUN 44	LWA
48.	STEWART, JAMES E.	34172082	TEC 5	"C"	CARDIGNONE	23 JUN 44	LWA
49.	DEKMAN, JOHN T.	01822378	1ST LT	"B"	ROCCASTRADA	23 JUN 44	LIA
50.	ASHMORE, LYLE T.	37243111	CPL	CAF	MONTEPESCALI	23 JUN 44	LWA

**SECRET**

51.	SIMPLETTE, LESTER (NMI)	34431683	SQT	"C"	MASSA MARTINA	24 JUN	44	SIA
52.	HACK, RALPH A.	13085463	PFC	"C"	MASSAMARTINA	24 JUN	44	LIA
53.	JACOBSON, ROBERT J.	01227010	1ST LT	"C"	MASSAMARTINA	24 JUN	44	LIA
54.	BARCA, ALBERT E.	35456644	TAC 5	"B"	ROCCOSTRADA	25 JUN	44	LIA
55.	DOWLING, ANDERSON	35458578	SQT	"A"	MONTMARI	25 JUN	44	SIA
56.	BRATTY, FRANCIS J.	33776632	PFC	"C"	PIA ZANI	25 JUN	44	LIA
57.	IKLINSKY, ANTHONY A.	35029758	LT	"A"	ROCCO SCIANO	27 JUN	44	LIA
58.	WILLINSON, DAVID L.	33116528	PFC	"C"	MONTROTONDO	27 JUN	44	LIA
59.	JACOBSON, ROBERT J.	01822010	1ST LT	"C"	MONTROTONDO	27 JUN	44	LIA
60.	SHYMAN, THOMAS R.	16094405	CPL	"C"	MONTROTONDO	27 JUN	44	LIA
61.	WEST, JR., ROBERT (NMI)	15057024	PVI	"C"	MONTROTONDO	27 JUN	44	LIA
62.	DENI, RAY W.	34088281	PVT	"C"	MONTROTONDO	27 JUN	44	LIA
63.	LANFY, RALPH B.	34171574	SQT	"C"	MONTROTONDO	28 JUN	44	LIA
64.	UHL, RICHARD E.	36302163	TAC 5	"C"	MONTROTONDO	29 JUN	44	LIA
65.	WOKKELL, JAMES E.	34171222	CPL	"A"	ROCCO SCIANO	29 JUN	44	SIA
66.	GOHSEY, WILLIAM H.	6582728	S/SQT	"B"	S. MARTE	29 JUN	44	LIA
67.	KEMMERS, LOUIS (NMI)	35388774	PVT	"B"	S. MARTE	29 JUN	44	LIA
68.	WOODY, LEVINTON (NMI)	37088629	CPL	"B"	S. MARTE	29 JUN	44	LIA
69.	COOPERMAN, HAROLD (NMI)	32780746	PVT	"B"	PIA ZANI	29 JUN	44	LIA
70.	KNEIPA, JOHN P.	32554652	PVT	"A"	PIA ZANI	30 JUN	44	LIA
71.	CORHAN, JOHN C.	35026213	PVT	"C"	PIA ZANI	30 JUN	44	LIA

SECRET

UNITED STATES ARMY FOR THE FORTH... COMPANY IS... TO  
AND NO. 13 A.I.

From all reports, both civilian and military, the enemy appears to be withdrawing all his artillery and heavy equipment, leaving just small groups to fight rear guard action. ... quite heavy.

June 21, 1951 - Attack continues with heavy forces mainly aimed at... in the center. ... control our post and... ing. The 3 gun companies have no change in assignment.

90th company had four new... over to... bring them up to twelve.

June 25, 1951 - The attack continues. ... which is progressing satisfactorily. ... company continues to support the Heavy Force; 90th company with... company with 60 81's.

90th company accounted for... 75 81's, and 150mm, and five mortars.

June 26, 1951 - The attack is continuing full blast; not too much... in the Heavy Force sector. ... have been running into a bit of trouble. During the fighting 90th company showed out a "Ford-Lux".

The companies are in pretty good shape as far as men are concerned. Our highest worry is getting crews. Our casualties are mainly gunners, drivers, and section chiefs in the gun companies. ... have a platoon... left and has lost quite a few... men.

June 27, 1951 - ... toward the... only small... forces guarding road blocks and... There have been no changes in assignments of the companies.

June 28, 1951 - ... 81's... personnel. Nothing more happened. The attack still progressing satisfactorily.

**SECRET**

AWARDS DURING PERIOD 1 - 30 JUNE 1944

During this period Purple Heart medals were awarded to the following personnel of the Battalion for wounds received in action against the enemy:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Sgt. Donald J. Blank, 33246805, Co. "A"       | 23. Pvt. Joseph J. Tambaccini, 31311917,     |
| 2. Pfc Merojildo Garula, 38011592, Co. "A"       | 24. T/5 John P. Kreapa, 32554652, Co. "A"    |
| 3. T/5 John A. Peressen, 36302104, Co. "A"       | 25. S/Sgt Milton R Turner, 34088236, Co. A   |
| 4. Pvt Donald Elmet, 12033202, Co. "C"           | 26. Cpl Lewis E Pearson, 15047326, Co A.     |
| 5. Sgt George A. Smith, 33119934, Co. "C"        | 27. Pfc Roy O. Talley, 34147322, Hq Co.      |
| 6. T/5 Allen K. Smith, 13117848, Co. "A"         | 28. Cpl Norman P. Ladue, 11000122, Co A.     |
| 7. Pvt Vincent E. DeFazio, 32796111, Co. "A"     | 29. T/4 Edward E. Scott, 6988943, Co B.      |
| 8. Pvt Ernest O. Stalnaker, 68948860, Co. "A"    | 30. T/5 George Steele, 34088760, Ren Co.     |
| 9. Pfc Lewis J. Pagan, 34171586, Ren. Co.        | 31. Pvt Guido Castagna, 31020913, Ren Co.    |
| 10. 1st Lt Frank W. Gady, III, 0464631, Co "A"   | 32. S/Sgt Joe H Patterson, 34147351, Ren Co  |
| 11. T/5 Leonard L. Jekorst, 37132039, Co. "A"    | 33. Pvt Frederick G Barsch, 6662947, Ren Co  |
| 12. T/S Ralph S. Albertson, 37290344, Co. "A"    | 34. Pvt Thomas F Harrington, 32175867, Hq Co |
| 13. T/5 George H. Laythe, 31079678, Co. "B"      | 35. Sgt Roy E. Kean, 20714973, Co. "C"       |
| 14. Pfc Alfred C. Davies, 10600344, Co. "B"      | 36. Capt Robert F Childs, 0452336, Hq Co     |
| 15. Pvt. Lloyd Paris, 32953160, Co. "B"          | 37. 2d Lt John K. Lewis, 01821844, Ren Co    |
| 16. Cpl Loveston Moody, 37088629, Co. "A"        | 38. Pfc Todd C. Bowman, 37088877, Co "B"     |
| 17. Pfc James J. Casella, 31097650, Co. "B"      | 39. Pfc Francis J Beatty, 33776632, Co "C"   |
| 18. S/Sgt William A Blackenship, 6985393, Co "B" | 40. Sgt Anderson Bowling, 35458598, Co "A"   |
| 19. Sgt Thadus A Newmy, 32086951, Co. "C"        | 41. Cpl Lyle T Ashmore, 37343141, Co "A"     |
| 20. 1st Lt Robert W. Staley, 01170195, Co. "C"   | 42. S/Sgt Irving Graubard, 32058908, Hq Co   |
| 21. Capt John H. Wright, 0449084, Co. "A"        | 43. T/5 Earl W Plunkett, 36051971, Hq Co     |
| 22. Pvt Lebbur Mansfield, 35119163, Co. "A"      |  |

One Leaf Cluster was awarded, in addition to the Purple Heart previously awarded, to the following members of the Battalion for wounds received in action against the enemy:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. 1st Lt Walter E. Lovelace, 01823546, Co "           | 7. Cpl Lewis E. Pearson, 15047326, Co A.    |
| 2. Sgt Roy F. Hinchey, 3129080, Co. "B"                | 8. Sgt Albert M. Desoto, 37328369, Co C.    |
| 3. 2nd Lt James Williams, 01824261, Co. "B"            | 9. T/5 James H. Stewart, 34172082, Co C.    |
| 4. Cpl Francis E. Hinchey, 33247000, Co. "C"           | 10. T/5 Anthony A Zelinsky, 35029758, Co A. |
| 5. T/5 Leonard L. Jekorst, 37132039, Co. "C"           |   |
| 6. Capt Robert J. Whitell, 0418880, Co B (2nd Cluster) |   |

**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, Egan, Gurnea, Harbo, Hendon, Pennington, Quinn, Nease, Gandy  
A. C. Ladd, c/o Postmaster, Wash., D. C.

1 July 1944

RE: ITALY

Action - June 1 - 30, 1944

Our Operations

The initial phase of this period found Major Moran in command of a tank three attacking and occupying the town of Viterbo. After this initial success the battalion was withdrawn to the vicinity of Cassinazione. Here they remained until the 29th of the month enjoying a well-earned rest, and during this time performed on all combat vehicles. On the 29th, the gun companies, acting in an anti-tank role for the combat command of the 1st Armored Division, moved through the mountains to a point just north of Cassinazione. This point General 1st and General 2nd became known as Cassinazione Company participated in an attack by Tank Three three through the central sector. This extraordinary attack caused a withdrawal of the German forces and allowed the combat columns to move forward again on the 30th.

Enemy Activity

Enemy activity contact was made with enemy tanks, as such, in the first part of the period; however, the enemy did not use of his anti-tank guns, both horse-drawn and self-propelled, on the road from Grosseto northward. The enemy was observed use of his 12 1/2 tanks on the 29th and 30th Tank Ins. an anti-tank gun. This use by the enemy of his tanks as anti-tank guns proved very effective, especially in the town of the mountains. In addition to 5 1/2 tanks, he succeeded in bagging 2 platoons of light tanks. In addition to his tanks, the enemy made frequent use of his self-propelled guns, ranging from 75mm high velocity gun to Sturmgeschutz and 150mm self-propelled guns.

Artillery During the early part of the month enemy artillery was light and of a limited nature. In the mountains between Grosseto and Viterbo all types of artillery were used, mainly in anti-tank and harassing roles. In the attack on Viterbo, however, a great deal of accurate, registered fire of all calibers was encountered. Casualties with equipment observed from commanding heights, and in-tervening mountains, was reported the substitution of infantry for our armored elements.

Enemy Activity During the most effective opposition the enemy offered during this period was the usual one seen east of the engineers. The roads, usually in hills, were the main bridges were, with few exceptions, thoroughly mined, cratered and destroyed. In addition, with the open, rolling ground before Cassinazione was reached near Cassinazione and areas surrounding it were effectively mined. Both aerial and ground type mines were encountered, the latter causing the greatest number of casualties due to the fact that they were often missed by our detectors. The infantry encountered was of a poor caliber, including fascists, school troops, replacement units, and depleted and battered units that had been in the line for a long time, or had been withdrawn because they had been considerably weakened in previous engagements. Lack of sufficient men to properly guard road-blocks and anti-tank positions was one of the reasons the blocks and obstacles were bypassed as quickly as they were. However, during the last week of the period, disintegration of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26th Panzer Division and select paratrooper units indicated that the Germans were bolstering their retreating lines with first class troops. It also verified the fact that they intended to give rear units all possible time to prepare and man the Gothic Line running from Pisa to Florence to Rimini.

WILLIAM H. BATEMAN  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
S-2

**SECRET**



DUP

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y.

1 August 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 July 1944 to 31 July 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 30 June 1944.

DOWNGRADED TO: For the Commanding Officer:

CLASSIFICATION REMOVED

AUTHORITY OF TAG... W.P.T.

*Jesse B. Wray*  
JESSE B. WRAY  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant.

25 Mar 44 HSP  
Date Initials

\*\*\*\*\*

OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 July - 31 July 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 158-I, IV, GSGS 4229

- Bn CP - 527127. Bn Trains - 594035
- "A" Co - CP - 512122; A1 - 508161; A2 & A3 - 512122
- "B" Co - CP - 604122; B1 & 2 - 602172; B3 - 624167
- "C" Co - CP - 480110; C1 & 3 - 398220; C2 - 448176
- Rcn Co - CP - 513125; 1st Rcn Plt. - 599090 (w/Co Mn);  
2nd Rcn Plt. - 508162; 3rd Rcn Plt. - 504168.

July 1st found the Battalion in action and attached to 1st Armored Division in vicinity of Pomarance, Italy. The Battalion, less "B" & "C", attached to Task Force Howze. "B" & "C" companies attached to CC "A" & CC "B" respectively. Reconnaissance continued on its mission of route reconnaissance for TFH and "A" company continued to give direct AT support.

97-692

10791  
5/3

Major Doran was placed in command of the left column of TFH. The force consisted of the 701st T.D. Bn. (--"B", "C", 2 plt. "A"), 1st Bn 6th Inf., "D" Co, 13th AR, "D" Co, 1st AR. The mission of this force was to secure the town of Mazzola and road junction on highway #68 2000 yards to the north. No time was set for the attack. Troops making up this force were in the line and had to be assembled prior to the jump off.

One M10 in "B" company received a shell through the turret, killing the crew and burning the vehicle. Another vehicle in "B" was hit with an AP which penetrated the fuel tank. The vehicle was still operative so continued forward until it was knocked out by an AT mine.

On July 2 both the Command Group and Trains moved to vicinity 4815. Recon. Co. less 2nd plt. also in same vicinity for maintenance.

"C" company lost two M10's destroyed.

July 3 - Doran Force to jump off at 0930. Recon. company ordered to send all available light tanks and armored cars, also Pioneer Plt. to CP of 13th AR to function as reconnaissance for TFD.

Upon arrival at Mazzola the advance elements were heavily shelled by artillery. An OP was established and fire brought down on both gun and mortar positions.

The attack was discontinued and those with Major Doran in Mazzola were ordered to hold the town but to evacuate by 2400 hrs. The town was cleared as ordered but on return an M10 of "A" company threw both tracks and had to be abandoned, also a light tank from Recon. company.

"C" company relieved for maintenance at 0600 hrs and pulled back to assembly area vicinity 414230. This area was heavily shelled, killing the 1st Sgt. and knocking out the Command Half-Track.

July 4 - The Battalion (less "B", "C", & Rcn) was put in Div. Reserve,

Major Doran, commanding, and moved to assembly area vicinity 478174 and to be prepared to support either CC "A" or CC "B". The 2nd Bn, 1st AR (-2 Cos) attached to Div. Reserve. Recon. Co. further attached to TFH. It took up positions as dismounted outpost in area vacated by TFH after withdrawing from Mazzola. "A" & Hqs. moved to assembly area where maintenance and rehabilitation were stressed.

July 5 - Division ordered the Battalion to establish a road block vicinity Saline to protect the left rear of CC "B". One section of "A" company and 1 platoon of "D" Co, 1st AR under command of platoon leader of "D" Co. were given the job.

"B" & "C" companies continued to provide AT protection for the two CC's. Nothing reported by these companies, everything was comparatively quiet.

Late in the afternoon of July 5, one platoon of "A" company was detached from Div. Reserve and attached to TFH.

July 6 - The remaining units of "A" company not already detached from Div. Res. were attached to CC "B". The detachments already made were not changed.

"C" company with the Peanut Force report resistance very light, mostly infantry and that they are on their objective.

Orders were received relieving Rcn Co by the 349th Inf, 88th Div. and upon relief Rcn will take charge of the road block vicinity Q499212 and in addition to that maintain a mounted patrol during the hours of darkness on road net between Q500180, Q504195, Q476202, and Q499212 and this will have to be coordinated with 81st Rcn.

"B" company had nothing other than routine reports.

July 7 - Our Ln. Officer with 13th AR reported that CC "A" was counter-attacked by a considerable number of infantry and several tanks but that it

was repulsed. TFH also was counterattacked and withdrew. Platoon of "D" company, 1st AR that was holding road block was relieved from attachment to CC "B" and reverts to control of 2nd Bn, 1st AR.

On orders from 1st Armored Division all companies remain in position and that the Battalion, ~~less Recon.~~, had been attached to the 88th Div.

July 8 - Upon attachment to the 88th Div. the gun companies were further detached to the following: "C" Co. to the 351st RCT, "B" Co. to the 349th RCT, and "A" Co. to the 350th RCT. Rcn Co. remained under Bn. Control to maintain AT warning net within Div. sector.

Gun companies moved with the infantry providing AT protection but had nothing of importance to report.

July 9 - Infantry and our TD's entered the outskirts of Volterra; except for heavily mined areas there was no resistance. From all indications the enemy appears to have completely withdrawn.

Lt. Hudson reported fresh Mk VI tracks but never observed the tanks themselves. While moving his CP into new area, captured 3 PW's, otherwise had nothing to report except mechanical difficulties due to terrain.

July 10 - Attachments of companies remains the same. The Bn CP moved into same place as "C" company. Our Ln. Officer with the 88th Div. reported a counterattack on the 350th Inf. of over company strength.

July 11 - The attack was continued today with our guns in direct support. During the day there was a noticeable increase in enemy artillery reported. "C" company reports the town of Laticco was burning. No other reports.

July 12 - The Bn CP was shelled at 0220B; Major Doran, Bn C.O. and 3 EM KIA and 14 EM wounded. During the early afternoon one round fell within the Bn CP area and killed one EM and wounded 3 others.

Captain Childs promoted to Major.

"A" company received several rounds of our own artillery which was quickly straightened out. No damage.

Nothing reported by other companies other than movements from one firing position to another.

July 13 - Companies had nothing to report; everything was very quiet.

July 14 - "A" company reports that they are moving north in two columns but that they are having difficulty because of obstacles in streams and roads. Except for "A" company's report, nothing was reported by the other companies except for normal movements to improve firing positions.

July 15 - 24 - This period was not one of great activity as far as the gun companies were concerned. The mission of providing AT protection for the MCT's of the 88th Div. as the enemy withdrew to the Arno River gave the TD's the opportunity to fire on some enemy vehicles and personnel.

Upon relief from attachment to the 88th Div., the Battalion reverted to control of 1st Armored Division in a rest area about six miles south of Cecina, Italy.

July 24 - 31 - This period was given over to rehabilitation of personnel, maintenance of vehicles, and reorganization of the Battalion under the new T/O & T/E. Our training consisted of radio procedure, gun drill with some firing at towed targets on the 1st Armored Division A/T range. The Battalion was officially reorganized 31 July 1944.

Location of 701st T.D. Bn. at end of period:

Battalion - vicinity Q245038

**ANNEX:**

**Ammunition expended during the month of July:**

M.E.	- - -	1878
A.P.C.	- -	562
Smoke	- -	18
Time (M54)		<u>14</u>
Total	- -	2472

**Casualties:**

**See Attached.**

Following is a list of Battle Casualties (all categories) sustained by this organization during the period 1 - 31 July 1944. (\* Indicates hospitalized.)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
COOPERMAN, HAROLD	32780786	Pvt.	B	1 July 44	KIA
*CURRAN, JOHN	35026213	Pvt.	C	1 July 44	LIA
HALIMAN, JAMES H.	37554211	Pvt.	B	1 July 44	KIA
FULMER, WILLIAM R.	37101644	T/5	B	1 July 44	KIA
CHAMBERS, BALDWIN B.	37005968	Cpl.	B	1 July 44	KIA
STEFFAN, MARTIN G.	37129800	Sgt.	B	1 July 44	KIA
SORENSEN, ARTHUR E.	32353701	Pvt.	B	1 July 44	LWA
*HAMMETT, MAURICE L.	34147367	Pfc.	Rcn.	1 July 44	SWA
NEW, HUBERT	6669669	Cpl.	B	2 July 44	KIA
CRAFORD, JR., ALBERT B.	34133988	Pfc.	Rcn.	2 July 44	LWA
*ANDERSON, RUDOLPH O.	01823079	2nd Lt.	B	2 July 44	LIA
*PARIS, JACK D.	14053121	Sgt.	B.	2 July 44	LWA
ASLING, ARNOLD A.	37519651	Pvt.	B	2 July 44	LWA
*BAILEY, WALTER E.	37131802	Pvt.	B	2 July 44	SWA
*SING, ENG W.	32175070	Pfc.	C	2 July 44	LWA
MORGAN, DELOSS B.	37449685	Pfc.	C	2 July 44	LWA
FEE, ROBERT	15053822	Pvt.	C	2 July 44	LWA
*COSBY, CECIL C.	6985611	T/4	C	3 July 44	LWA
*BLANK, DONALD J.	33246805	Sgt.	A	3 July 44	LWA
DIXON, MATTHEW	34088281	1ST/SGT.	C	3 July 44	KIA
SHANNAHAN, JOSEPH J.	6831793	Pvt.	Rcn.	4 July 44	LWA
LANGDON, DONALD L.	13085355	Pfc.	Rcn.	4 July 44	LWA
ANDERSON, CLAYTON	35262612	Pvt.	Med. Det.	4 July 44	LWA
BOWMAN, BENEDICT J.	35106351	Pvt.	C	6 July 44	KIA
COOPER, JR., THOMAS A.	34171527	T/5	C	6 July 44	KIA
MANGUM, GEORGE W.	37368178	T/5	C	6 July 44	LWA
KING, WILLIAM C.	14004817	Pvt.	C	6 July 44	LWA
*DELMAGE, DAVID V.	12082072	Pfc.	C	6 July 44	LWA
*HARBER, JERRY J.	33209549	Pvt.	C	6 July 44	LWA
*BLANKENSHIP, WILLIAM A.	6985393	S/Sgt.	B	7 July 44	LWA
STREET, HARVARD J.	34125474	Sgt.	C	7 July 44	LWA
MILLS, HARDEE R.	14013784	Sgt.	C	11 July 44	MIA
DORAN, FRANK M.	0282923	Major	Hq.	12 July 44	KIA
*COOGAN, JR., WILLIAM G.	01821827	2nd Lt.	A	10 July 44	LWA
WILKENS, WALTER B.	32230748	Pvt.	Hq.	12 July 44	KIA
DENT, RAY W.	34088281	Pvt.	C	12 July 44	KIA
WEST, JR., ROBERT	15057024	Pvt.	C	12 July 44	KIA
BOYLE, EDWARD J.	33318232	Pvt.	C	12 July 44	KIA
*DURARD, EARLE	34147403	T/5	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
*McKENNA, CHARLES J.	20233525	Pvt.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
*JUSTUS, GILBERT W.	38487139	Pvt.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
GREEN, CARL M.	01822696	2nd Lt.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
BOLIN, JR., LUTHER	15054689	T/4	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA

List of Battle Casualties cont'd.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
BRUETT, ERNEST E.	36302149	Pfc.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
DUHAIME, ALBERT J.	31379247	Pvt.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
GRUIS, BERNARD H.	39305488	T/4	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
MIDKIFF, NOBLE H.	35482495	T/5	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
SEAMAN, JOHN R.	36397305	Pfc.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
YESLOFSKY, MURRAY	32175782	Pvt.	Hq.	12 July 44	LWA
*TALIAFERRO, ERNEST E.	15047713	Pfc.	C	12 July 44	LWA
*HAJJAR, MICHAEL	11046319	Pvt.	B	12 July 44	LWA
*REPKA, BOLESZAW S.	32387217	Pfc.	C	12 July 44	LWA
*ROBERTS, CONDY	15044275	Pvt.	C	12 July 44	LWA
*SPENCER, PORTER J.	7040507	Pvt.	C	12 July 44	LWA
SCOTT, ROBERT S.	33397226	Pvt.	B	15 July 44	LWA
*LENZINI, HERMAN C.	36302260	Sgt.	C	15 July 44	LWA
HODOR, STANLEY	31124452	Pfc.	C	15 July 44	KIA
DEGMAN, JOHN T.	01822378	1st Lt.	B	18 July 44	LWA
SNELL, CLARENCE H.	34508911	Pvt.	C	24 July 44	KIA
PICCOLI, SYLVESTER C.	33778453	Pvt.	A	18 July 44	LIA



## A W A R D S

1. During the period 1 - 31 July 1944 the following named personnel were awarded Purple Hearts for wounds received in action:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>
Hammett, Maurice L.	34147367	Pfc.	Rcn.
Paris, Jack D.	14053121	Sgt.	*B
Schramski, Jerome J.	36160515	Pvt.	A
Russell, Lloyd W.	33090117	Sgt.	A
McKenna, Charles J.	20233525	Pvt.	Hq.
McNair, John L.	38018181	Pvt.	C
Urban, Earl L.	35029497	S/Sgt.	C
Street, Harvard J.	34125474	Sgt.	C
Cosenza, Peter C.	13098939	Pfc.	C
Seaman, John R.	36397305	Pfc.	Hq.
Justus, Gilbert W.	38487139	Pvt.	Hq.

2. During the period 1 - 31 July 1944, and Oak Leaf Cluster was awarded in addition to a Purple Heart previously awarded for wounds received in action, to the following listed personnel:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>
Moody, Leveston	37088629	Cpl.	B
Blank, Donald J.	33246805	Sgt.	A
Patrick, Isadore	34088170	Sgt.	B
Hiatt, Paul	37103779	Tec 5	C
*Degman, John T.	01822378	1st Lt.	B

\*(First and Second Cluster)

3. Pvt. William E. Ware, 7040392, Reconnaissance Company, was posthumously awarded a Silver Star for gallantry in action on 22 June 1944, per General Order No. 70, Headquarters First Armored Division, dated 21 July 1944.

4. Capt. Albert B. Morrison, 0422189, and 1st Lt. Robert J. Jackson, 01822010, were awarded Bronze Star medals for gallantry in action on 30 May 1944, per General Orders No. 70, Hq. First Armored Division, dated 21 July 1944.

5. S/Sgt. Earl L. Urban, 35029479, Sgt. Ralph B. Laney, 34171574, Cpl. Allen E. Knorr, 33230761, and Tec 5 Leonard L. Jokerst, 37132039, all of Company "C" were cited for gallantry in action on 30 May 1944, per General Orders No. 71, Hq. First Armored Division, dated 22 July 1944.

6. S/Sgt. Melvin F. Dailey, 32033802, Medical Detachment, was posthumously awarded a Bronze Star medal for gallantry in action on 22 June 1944, per General Orders No. 71, Hq. First Armored Division, dated 22 July 1944.

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 164, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

1 August 1944

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following intelligence report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 July 1944 to 31 July 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The intelligence covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous intelligence report submitted and including 30 June 1944.

For the Commanding Officers

*Jesse B. Wray*  
JESSE B. WRAY  
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.  
Adjutant.

\*\*\*\*\*  
INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 July - 31 July 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 158-I, IV, GSGS 4229

Bn GP - 527127. Bn Trains - 594035  
"A" Co - CP - 512122; A1 - 508161; A2 & 3 - 512122  
"B" Co - CP - 604122; B1 & 2 - 602172; B3 - 624167  
"C" Co - CP - 480140; C1 & 3 - 398220; C2 - 448176  
Rcn Co - CP - 513125; 1st Rcn Plt. - 599090 (w/Co Mm);  
2nd Plt. - 508162; 3rd Plt. - 504168

OUR OPERATIONS:

Initially the battalion was attached to the Howze Force, CC "A" and CC "B", but midway during the period was attached to the 88th Infantry Division. Little armor was encountered during the period, and our activity was directed mainly at personnel, machine gun nests, enemy strong points in houses, etc. During the period OP's were established and successfully directed fire upon enemy personnel and vehicles. On the 24th of July our

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units were relieved, and withdrawn from the line, returning to the First Armored Division bivouac area.

ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Armor: Throughout the period the enemy used armor sparingly, but always operating in groups of 2 or more. The enemy used his tanks during the period as a defensive weapon, using them occasionally in an offensive role. Mk VI's, IV's, and SP's were used in anti-tank and artillery roles, delaying our advancing forces as long as possible, and then retreating before our destroyers could bring effective fire upon them. The enemy's use of considerable numbers, as compared with the previous period, of Mk VI tanks and heavier caliber SP guns was a definite shift from his use of Mk IV's and light and medium caliber SP guns; that is, the emphasis was upon heavier caliber guns using them in anti-tank and artillery roles. In the few instances in which armor was used, in enemy counter-attacks, they were used in small numbers, and were easily dispersed by our TD's and artillery.

ARTILLERY:

Although the enemy concentrations were just as heavy as in previous periods, in general, the enemy artillery was lighter than in the previous period. Supplementing his artillery pieces with SP's and increased Nebelwerfer activity, and making good use of available armor, the enemy was able to protect the slow retreat of his infantry, and slow down our advance considerably. The enemy again used his artillery mostly to harass and interdict rear areas as well as placing heavy concentrations on our forward areas.

ENEMY TROOP ACTIVITY:

Enemy action throughout the period was defensive, with a few exceptions in which he counter-attacked unsuccessfully. Enemy opposition throughout the period was comparatively light, but the enemy made excellent use of demolitions, mines, both anti-tank and personnel, road blocks, and intensive small arms and

machine-gun fire to slow down our forces. He practiced his usual delaying tactics employing well placed groups of infantry with an abundance of automatic weapons, SP's, heavily mined roads and avenues of approach, and numerous road blocks. Mines were found at times to be 3 deep, and so well covered by machine-gun and small arms fire that our advance was delayed for considerable periods of time. Enemy movements, harrassed by artillery, aircraft and partisan activity, were much lighter than in the previous period. Valuable information on enemy activity, mines, dispositions of artillery pieces, tanks, etc. was supplied by friendly partisans operating behind the enemy lines. The enemy made good use of well organized defensive positions, and made strong points of strategically located houses. From the units identified it was quite evident that the enemy was finding it extremely difficult, and often impossible, to withdraw his units, or divisions, long enough to reorganize. However, he did the next best thing, collecting the remnants of decimated units, and putting them under experienced commands, thereby getting the maximum benefits possible under the circumstances.

Few of the enemy were captured, as compared to the previous period, but those taken again represented a motley group from all parts of Europe, many of whom were deserters who volunteered much valuable information. However, there was a noticeable stiffening resistance by the enemy, even though the morale of the troops captured indicated complete resignation to ultimate defeat.

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 164, c/o Postmaster, L.I., N.Y.

1 September 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (three channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 15-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 August 1944 to 31 August 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Diary, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted and including 31 July 1944.

For the Commanding Officers

*Carl B. Baker*  
CARL B. BAKER  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn.  
Adjutant.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 August - 31 August 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of periods:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000  
Sheets 119-III, IV

Battalion in assembly area vicinity - 215000

The period opens with the battalion in the 1st Armored Division rest and training area in the vicinity of Spina, Italy (215000), following the training program set forth in Training Manual 12 to 14 inclusive, 1st Armored Division.

During the period August 1 to August 9 inclusive, training was conducted in the following subjects: gun drill for 3" and 37mm, radio procedure, disciplinary drills, care and cleaning of weapons, camouflage, map reading, orientation, drivers' instruction and maintenance and physical conditioning. All the above mentioned subjects were covered necessary due

1000

to the long period of combat which tends to make everyone either sloppy or rusty. This training proved very satisfactory.

On August 9 the battalion moved to an assembly area vicinity 20410 with elements of the 1st Armored Division. Upon arrival in the new area the training program mentioned above was continued. Arrangements were made for firing both 3", 7.5", and small arms.

On August 12 two companies were alerted to move to direct fire positions; "B" company attached to OC "B" and "A" company to OC "A". Reconnaissance and "C" companies remained in battalion assembly area and continued with training program. Plans were made for relief of companies so that all could get the benefit of the training program. "B" company went into position vicinity Percoli and "A" company vicinity Ronasco. Upon arrival in area in vicinity of Percoli, "B" company relieved "C" company, 805th TD Bn.

Training continued for companies remaining in assembly area. The evening of August 17 "A" company was relieved in position by "C" company. Upon relief "A" company returned to battalion assembly area and continued the training program.

On August 21 "C" company and "B" company were detached from their respective combat commands and reverted to battalion control. The battalion was assigned to Division Artillery as support. All direct fire positions were vacated and the guns put in indirect positions. Reconnaissance company manned two OP's in each of the three companies' sectors.

On August 23 "A" company, having completed training program, moved to indirect fire positions vicinity of Palda in support of the 27th Armored Field Artillery.

The remainder of the period all companies occupied artillery positions in support of Division Artillery, 1st Armored Division. Reconnaissance company manned OP's and directed fire of companies of 701st TD Bn, plus the field

**Artillery Battalions of the Division.**

**Positions of 701st T.D. Bn. at close of period:**

**Bn CP - 295446. Bn Trains - 287443**

**"A" Co - GR-103515; AI-1032538; A2-10005424**

**"B" Co - GR-113517; BI-11235195; B2-11565171**

**"C" Co - GR-209516; CI-26925212; C2-2065216**

**Non Co - GR-11518; CP's - 1st Non Plt - 250561 & 225576  
2nd Non Plt - 317568 & 335572  
3rd Non Plt - 373568 & 391586  
Flash CP - 307557**

**Italy 1/30,000, sheets I, IV, 0909 1229.**

AMER

Amputation Expenses

HE - 9775  
AFC - 1000  
Books - 329  
Misc - 27  

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TOTAL 10131



HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, U. S. ARMY

6 September 1944

CASUALTIES

During the month of August the Battalion suffered only one battle casualty.

William A. Blankenship, 6985393, S/Sgt, Co. B, LWA 16 Aug 44.

During the month awards were made to personnel of the Battalion as follows:

Purple Hearts were awarded to:

1. Albert E. Borga, Pvt., 35456644, Co. B
2. Clayton E. Anderson, Pvt. 35262612, Rcn Co.
3. Albert J. Duhaime, Pvt., 31379247, Hq & Hq Co.
4. Carl K. Green, 1st Lt., 01822696, Hq & Hq Co.
5. Noble H. Midkiff, Tec 5, 35482495, Hq & Hq Co.
6. Ernest E. Bruett, Pfc., 36302149, Hq & Hq Co.
7. Cecil C. Cosby, Tec 4, 6985611, Co. C
8. Boyd L. Rhodes, Pvt., 39528323, Co. C
9. Robert S. Scott, Pvt., 33397226, Co. B

1st Lt. Charles S. Briggs, 0406979, Hq & Hq Co. was awarded Bronze Star for meritorious service from 23 May to 20 July per GO No. 81, Hq 1st A.D., dtd 28 August.

Cpl Thomas R. Sherman, 16094405, Co C, was awarded a Bronze Star Medal for gallantry in action on 30 May per GO No. 81, Hq 1st A.D., dtd 28 August.

S/Sgt Robert E. Mitchell, 36302179, Co C, was awarded a Bronze Star Medal for courageous action during period 22 June - 7 July per GO No. 81, Hq 1st A.D., dtd 28 August.

Pvt Luther A. James, 6983914, Rcn. Co., was awarded a bronze Star medal for heroic service on 1 July 1944 per GO No. 77, Hq 1st A.D., dtd 8 August 1944.

Secret  
Per Auth CG 1st AD  
Initial:  
Date: 18 November 44.

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
ARO 464, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

1 November 1944

SUBJECT: Operations Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, Ait 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 October 1944 to 31 October 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted up to and including 30 September 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN E. DOOLEY  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn.  
Adjutant.

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#### OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 October - 31 October 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000

Bn. CP - 700766. Bn. Trains - 697777  
"A" Co CP - 698769 (assy area)  
"B" Co CP - 707777 (assy area)  
"C" Co in arty positions vicinity 200860 (attached to BRF)  
Rcn Co CP - 695774 (assy area)

The period opened with the battalion ("C" Co) in assembly area vicinity Prato-Florence area. "C" company, attached to Brazilian Expeditionary Force under IV Corps control, continue artillery support role.

1 to 13 Oct. - Battalion ("C" company), in assembly area, carried out rigorous training and maintenance schedule. Physical conditioning of personnel and maintenance of all vehicles was stressed. Training schedule for this period included gun drills (all weapons), radio procedure, use of AF and map reference point codes, map reading and inspections of personnel and

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equipment. Three days were spent on 1st Armored Division anti-tank range by all 3" and 37mm gun crews firing both platoon and individual firing problems. Rifles and carbines were fired by all personnel on 1st Armored Division rifle range. Orientation and training films were scheduled during periods of inclement weather. On 13 November route reconnaissance was made from battalion assembly area to vicinity 820043 (Muta Pass) by all unit commanders. Billeting details from each company remained in new areas.

14 Oct. - Preparation of battalion (-"C" Co) for movement. Departed area vicinity 47077 at 140900. Order of march - "A", "B", Rcn., Hqs. Battalion closed in areas 141345 October 1944 - Bn CP - 806046. Bn Trains - 817044; "A" Co CP - 811052; "B" Co CP - 812058; Rcn Co CP - 818046. Remainder of day spent in establishment of bivouac.

15 Oct. - Reconnaissance of area vicinity 845223 for artillery positions by "B" company officers.

16 Oct. - "B" company departs area vicinity 812058 at 0500A, closing in artillery positions at 0730A hrs. "B" Co CP at 845223; "A" btry at 84362250; "B" btry at 84702242; attached to 1st Armored Division artillery in support of 91st AFA battalion.

FM radio CPX carried out by battalion (-"B" & "C"). Use of M-209, AF code and map reference point code and correct radio procedure stressed.

17 Oct. - Maintenance and training. Battalion "B" & "C" companies in artillery positions.

18 Oct. - "A" company made reconnaissance for anti-tank positions in CC "A", 1st Armored Division sector for 3rd platoon and moved platoon at 1600A closing in positions 820262, 828261, 830263, and 831263 at 2100A hrs. Bn. CP moved from 816046 to 818045 closing at 1800A hrs. Battalion (-"B" & "C") continued maintenance of vehicles.

19 Oct. - "A" company (-3rd platoon) alerted for movement 1400A hrs, departed vicinity 809055 at 1645A closing in artillery positions at 2100A hrs.

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at 857229. "A" battery - 85672295; "B" battery - 85622270; attached to 1st Armored Division artillery in support of 27th AFA battalion upon closing.

20 to 26 Oct. - No change in dispositions, "B" company and "A" company (-3rd platoon) continued reinforcing fires of 1st Armored Division artillery. Counterbattery fire damaged two "A" company M10's on 21 October. No casualties. Maintenance and winterizing of vehicles continued throughout the battalion.

27 to 31 Oct. - Reconnaissance company assigned mission of maintaining route #6527 from 819043 to 780190 on 27 October. Moved company on 30 October to: CP - 808045; 1 & 2 Rcn Plts - 795095; 3rd Rcn & Pioneer Plts - 772127. "A" and "B" companies continued in reinforcing artillery roles carrying out normal harassing missions with few observed fires due to poor visibility.

Positions of Battalion at close of period:

Bn CP - 818045. Bn Trains - 817044.  
Rcn Co CP - 808045. 1st & 2nd Rcn Plts - 795095.  
3rd & Pioneer Plts - 772127.

Detached Units:

"A" Co CP - 857229. 1st Plt - 85672295  
2nd Plt - 85622270  
3rd Plt - (1 gun each) - 826262; 828261; 830263;  
831263.  
"B" Co CP - 843224. "A" btry - 84362250; "B" btry - 84702242.  
"C" Co CP - 191995. "A" btry - 18790008; "B" btry - 18490010.

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ANNEX:

Ammunition Expenditures:

HE	-	11781
SMOKE	-	176
TRAC	-	18
TOTAL	-	<u>11975</u>

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464, U. S. Army

CASUALTIES

1. During the period 1 - 31 October 1944 the Battalion suffered the following personnel casualties:

- Tec 5 Arthur E. Lawson, 33 098 752, Co A, SWA, 20 Oct 44
- Tec 5 George W. Wachter, 33 553 309, Co A, SWA, 20 Oct 44
- Pvt Henry D. Harper, Jr., 18 137 434, Co A, LIA, 21 Oct 44
- Pvt Irvin M. Peterson, 37 095 774, Hq & Hq Co, LWA, 24 Oct 44 (Not hosp)
- Tec 5 Elbert W. Rugar, 32 136 057, Hq & Hq Co, LWA, 24 Oct 44 (Not hosp)

2. During this period the following changes in status of former Battle Casualties occurred.

- Sgt Hubert Woosley, 15 046 136, Co A, returned to duty
- Sgt Frank G. Allen, 33 126 411, Co C, from MIA to KIA as of 22 Jun 44
- Tec 5 Arnold W. Richson, 36 803 500, Co C, from MIA to KIA as of 22 Jun 44
- Pfc Carl C. Anderson, 36 457 419, Co C, from MIA to KIA as of 22 Jun 44
- Pvt Clarence I. Parker, 33 090 663, Rcn Co, returned to duty
- 1st Lt. Walter E. Loveless, 01 823 546, Rcn Co, returned to duty
- Pfc Ernest S. Taliaferro, 15 047 713, Co C, returned to duty
- Cpl James B. Worrell, 34 171 222, Co A, returned to duty
- Pvt Eng W. Sing, 32 175 070, Co C, rehospitalized for former wounds.

AWARDS

1. During the period 1 -31 October 1944 Awards to the following named personnel of this organization were announced:

a. 1st Lt JOHN T. DEGMAN, 01822378, and Cpl Joseph T. Simon, 37098945, both of Co "B", were awarded a Silver Star for gallantry in action on 1 July 1944 near Mensano, Italy, per General Orders No. 86, Hq 1st Armored Division, dated 3 October 1944.

b. General Orders No. 87, Hq 1st Armored Division, dated 19 October 1944, awarded Purple Hearts and/or Oak Leaf Clusters thereto to the following:

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| 1st Lt. John T. Degman, 01 822 378, Co B      | 4th Oak Leaf Cluster |
| S/Sgt William A. Blankenship, 69 853 93, Co B | 2nd Oak Leaf Cluster |
| S/Sgt William A. Blankenship, 69 853 93, Co B | 1st Oak Leaf Cluster |
| Pvt Arnold A. Asling, 37 519 651, Co B        | P/H                  |
| Pfc Frank Bertino, 32 433 343, Rcn Co         | P/H                  |
| Pvt Kenneth L. Ford, 37 512 515, Co B         | P/H                  |
| S/Sgt John R. Foster, 34 147 012, Rcn Co      | P/H                  |
| S/Sgt William H. Goolsby, 63 82728, Co B      | P/H                  |
| Pvt Joseph F. Herman, 32 324 406, Co B        | P/H                  |
| Tec 5 Donald L. Langdon, 13 085 355, Rcn Co   | P/H                  |

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Awards of Purple Hearts and/or Oak Leaf Clusters thereto cont'd.

Pvt Gunval Mattson, 37 098 335, Co B	P/H
Sgt Rex Meredith, 6 669 903, Co B	P/H
Sgt William E. Roy, 15 043 980, Co B	P/H
Sgt Deward K. Salley, 15 057 131, Rcn Co	P/H
Pvt Joseph J. Shannahan, 6 831 793, Rcn Co	P/H
1st Lt. John R. Short, 01 823 223, Co B	P/H
Pfc Arthur E. Sorenson, 32 353 701, Co B	P/H
Sgt Oscar E. Swanson, 36 185 161, Rcn Co	P/H
Pvt Norman Vigderhouse, 33 193 261, Rcn Co	P/H
Tec 5 James F. Upchurch, 34 134 349, Rcn Co	P/H

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HEADQUARTERS 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464 c/o Postmaster, N.Y.C., N.Y.

**SECRET**  
Per Auth: CO 701 TD Bn.  
Initials: *JED*  
Date: 1 Jan 1945

1 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operations Report.

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. (Thru channels).

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following operations report of the 701st tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period 1 December 1944 to 31 December 1944, is herewith submitted.

2. The operations covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.

3. Previous operations report submitted covered period up to and including 30 November 1944.

For the Commanding Officer:

*John E. Dooley*  
JOHN E. DOOLEY,  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn.,  
Adjutant.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period: 1 December - 31 December 1944.

Locations of 701st TD Bn. beginning of period:

- MAPS: 1/50,000, Sheets 98-I, 106-IV, GSGS 4229, Italy.
- Bn. CP - L-818045. Bn. Trains - L-817044.
- A Co CP - L-857229. 1st Plat - L-85672295. 2nd Plat - L-8562270.
- 3rd Plat - (1 gun)-L-825262; L-828259. (2 guns)-L-829259.
- B Co CP - L-843224. "A" Btry - L-84362250; "B" Btry - L-84702242.
- C Co CP - Q-700766 (Assy. Area)
- Rcn Co CP - L-771123. 1st & 2nd Rcn Plats. -L-795095.
- 3rd & Pioneer Plats. -L-773127.

Period opened with A Company (-3d Plat) in artillery positions attached to First Armored Division Artillery with mission of reinforcing fires of the 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 3d Platoon of A Company in anti-tank positions attached to 91st Rcn. Bn. in 1 AD sector.

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B Company in artillery positions attached to First Armored Division Artillery with mission of reinforcing fires of the 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion. C Company attached to First Armored Division Reserve, in assembly area. Hon. Co. under Battalion control with mission of maintaining highway #6527 from L-819043 to L-780190.

1 Dec. - Normal harassing missions fired.

2 Dec. - 3d Plat., A Company, reverted to control of CC"B", 1 AD at 021200A Dec when CC"B" relieved 91st Hon Co in place. 1st Platoon, C Company moved from 700766 to L-830264 closing at 021000A Dec 44, in preparation for relieving 3d Platoon, A Company. C Company (-1st Plat) preparing for movement. Hon. Co. conducted route reconnaissance to Ronzuno and Anconella. A & B Companies fired unobserved harassing missions. 1st Platoon, C Company completed relief of 3d Platoon of A Company in place and 3d Platoon, A Company moved to A Company area at L-85722253 reverting to A Company control.

3 Dec. - No change. C Company (-1st plat) departed area 700766 at 031800A Dec 44, closed in area vicinity L-820235 at 040115A Dec 44. Attached to 1 AD Artillery to reinforce the fires of 129 Field Artillery Battalion.

5 Dec. - C Company (-1st Plat) took up artillery positions. Company CP L-82082345. 2d Platoon - L-82021-23270; 3d Platoon - L-81918-23343.

6-7 Dec. Normal assigned duties by all units.

8 Dec.- C Company (-1st Plat) moved Company CP to L-818231. 2d Platoon to L-819233 and 3d Platoon to 818231.

9 to 25 Dec. - Normal assigned duties by all units.

26. Dec. - 2d Hon Platoon, Hon Co moved from L-795095 to vicinity L-7224; L-8327; and L-8327 for air-ground coordination mission.

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27 Dec. - A Company, B Company, and C Company moved from L-857229; L-845223 and L-818231 respectively closing at L-818045; L-812057 and L-818045 at 271500A Dec. 44, 2d Platoon, Rcn. Co., returned to L-795095 reverting to Rcn. Company control. Preparations by all units for movement to IV Corps sector.

28 Dec. - Battalion departed vicinity L-818045 closing in following positions at 280830A Dec. 44:

Battalion CP - L-144796  
A Company CP - L-141792  
B Company CP - L-143795  
C Company CP - L-144798  
Rcn. Co CP - L-138793  
Bn. Trains - L-139798

3d Platoon, Rcn Company carried out route reconnaissance.

29 Dec. - 31 Dec. - Rcn Company assigned mission of patrolling coastal sector from Viareggio south to south of Serchio River (U-998731). Rcn Company moved and established OPs at: Rcn Company CP - U-004774; 1st Platoon - U-993769; 2d Platoon - U-988792; 3d Platoon - U-999730; Pioneer Platoon - U-004773. Other Companies carried out physical conditioning, training and maintenance program.

Positions at close of Period:

Bn CP - L-144796. Bn Trains - L-139798.  
A Co CP - L-141792  
B Co CP - L-143795  
C Co CP - L-144798  
Rcn Co CP - U-004774. 1st Plat - U-993769. 2d Plat - U-988792. 3d Plat - U-999730.  
Pioneer Plat - U-004773.

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ARND:

Assaultion Expenditure during period:

3", High Explosive - - - - -	2,248
3", Smoke - - - - -	81
3", Time - - - - -	<u>39</u>
Total	2,418

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 404 U.S. ARMY

6 January 1945.

1. During the period 1 - 31 December 1944 the Battalion suffered the following personnel battle casualties:

Col. George W. Marcoux, 11038900, Co. "A", LWA, Loiano, Italy, 15 Dec 44  
(Hosp).

Pfc 5 John P. Krempa, 32554652, Co. "A", SWA, Loiano, Italy, 15 Dec 44  
(Hosp).

2. The following changes in status of formerly reported personnel battle casualties occurred:

Pvt. Mel B. Kensler, 16073794, Co. "A" - Returned to duty 24 Dec 44.

Lt. Ray F. Hanshaw, 32299080, Co. "B" - Returned to duty 1 Dec 44.

3. Award of the following decorations were published during this period:

a. The Purple Heart was awarded to the following named individuals for wounds received in action against the enemy:

Sgt. Lawrence F. Biggs, 34333008, Co. "C"

Pvt. Clyde Monroe, 35119052, Co. "A"

S/Sgt. James O. Johnson, 35213654, Co. "A"

Pvt. Vernon E. Welch, 37603507, Co. "A"

Pvt. James E. Tweedy, 38084398, Co. "A"

b. The first Oak Leaf Cluster was awarded to Pvt. Kenneth L. Maneely, 6261593, Co. "A" for wounds received in action against the enemy.

*Sup*

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HEAD QUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464 U.S. ARMY

SECRET  
Per Auth: CO, 701 TD Bn.  
Initials:  
Date: 1 March 1945

1 March 1945.

**SUBJECT:** Operations Report.

**TO :** The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C. (Thru Channels)

1. Submitted herewith Operations Report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion for the period 1-28 February 1945, inclusive, in compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated 10 March 1943.

2. This operations report is taken from the Unit Journal and Unit Diary and supporting documentary evidence is attached thereto.

3. Operations report covering period through 31 January 1945 submitted previously.

For the Commanding Officer:

*John E. Dooley*  
JOHN E. DOOLEY,  
1st Lt., 701st TD Bn.,  
Adjutant.

1 Incl  
Ops Rpt w/allied papers.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYSER BATTALION

Period: 1 February - 28 February 1945.

Location of 701st TD Bn, beginning of period:

MAP: 1/50,000, sheets 97 I, II, 104 I, II, 0809, Italy.

Bn CP - 1582130. Bn Train - 1582118.

A Co CP - 1587147. 1st Plt, 1st Sert. 1580177; 2d Sert. 587147.

2d Plt, 902138.

3d Plt, 594121.

B Co CP - 0954895. 6 guns - 09570-9009; 6 guns 09570-9036.

C Co CP - 15570-1260. 6 guns - 5483-1255; 6 guns - 6116-1516; 2 guns -

5480-1266 (8mm)

Bn Co CP 1660183.

The period opened with A Co in direct fire position and C Co in arty

position under operational control of 424 P.A. Group. B Co, attached to 92

Medium Artillery, in artillery positions. C Co manned two (2) 88mm guns for

424 P.A. Group. Bn Co, attached to II Corps and further attached to 81st Bn.

Sq., under reconnaissance of area in vic 1697196.

1 Feb - A Co closed 311700Z Jan 45 at 1587147 in direct fire position

under operational control of 424 P.A. Group. B Co closed 312300Z Jan 45 at

0954895 in artillery position, attached to 92 Div Arty. C Co closed 311615A

Jan 45 at 155701260 in artillery position under operational control of 424

P.A. Group. C Co manned two (2) 88mm guns for 424 P.A. Group.

B Co - A and B Companies - No activity for the period. C Co fired

harassing missions. Bn Co, still defend, conductive mortar school.

3 Feb - A and C Companies normal harassing missions. A Co CP at 587178 and

Platoon. C Co CP at 543136.

4 Feb - Bn Co, attached to Bn Sq, began rally of "B" Troop, 81 Bn Sq at

0954895 P.A., completed at 0954895 P.A., Bn Co CP at 1570196, 1st Plt, 1st Section

at 671307, 2d Section at 676208, 2d Plt at 682008, 3d Plt at 681197, Platoon

Platoon, (3 Mortars) at 681196.

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5 - 6 Feb Normal fire missions carried out by the Companies.

7 Feb - B Co attached 92 Inf. Division 061200A Feb. 1st Platoon, B Co, attached 3d Bn 366 Inf. Bn., 2d Plat attached 370 Inf. Regt. 1st and 2d Platoons supporting 760 Tank Bn. 3d Plat attached 371 Inf. Regt.

8 Feb - B Co supported attack of 92 Inf. Division. 1st Plat. vic 910936 in direct fire position. 2d Plat. vic 934972, direct fire, 3d Plat, reinforcing fires of 599 F.A. Bn. from 957900.

9-17 Feb - A, B, and C Companies continued normal fire missions. Fires observed by A and C Companies OPs. B Co continues to carry out security patrols along Nam River in sector.

18 Feb - A Co (-1st Plat) attached 10MT Div and further attached to Division Artillery, 10 MT Division as of 170001A Feb. 1st Plat, A Co, attached to 751 Tank Bn. 170001A Feb. C Co detached operational control from 424 F.A. Group and attached 248 F.A. Bn. for operational control 181200A Feb 45. B Co remains in general artillery support of 92 Division.

19 Feb - A Co, CP at 517129, 1st Plat 588177, 2d Plat, 1st Section, 489151, 2d Section 493141, 3d Plat, 517129. C Co (OP) C-24 at 584182 closed 182000A Feb. B Co, detached 92 Inf. Division 190600A Feb 45, in route to 561155 at close of period. Will revert to Bn control upon closing.

20 Feb - A Co, 1st Plat, 3 guns at 588182, 2d Plat, 2 guns at 483158, 2 guns at 402142, supporting 10 MT Division in artillery role. B Co CP at 5575-1495, 6 guns at 5553-1474, 4 guns at 555-150, 2 guns at 561-155, closed 192250A Feb reverting to Bn control. Supporting BHF in artillery role.

21 Feb - A Co (-1st Plat) in support of 10 MT Division moved 2d Plat vic 545-188, 3d Plat vic 5185-1695, 5190-1699, 5265-1732, 5263-1760. B Co prepared to move to new positions.

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22 Feb - A-24 (OP) closed 212000A Feb 45 and A-24B closed 212000A Feb.

Bn (-1 and Recon Cos) attached to 248 P.A. Bn. for operational control 221800A Feb 45. A Co (-1st Plat) in support of 10 MT Division closed: A-1, 1st Section, at 584-183, 2d Section at 588-182, A-2, 1st Section, 539-184, 2d Section at 545-183. B Co, in support of 10 MT Division moved 6 guns to 555-150.

23 Feb - A Co (-1st Plat) in support of 10 MT Division, 2d Plat at 539-183, 541-183, 544-184, 543-185; 3d Plat at 520-171, 526-178, 524-172, firing on a strong point. 1st Plat, A Co, 2 guns at 587-188, 1 gun at 585-184, supporting 751 Tank Bn. B and C Companies normal harassing missions. Recon Co, still detached, carrying out routine security patrols along Rance River.

24 Feb - C-24 (OP) opened at 588-188 at 231830A Feb 45. A, B, and C Companies normal harassing missions for the period.

25 Feb - A Co (-1st Plat) in support of 10 MT Division moved 1 gun to 586-188 and 2 guns at 585-184.

26 Feb - A Co (-1st Plat), 3d Plat assembled at 500-138, assuming roving gun mission. Firing positions at 588-182, 505-155, 514-167, and at 493-141 which is stationary position for 1 gun. 2d Plat, 1 gun at Jaggie Montans. A Co CP closed 261600A Feb 45 at 5114.

27-28 Feb - Normal harassing missions carried out for the period. Recon Co, still detached, no change. A Co CP closed at 517-126.

Positions at close of period:

Bn CP 1582-180	Bn Trains 1581118
A Co CP 1517-186	1st Plat, 2 guns at 587-188, 1 gun at 585-184
B Co CP 15374-1495	2d Plat at 539-183, 541-183, 544-184, 543-185.
C Co CP 15570-1260	6 guns at 5553-1474, 4 guns at 555-150,
Recon Co CP 1478-196	2 guns at 561-155.
	6 guns at 5580-1225, 6 guns at 6116-1510
	(2 guns at 15597-1261, 88mm)
	1st Plat, 1st Section at 674-207, 2d Section at 676-206
	2d Plat, 680-208, 3d Plat, 681-197, Pioneer Plat (3 mortars)
	681-194.



ANNEX

ammunition expenditure during period:

3", High Explosive - - - - -	14,425
3", A/C - - - - -	20
3", Smoke - - - - -	467
3", Time - - - - -	182
3", Illuminating - - - - -	123
3", Scented Charge - - - - -	31
30mm, High Explosive - - - - -	<u>295</u>
Total	16,219

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464 U.S. ARMY

March 1, 1945

COMBAT LESSONS LEARNED - 1 - 28 FEBRUARY 1945

1. During recent operations the proper reports on the action and troop disposition of the Companies have not been satisfactory. The reports have been accurate but not on time.

2. In the attempt to determine the cause, the reasons most generally given are:

(1) Not enough time, and (2) Too busy.

3. It is believed that this deficiency can be corrected by devoting more time to the development of the Leader - Radio Operator team. As it stands now the leader, whether he be Chief of Section, Platoon Leader, or Company Commander, lacks confidence in the radio operator. He is regarded as a radio tender or watchman.


4. The training of radio operators should be divided into two phases.

Phase #1 should be separate training for the radio operators to cover proper procedure, care and operation of the set, use of AF codes, and the use of map reference point code.

Phase #2 should be training in which the leader and the radio operator work together. This training will include paraphrasing the message in the clear to make it conform to the limitations of the code sheet and yet retain the intent of the original message. Another step will have the radio operator repeat the exact words of the leader when transmitting a message in the clear. Too many operators attempt to sub-guess the intentions of the leader and too often are wrong.

5. Once the leader has confidence in the ability of his operator then a minute or two of his time will suffice in the submission of reports.

For the Commanding Officer:

  
JOHN M. WRIGHT,  
Capt., P.A.,  
S-3.

HEADQUARTERS IV CORPS  
THE QUONIAMO GENERAL

27 February 1945

Subject: Commendation

To: Commanding Officer, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion,  
APO 144, U. S. Army

It is gratifying for me to commend you for the offensive efforts displayed by your battalion in the recent offensive operation in Italy.

Your excellent leadership, tank destroyers fought bravely against stubborn enemy resistance on some of the most difficult terrain up to and along Mt. Balivodere and on the Appella di Iannicchio, which eventually placed elements of your organization on important commanding ground in direct observation of enemy road nets.

Although some of your elements were employed to support the artillery fires, others were used in the more characteristic tank destroyer role of aggressively engaging the enemy in combat, which role is so vital against an enemy equipped with tanks, armor and self-propelled weapons.

Individual serving tank destroyers along this sector also aided materially in establishing firely our recently won positions.

WILLIS D. CHRYSLER  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

*John C. Wooley*  
JOHN C. WOOLEY,  
1st Lt., U. S. Army  
Adjutant.

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ANNEX TO OPERATIONS REPORT

1. During the period, 1-28 February 1945, this organization suffered the following personnel battle casualties:

Pfc	Clyde Merton	38029256	Co "B"	LWA	9 Feb 45
Pvt	John T. Doster	14141918	Co "C"	LWA	13 Feb 45

2. The following changes in status of previously reported personnel battle casualties are reported:

Cpl George W. Marceau 11038900 Co "A" LWA 15 Dec 44 RTD 24 Feb 45

3. During the period, 1-28 February 1945, the following awards to personnel of this organization were announced:

a. Bronze Star Medal

1. 2d Lt KNUTE E. NYSTRÖM, O-1999105, Recon Co., for meritorious services, in support of combat operations, from 20 October 1944 to 24 December 1944, per Sec V, GO No. 14, Hq. Fifth Army, dated 6 February 1945.
2. T/Sgt Laurence J. Fahy, 38009928, Hq & Hq Co., for meritorious services in combat, from 24 February 1944 to 5 June 1944, per Sec V GO No. 14, Hq Fifth Army, dated 6 February 1945.
3. S/Sgt Henry J. Schultz, 35005479, Co "A", for meritorious services in combat from 25 March 1944 to 5 June 1944, per Sec V, GO No. 14, Hq Fifth Army, dated 6 February 1945.
4. S/Sgt James H. Grubbs, 6661575, Co "C", for meritorious services in support of combat operations, from 22 May 1944 to 9 September 1944, per Sec V, GO No. 14, Hq Fifth Army, dated 6 February 1945.

b. 1st Oak Leaf Cluster to Purple Heart.

1. Tec 5 George W. Mangum, 37368178, Co "C", per Sec II, GO No. 10, Hq 1st Armd Div., cs.

c. Purple Heart for Wounds Received in Action Against the Enemy.

1. Sgt Julius J. Fussell, 34208886, Co "C", per Sec II, GO No. 9, Hq 1st Armd Div., cs.
2. Tec 5 Deloss B. Morrison, 37449685, Co "C", per Sec II, GO No. 9, Hq 1st Armd Div., cs.

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Purple Heart for Wounds Received in Action Against the Enemy (cont)

3. Cpl Ernest Albritton, 34057426, Co "C", per Sec I, GO No. 9,  
Hq 1st Armd Div., ss.
4. Tec 5 George W. Mangum, 37368178, Co "C", per Sec I, GO No.10,  
Hq 1st Armd Div., ss.
5. Tec 4 Edward K. Hines, 7041351, Co "C", per Sec II, GO No.10,  
Hq 1st Armd Div., ss.
6. Pvt Porter J. Spenser, 7040507, Co "C", per Sec I, GO No. 11,  
Hq 1st Armd Div., ss.

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701st Tank Destroyer Battalion  
420 454 U.S. ARMY

Per Auth: SGT J. E. W. 1st Lt. T.D. Bn.  
Initials: JEW  
Date: 1 April 1945

1 April 1945.

Operations Report.

To: The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington 25, D.C. (Para Channels)

1. Submitted herewith operations report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion for the period 1 - 31 March 1945, inclusive, in compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated 10 March 1943.

2. This operations report is taken from the Unit Journal and Unit Diary and supporting documentary evidence is attached thereto.

3. Operations report covering period through 28 February 1945 submitted previously.

For the commanding officer:

*John E. Wasley*  
JOHN E. WASLEY,  
1st Lt., 701st T.D. Bn.,  
Adjutant.

1 Incl  
Ops Rpt w/allied papers.

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Period: March - 31 March 1945.

Location of 701st Tn. beginning of period:

	1/50,000, sheets 97 I, 98 III, 98 IV, Italy.
1st Co	532-180
2nd Co	537-186
3rd Co	537-186
4th Co	537-186
5th Co	537-186
6th Co	537-186
7th Co	537-186
8th Co	537-186
9th Co	537-186
10th Co	537-186
11th Co	537-186
12th Co	537-186
13th Co	537-186
14th Co	537-186
15th Co	537-186
16th Co	537-186
17th Co	537-186
18th Co	537-186
19th Co	537-186
20th Co	537-186
21st Co	537-186
22nd Co	537-186
23rd Co	537-186
24th Co	537-186
25th Co	537-186
26th Co	537-186
27th Co	537-186
28th Co	537-186
29th Co	537-186
30th Co	537-186
31st Co	537-186
32nd Co	537-186
33rd Co	537-186
34th Co	537-186
35th Co	537-186
36th Co	537-186
37th Co	537-186
38th Co	537-186
39th Co	537-186
40th Co	537-186
41st Co	537-186
42nd Co	537-186
43rd Co	537-186
44th Co	537-186
45th Co	537-186
46th Co	537-186
47th Co	537-186
48th Co	537-186
49th Co	537-186
50th Co	537-186
51st Co	537-186
52nd Co	537-186
53rd Co	537-186
54th Co	537-186
55th Co	537-186
56th Co	537-186
57th Co	537-186
58th Co	537-186
59th Co	537-186
60th Co	537-186
61st Co	537-186
62nd Co	537-186
63rd Co	537-186
64th Co	537-186
65th Co	537-186
66th Co	537-186
67th Co	537-186
68th Co	537-186
69th Co	537-186
70th Co	537-186
71st Co	537-186
72nd Co	537-186
73rd Co	537-186
74th Co	537-186
75th Co	537-186
76th Co	537-186
77th Co	537-186
78th Co	537-186
79th Co	537-186
80th Co	537-186
81st Co	537-186
82nd Co	537-186
83rd Co	537-186
84th Co	537-186
85th Co	537-186
86th Co	537-186
87th Co	537-186
88th Co	537-186
89th Co	537-186
90th Co	537-186
91st Co	537-186
92nd Co	537-186
93rd Co	537-186
94th Co	537-186
95th Co	537-186
96th Co	537-186
97th Co	537-186
98th Co	537-186
99th Co	537-186
100th Co	537-186

The period opened with the formation of two (2) armored forces made necessary by nature of the terrain and mission to be accomplished. Force heading composed of 1st Co (-1st Bn); 701 Tn; 751 Tank Bn (2 Bns); and 751 Tank Bn as corps troops took an offensive position in support of the 1st. Force heading composed of 1st Co, 701 Tn, 751 Tank Bn, 751 Tank Bn, and 1st Bn, 701 Tn as corps troops prepared to provide air support to the attack of the 1st Bn and elements of the 1st. Company 701 Tn remained initially in arty positions under the operational control of the 31st Div arty prepared to move to their primary mission on 2 hour notice.

1 - 2 March - 1st Co (-1st Bn) carried out normal direct fire harassing missions. 1st Bn supported 751 Tank Bn. 1st Co prepared for movement to 577-182. 1st Co remaining temporarily in arty posns and ready to move. 1st Co, no change.

3 - March - 1st Co 537-186 as force heading, supported 1st Bn attack by direct fire from defensive positions in the 1st sector. Fire was placed

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on targets of opportunity and probable ey locations. Ridge lines and draws were well covered. This fire is believed to be largely responsible for ey personnel of approximate company strength to surrender to our forces. Force Madden provided direct fire support while accompanying the attack. A Co CP at 516-129; 2d Plat, 1st Sect - 1 gun at 533-181, and 1 gun at 544-185; 2d Sect at 505-154; 3d Plat, 1st Sect at 489-151, 2d Sect at 492-141. B Co, 701 CP at 573-200. B Co, 751 Tank Bn CP at 517-177, 3 gun at 504-152, 1 Sect at 507-166, 1 Sect at 520-171, 1 gun at 517-177, and 1 gun at 513-133. C Co, 751 Tank Bn CP at 548-168, 4 guns at 521-177, 2 guns at 542-186, 1 Plat at 545-187. 3 tanks bogged down at 550-189, 1 tank at 545-185. D Co, 751 Tank Bn CP at 559-181, 1st Plat at 540-185, 2d Plat, 1st Sect at 537-183, 2d Sect at 537-180, 3d Plat via 541-183. C Co, 701 TB Bn detached 34 Div Arty at 031134A March and atchd operational control Force Madden and moved to assembly area via 571-176.

4 March - A Co (-1st Plat) and B and C Cos, 751 Tank Bn (-2 Plats) and D Co, 751 Tank Bn remained in position supporting attack by direct fire at targets of opportunity and probable ey locations. B Co, 701 in direct support of 10 St Div attack. C Co, 701 atchd operational control Force Madden. B Co, 701 knocked out a German 75cm self propelled at 593-237.

5 March - A Co (-1st Plat) fired normal harassing missions by request of the 387. B and C Companies, 701 continued in direct support of 10 St Div attack.

6 March - Recon Co relieved at 052000A Mar and closed at 603-183 at 060100A Mar. Remaining atchd II Corps and further atchd 81st Recon Sq. 3d Plat, D Co, 751 Tank Bn moved from vic 542-184 closing at 510-157 at 060930A Mar.

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3d Plat, C Co, 751 Tank Bn moved from vic Niola to Lizzano closing at 060115Z Mar. Both platoons stood to B Co, 701 Tank Bn.

7 - March - C Co, 701, moved 2 guns to 494-141 and 2 guns to 4950-1509.

2d Plat, C Co in direct fire positions fired on by mortars, probable by ATs, MGs, mortars, and 75mm guns. 3d Plat in indirect fire positions. C Co, 701, occupied direct fire positions at 1st Plat 564-226, 2d Plat 559-231, 3d Plat 591-238. C Co, 701, CP at 600-252, 1st Plat at 609-251, 2d Plat at 604-255, 3d Plat at 600-254, rear CP at 594-242 and occupied direct fire positions via Castel d'Alcino with the mission of establishing road blocks against possible enemy armored counterattack. Ken Co, still active, stood 4 Tank Bn at 071400Z Mar. moved at 071630Z Mar to Stanco (710-217) to replace 1st Troop, 91 Recon Bn as a reserve. 3d Plat, C Co, 751 Tank Bn moved from vic Niola to 984-167 closing at 062000Z Mar. 3d Plat, C Co 751 Tank Bn moved from vic Niola to 980-157 closing at 062000Z Mar. Both platoons remained attached to B Co, 701 Tank Bn for operations.

8 - March - 1st Plat, C Co departed from 585-144 closing at 060210Z at 07200Z Mar and is attached to C Co, 701. 1 and 2 Cos, 701 continued in direct support of 10 AF Div under operational control Force Hadden. 3d Plat, C Co, 751 Tank Bn closed at 980-167 at 070430Z. 3d Plat, C Co, 751 Tank Bn closed vic Niola at 071600Z Mar to prevent unit control. 1 and 2 Cos, 751 continue in direct support of 201 Tank Bn in defensive direct fire roles.

9 - March - C Co (-1st Plat) carried out normal harassing missions. 1st Plat, C Co, 701 relieved a plat of C Co, 760 at 610-238 and 600-237, 2 guns at each point, closed at 2100Z. C Co, 701 (-2nd Plat) continued in direct support of 10 AF Div. 2d Plat, C Co, 701, closed at 601-244 for maintenance work.

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10 - March - No change during the period. Normal arty missions carried out.

11 - March - A Co, 701 carried out usual harassing missions. No change in attachments. 3d Plat, B Co, 751 Tank Bn moved to: 1st Sect at 505-172, 2d Sect at 513-153 closing at 102230A War and remained attached to B Co, 751 Tank Bn. 1st Plat, A Co, 701, attached to B Co, 701, moving to new posns at: 1st Sect 505-153 and 2d Sect 543-186.

12 - March - No change in attachments or locations during the period. Normal arty missions carried out.

13 - March - Recon Co, still detached, engaged in security patrolling of forward posns for 4th Tank Bn, and to make combat patrols as ordered. Map study during the day for officers and plat agts of the Vergato area for raid upon Vergato when ordered by the Combat Command. Mortars in Bn support. Concentration area is Vergato.

14 - March - A Co, 701, carried out normal harassing missions during the period. B and C Cos, 701 continue in direct support of 10 AF Div under operational control Force Hadden. D and E Cos, 751 Tank Bn - No activity. B Co, 751 Tank Bn carried out normal harassing missions.

15 - 16 March - 3d Plat, C Co, 701, relieved their 1st Plat at 154030A War without incident. 1st Plat getting maintenance check and oil change. B and C Cos, 751 Tank Bn carried out direct fire missions. A Co, 701 fired on approximately 20 enemy personnel at 458-214. Several persons observed helping others away from area, indicating some had been wounded. B Co, 701 fired on enemy tower ( ) at 558-244 knocking corner off.

17 - March - 2d Plat, B Co, 701, moved from 567-234 closing at 1900A. 1st Plat, A Co, 701, relieved from attached B Co, 701 and reverted control of parent unit

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and moved to vic Iola (568-211) closing at 171800A Bar. No other changes during the Period.

18 - March - 2d Plat, A Co, 701, moved from 5026-1886 to 5068-1370; 3d Plat, A Co, moved from vic Iola (5680-220A) to: 2 guns at 5068-1370 and 2 guns at 505-193. 1st Plat, B Co, 701, moved from 585-225 to 587-243 and 591-243 closing at 2000A. 2d Plat, B Co, 701 closed at 591-235 at 2000A. No other changes for this period.

19 - March - Normal harassing missions carried out during the period. No change in locations or attachments.

20 - March - B Co, 701, moved 1st Plat plus one gun 2d Plat to 6031-2369 closing at 1500A. 3d Plat, plus one gun of 2d Plat closed at 6047-2360 at 1500A. 2d Plat - 2 guns closed at 599-35 at 1500A. 1st Sect, 2d Plat, C Co, 701 closed at 601-244 and 2d Sect at 606-45A at 2000A Bar. B Co, 751, carried out odd fire missions on enemy personnel with good results. C Co, 751, no activity.

21 - March - B Co, 701, defend Force Garden and is under operational control 424 FA Gp. Able and Coy Strys of B Co, 701, fired registration on road junction. C Co continued under operational control Force Garden. No change in locations.

22 - March - B Co, 701 lost fired German 75mm Pak How and found gun operating correctly. C Co, under operational control 424 FA Gp fired harassing, registrations, and illuminating missions during period. B Co, 3d Plat, 751, fired 1 mission on enemy personnel.

23 - March - In redistribution of armor B Co, 751 Tank Co took up the following positions: 1st Plat, 1st Sect at 493-140 - 2 tanks, 2d Sect at 489-143 - 1 tank and 488-145 - 1 tank, 2d Plat, 1st Sect 520-170 - 3 tanks, 2d Sect at 516-176 - 2 tanks, 3d Plat, 1st Sect 507-165 - 3 tanks, 2d Sect 499-166 - 2 tanks, closing at 2145A Bar. Moving from Corona 1 tank hit a mine at 5175-1745 and was completely

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destroyed. 3d Plat, B Co, 751 Tank Bn. moved to: 1 Sect 527-177 and 2d Sect 531-178.

24 March - A Co, 701 test fired German 7.5cm rifle, gun fired very well, no malfunctions. B Co, 701 remains under operational control 424 FA Cp and C Co, 701 remains under operational control Force Madden.

25 - March - B Co, 701, moved 5 guns from 803-236 to 592-237 closing at 242000A Mar. No incidents occurred during movement. A Co, 701, fired German 75cm Pac How with good results. Recon Co, still detached, relieved at 242100A Mar by B Co, 1st Tank Bn and closed at stance (710-219), Pioneer plat in position at 706-231 (3 mortars) attend to 1st Tank Bn.

26 March - A Co, 5 TDs in anti-tank role pull back to indirect fire positions at 507-137 and 509-138 for special missions. B Co, 701, carried out arty missions. C Co - No change. D, E, and F Companies, 751 Tank Bn - No activity.

27 - March - 1 Sect, 3d Plat, B Co, 751 Tank Bn returned to positions at 507-166 after slight move to avoid arty fire. Usual arty missions carried out by A and B Cos, 701. D, C, and E Cos, 751 Tank Bn - No activity.

28 - March - A Co, 701, 1st Plat (Able btry) at 5918-2307, 2d Plat (Dog btry) at 5027-2357, 3d Plat (Star btry) at 5926-2348, Rear CP at 599-233 and is under operational control 424 FA Cp. B Co, 701 CP closed at 607-252, 1st Plat 606-254 - 2 guns, 2 guns at 611-244, 2d Plat at 566-219, 3d Plat at 609-253, Rear CP at 572-223 closing at 241000 Mar and is under operational control Force Madden.

29 - 31 March - No change in locations or attachments during this period. Normal harassing missions carried out.

Positions at close of Period:

Bn CP L557-150

Bn Trains L581-118

A Co CP L516-129

1st Plat, 1st Sect 489-151 - 2 TDs

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2d Sect 507-137 - 2 TDs - Indirect fire

		2d Plat	505-138 - 4 TDs - Indirect fire
		3d Plat	553-195 - 4 TDs
B Co CP	1607-252	1st Plat	606-254 - 2 TDs
			601-244 - 2 TDs
		2nd Plat	566-219 - 4 TDs
		3rd Plat	609-252 - 2 TDs
			609-253 - 2 TDs
C Co CP	1593-235	1st Plt (Able btry)	5918-2367
		2nd Plt (Dog btry)	6047-2359
		3d Plt (Star btry)	5926-2348
Hon Co CP	1710-219	Pioneer platoon	706-231 (3 mortars)

Positions at close of Period (751 Tank Bn)

B Co CP	1517-129	1st Plt, 1st Sect	493-140 - 2 tanks
		2nd Sect	488-143 - 1 tank
		2nd Plt, 1st Sect	530-170 - 3 tanks
		2nd Sect	516-176 - 2 tanks
		3rd Plt, 1st Sect	507-165 - 3 tanks
		2nd Sect	499-166 - 2 tanks
C Co CP	1548-168	1st Plt	565-227 - 5 tanks
		2nd Plt	572-207 - 5 tanks
		3rd Plt	553-195 - 5 tanks
D Co CP	1558-161	1st Plt, 1st Sect	535-180 - 3 tanks, light
		2nd Sect	537-182 - 2 tanks, light
		2nd Plt, 1st Sect	527-176 - 3 tanks, light
		2nd Sect	531-177 - 2 tanks, light
		3rd Plt, 1st Sect	539-185 - 3 tanks, light
		2nd Sect	540-183 - 2 tanks, light

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REF ID:

Ammunition expenditure during period:

3", High Explosive - - - - -	4,902
3", High Explosive (Reduced Charge) - - - - -	2,236
3", Smoke - - - - -	125
3", Blue - - - - -	58
3", Star - - - - -	94
3", APC - - - - -	76
3", T-105 - - - - -	4

Total 7,577

7.5cm High Explosive (German) - - Rifle	44
7.5cm High Explosive (German) - - How	110

S-1 ANNEX TO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 MARCH 1945

I. a. CASUALTIES:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Co</u>	<u>Date of Casualty</u>	<u>Type of Casualty</u>
Sgt	Richard Wehrley	15042970	C	5 Mar 45	LWA
Pfc	Charles W. Keith	32033603	C	5 Mar 45	LWA
Cpl	Dalce L. Zeigler	34071660	C	6 Mar 45	LWA
Pvt	Lester M. Phillips	6985182	B	6 Mar 45	LWA
Tec 5	William C. King	14004817	C	7 Mar 45	LWA
Pvt	Dale P. Holybee	39833207	C	7 Mar 45	LWA
Pvt	John T. Smith	34442336	C	8 Mar 45	KIA
*S/Sgt	Sterling K. Smith	15042538	C	9 Mar 45	LWA
Sgt	Donald J. Blank	33246805	A	29 Mar 45	LIA
Cpl	Earl E. Gipson	15077722	Rcn	29 Mar 45	KIA
*S/Sgt	Jim W. Hooten	34147207	Rcn	29 Mar 45	LWA

\* Indicates personnel not hospitalized.

b. Changes in Status of Personnel Previously Reported as Casualties:

Pfc	Clyde Merton	38029256	B	LWA 9 Feb 45	RTD 24 Mar 45
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II. AWARDS

a. Legion Of Merit:

T/Sgt	Henry D. Kirsher	37098831	Co B, per GO #51 Hq MTOUSA es
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b. Bronze Star Medal:

T/Sgt	Howard J. Spaulding	35155475	Hq & Hq Co, per GO #24 1st Armd
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c. Purple Heart:

Tec 5	William C. King	14004817,	Co C per GO #18 Hq 1st Armd Div es
Pfc	Lorenzo P. Ford	13087071,	Co C per GO #19 Hq 1st Armd Div es
Pvt	William J. Novak	35320783	Co C per GO #20 Hq 1st Armd Div es

III. REPLACEMENTS:

During the period the Battalion received one officer and sixteen enlisted men as replacements.

IV. ROTATION AND TEMPORARY DUTY:

Seven enlisted men departed for the U. S. on temporary duty and seven departed on rotation.

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HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464 U.S. Army

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* S E C R E T  
\*Per Auth: CO 701st TD  
\*Initials:                       
\*Date: 10 May 1945  
\*\*\*\*\*  
10 May 1945

SUBJECT: Operations Report.

TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington 25, D.C.  
(Thru Channels)

1. Submitted herewith Operations Report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion for the period 1 - 30 April 1945, inclusive, in compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated 10 March 1943.
2. This Operations Report is taken from the Unit Journal and Unit Diary and supporting documentary evidence is attached thereto.
3. Operations Report covering period through 31 March 1945 was submitted previously.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

*John E. Dooley*  
JOHN E. DOOLEY  
1st Lt, FA  
Adj

1 Inclosure:  
Opns Rpt w/allied Papers

Apr 45  
74M  
26 Mar 46 HSD

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OPERATIONS REPORT OF THE 701st TANK DESTROYER BATTALION FOR THE PERIOD 1 APRIL TO

30 APRIL 1945.

Location of Troops on 1 April 1945:

Battalion CP.....	L557150
Battalion Trains.....	L581118
Reconnaissance Company.....	L710219
4th Recon. Platoon (3 81mm Mortars) ..	L706231
Company "A".....	L516129
1st Platoon (1st Section).....	L489151
1st Platoon (2nd Section).....	L507137
2nd Platoon.....	L505138
3rd Platoon.....	L553195
Company "B".....	L607252
1st Platoon (1st Section).....	L606254
1st Platoon (2nd Section).....	L601244
2nd Platoon.....	L566219
3rd Platoon (1st Section).....	L609252
3rd Platoon (2nd Section).....	L609253
Company "C".....	L593235
1st Platoon.....	L59182367
2nd Platoon.....	L60472359
3rd Platoon.....	L59262348
751 Tank Bn. (B, C & D Co's Operationally attached)	
"B" Company, 751 Tank Bn.....	L517129
1st Platoon (2 Tanks).....	L493140
1st Platoon (1 Tank).....	L488143
1st Platoon (1 Tank).....	L488145
2nd Platoon (3 Tanks).....	L530170
2nd Platoon (2 Tanks).....	L516176
3rd Platoon (3 Tanks).....	L507165
3rd Platoon (2 Tanks).....	L499166
"C" Company, 751 Tank Bn.....	L548168
1st Platoon.....	L565227
2nd Platoon.....	L572207
3rd Platoon.....	L553195

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Location of Troops on 1 April 1945: (Cont'd)

"D" Company, 751 Tank Bn	
1st Platoon (3 Tanks)	L535180
1st Platoon (2 Tanks)	L537182
2nd Platoon (3 Tanks)	L527176
2nd Platoon (2 Tanks)	L531177
3rd Platoon (3 Tanks)	L539183
3rd Platoon (2 Tanks)	L510185

As the period opened the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 751 Tank Battalion were in defensive positions along the entire right of the IV Corps front. Company "C" of the Battalion was in indirect fire positions under operational control of the 424th F.A. Group. Company "B" was under operational control of the 751st Tank Battalion (FORCE MADDEN). Reconnaissance Company was attached to II Corps, sub attached to the 1st Armored Division and in Infantry positions with the 1st Tank Battalion (dismounted). "E", "C", and "D" Cos. of the 751 Tank Battalion were under control of Headquarters, 701st T.D. Bn. (FORCE REDDING).

Reconnaissance Company reverted to Battalion control on the 1st and was moved to the SILLA area (L593136), where the Company was put on their vehicles for the first time in several months. Vehicular and radio maintenance, and the preparation of their vehicles for combat occupied their time for the next ten days. The long winter period as Infantry had resulted in the fact that their vehicles had not had proper preventative maintenance and a long period of work was needed to refit their vehicles for combat.

For the other units of the Battalion the FORCE MADDEN - FORCE REDDING tactical grouping held until the 9th of April, when all reverted to parent unit control. During this period, positions of units

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remained essentially the same, with some few exceptions, and normal observed and unobserved, direct and indirect fires were carried out from static defensive fire positions. While these activities were being carried out, plans were being made for the prospective offensive operation soon to take place. The Battalion (and the 751 Tank Bn) was to be in direct support of the 10th U.S. Mountain Infantry Division (U.S. IV Corps) in the Fifth Army attempt to break out of the apennines into the RO River Valley. The Division Commander had decided that one Tank Company and one Tank Destroyer Company would be attached to each Infantry Regiment for the initial stages of the operation. The attachments (to take effect 1200 hrs D-1) as follows :

- 85th Mt. Inf. Regt. "B" Company, 701st T.D. Bn.  
"E" Company, 751st Tank Bn.
- 86th Mt. Inf. Regt. "C" Company, 701st T.D. Bn.  
"C" Company, 751st Tank Bn.
- 87th Mt. Inf. Regt. "A" Company, 701st T.D. Bn.  
"A" Company, 751st Tank Bn.

By mutual agreement between the 701st and 751st Commanding Officers it was further agreed that each Tank Destroyer Company would send one Platoon to its corresponding Tank Company, and each Tank Company would send one Platoon to its corresponding Tank Destroyer Company. This was done to bolster the firepower of the Tank Company with the 3" gun and to give the TD's the benefit of the automatic weapons of the medium tank. The communications problems in this were nil, due to the fact that both units were equipped with the SCR 500 radio series (a mutual exchange and alignment of crystals was made).

The Infantry Regimental Commanders were to send one Tank or TD Company with each assault Infantry Battalion. This gave six armored

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Companies with the six assault Infantry Battalions. None of the Armor was to be held in reserve with the exception of the 701st Reconnaissance Company and "D" Company of the 751st Tank Bn. These two Companies were to be attached to a formation known as Task Force PURSUIT under command of the 3rd Bn. of the 86th Infantry Regiment. This force was to be activated upon Division order and was to be used to exploit any major breakthrough made during the attack.

The period 9 - 12 April was spent in readying for the operation. The Tank - Tank Destroyer Platoon exchange was made, and on the 12th all Companies moved to their assembly areas for the attack. At 1800 hrs 12th April, the dispositions were as follows:

Bn C.P.	L590238
"A" Company	L619245
"B" Company	L607252
1st Platoon	L566219
2nd Platoon, 1st Section	L606254
2nd Platoon, 2nd Section	L609252
3rd Platoon	L572223
"C" Company (- 1 Gun)	L637237
(1 Gun, "C" Company	L602243
Reconnaissance Company	L603237

(The one "C" Company gun at L602243 was for firing "star" shells over given target areas at night for airplanes. This air-ground cooperation in night bombing was used several times with success during the operation).

The scheduled attack by the 10th Mountain Division began at 0700 hours 14 April. All Gun Companies of the Battalion moved in support. Enemy minefields and demolitions held up progress for most of the initial day.

The attack progressed slowly. By the 15th TOLE had been taken, and elements were moving slowly north against scattered resistance.

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Company "A" engaged three enemy tanks this date, and put one of them out of action. Again on the following day, "A" Company destroyed another enemy tank, and Company "C" destroyed 2 anti-tank guns.

The 85th Regiment and Company "B", 701st Tank Destroyer Bn. secured the left flank against counterattack as our attack progressed. This left "B" Company well in our rear for the next few days, and difficulty was experienced in maintaining communications. On the 18th however, "B" Company was detached from the Battalion and attached to C.C."A" of the 1st Armored Division. This Company was destined to remain detached for the remainder of the operation.

The breakthrough into the PO Valley was made on April 20th. Two Infantry Battalions supported by "A" and "C" Companies were out of the Appenines and at 1300 hours the Reconnaissance Company passed through with orders to cut Highway # 9. This was affected by 1400 hours. On this day, Company "C" destroyed one MK IV and one 150 mm gun. Innumerable prisoners were taken. ("B" Company, with C.C."A", destroyed 2 S/P guns in the L6940 grid square at 191200B). Battalion dispositions at 201800B April were :

En CP	751506
"A" Company	752255
"C" Company	733567
1st Platoon	741563
"B" Company	
1st Platoon	680399
2nd Platoon	683396
Reconnaissance Company	772546
1st Platoon	777548
2nd Platoon	778543
3rd Platoon	737563
4th Platoon	774552

The Divisional objective for the next day was to secure the BOAMPORTO bridges intact. "A" and "C" Companies were to support the

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advance of the 2nd Bn. of the 86th Regiment. Reconnaissance Company was to provide a reconnaissance screen for the divisional advance. At 0910 hours one M-8 and one M-20 armored car of the Reconnaissance Company were destroyed by enemy A/T fire. The Platoon Leader of the First Platoon was killed, and his Platoon Sergeant was seriously wounded in action. The Company was forced to withdraw and choose another route of advance.

Enemy resistance suddenly collapsed in this area. With Reconnaissance Company in the lead, the 2nd Bn. of the 86th Infantry (motorized) protected in column by the guns of "A" Company moved along the roads to BOMPORTO at speeds approximating 30 M.P.H. Elements of Rcn Co arrived at BOMPORTO at approximately 1600 hrs., somewhat in advance of the main column, and secured both bridges intact. In the village, however, the 2nd Platoon of the Company became involved in a street fight with German Infantry. One M-8 Armored Car was hit and burned by an enemy bazooka and the Platoon Sergeant was killed. The Platoon was forced to withdraw back across the canal bridge until Infantry and TD's came forward to secure the town. At 211800B April, dispositions of the Battalion were :

Bn CP	L 751506
"A" Company	L 655753
Reconnaissance Company	L 655753
"C" Company	
1st Platoon	L 711603
2nd Platoon	L 717603
3rd Platoon	L 734595

Advances to the North continued the next morning. The 10th Division attacked regiments abreast, the 86th Infantry (Route "B") and the 87th Infantry (Route "A"). Company "A" supported the 86th

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and Company "C" supported the 87th. Reconnaissance Company provided a screen for Route "A". Objective for the day was CALATTA (F5913) on the PO River. Resistance was slight and Company "C" reached the town of S. BENEDETTO (F5811) about 2000 hours in the evening. The column proceeding along Route "B" was not able to reach objective that night but elements of the Reconnaissance Company arrived at CALATTA at 0900 hrs. Road blocks were immediately established along all routes of approach by Companies "A" and "C". Enemy resistance that remained in the area was mopped up.

Infantry units of the 10th Division immediately crossed the river. Companies "A" and "C" supported this operation by direct fire. The crossing of the PO River by Tanks and Tank Destroyers, however, presented a most difficult problem, due to the fact that there were no bridges available. It was not until the 25th of April that elements of this Battalion were able to cross the River to support the Infantry bridgehead. Reconnaissance Company crossed on an M-1 treadway bridge about 251300B April and joined the 86th Infantry Regiment in their advance to the North (objective VERONA). This treadway bridge, however, was not a suitable means for the M-10s to use in crossing, and a captured ferry was utilized in ferrying the Destroyer Companies across. The progress was slow and the method tedious but by 260100B April Company "A" and seven M-10s of "C" Company had completed the crossing. These Destroyers then set about to carry out their assigned mission of flank protection advance. Elements of the Reconnaissance Company were in VERONA with the 3rd Bn. 86 Infantry at 260100B April. Mopping up by all elements continued throughout the day, and at 1600hrs

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Reconnaissance and "C" Companies moved to BUSSOLENCO (F5458) to occupy and defend the town for the night.

The Battalion assembled at 0800 hrs the following morning and moved in support of the advance of the 87th Infantry Regiment along the shores of Lago di Garda. Minor resistance was met during the day, mostly from 88 mm dual-purpose A/T - A/T guns, of which Company "A" destroyed two and Recon Company destroyed one during the days operations. Forward elements of the Battalion reached F4578 at 2000 hours on the 27th when relieved by elements of the 751 Tank Battalion who continued in the advance.

(During this entire period, Company "B" of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been detached from the Battalion and had been in support of the attacking 1st Armored Division. The Battalion was unable to maintain contact with this Company throughout the greater part of the April operations. Company "B" on the 28th of the month was attached to the 81st Reconnaissance Squadron and on this date entered SOMMINO (770540).

Extensive demolitions at F5696 and tunnel destruction in this area prevented further armored advance in a northerly direction. An engineer estimate of the time to construct a passable route was 7 days. In the afternoon of the 28th, Infantry units of the 10th Division made an amphibious operation (by means of "DUKW's") around the demolished road area and proceeded north. The Gun Companies of the Battalion supported this operation by direct fire. When the advancing Infantry was out of effective support range of the Destroyer's guns, the Companies were withdrawn and road blocks were set up throughout the Divisional area. Dispositions remained essentially the same throughout



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the remainder of the period. On the 30th the Battalion prepared to move to vicinity of RIVA (A551044) and TORRELE (A575025) by ferry north on Lake Garda, and thence to continue to the North in the direction of the Brenner and RESIA passes to AUSTRIA in support of the 10th Infantry Division, which was assembling to attack.

The last reported location of Company "B" was TREVIGLIO (K5668) on the 29th of April.

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The month had been a period of continual movement. A great valley had been crossed as the Fifth Army advanced from the Appenines to the Alps. A major water obstacle had been crossed, and the German armies in Italy had virtually been destroyed. The spring offensive had been a gratifying success.

For the Officers and Men of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion this month meant the completion of 35 long, arduous months of overseas service. This was perhaps the most singly important month of them all to us, for at long last the end of the European War seemed in sight. Elements of this Battalion were among the first American ground forces to engage the Nazi enemy in this war. It was a gratifying thought that the end was so near; and that the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been a part of that Fifth Army whose privilege it had been to assist in the destruction of the enemy in ITALY.

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Location of Units at the end of the period (302400) :

Bn. C.P.	F 525914
Bn. Trains	F 511939
Recn Company	F 512888
"A" Company	F 525915
1st Platoon	F 512888
2nd Platoon	F 538951
3rd Platoon	F 535945
"B" Company	X 5668
"C" Company	F 535936
1st Platoon	F 511671
2nd Platoon	F 555956
3rd Platoon	F 555956

*Albert B. Morrison*

ALBERT B. MORRISON  
Captain, Inf  
S-3

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S-1 ANNEX TO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR PERIOD 1 - 30 APRIL 1945

I. a. CASUALTIES:

	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Name</u>					
*	Sgt	Russell Simmons	34160213	B	4 Apr 45	LIA	
*	Tec 4	Lonnie W. Phillips	15045811	B	11 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Sgt	John J. Carroll	31029681	B	15 Apr 45	LWA	
	1st Lt	Lawrence V. Burke	01176904	C	15 Apr 45	LIA	
	Tec 4	Charles H. Scott	33090791	B	15 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Raymond R. Sturm	33580281	B	15 Apr 45	LWA	
*	1st Lt	John NMI Hudson	01307549	C	17 Apr 45	LWA	
	T/Sgt	Howard J. Spaulding	35155475	Hq	17 Apr 45	LWA	
	Tec 5	Noble H. Midkiff	35482495	Hq	17 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pvt	Joseph H. Metzeder	37721341	Hq	17 Apr 45	KIA	
*	Tec 4	Carlos Snell Jr	34359063	B	18 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Claude A. Crowder	35260250	B	18 Apr 45	LWA	
	Tec 5	Robert E. Leasure	37328661	C	18 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Willard J. Cummins	15047888	Rcn	18 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Pvt	John T O'Rourke	33026617	C	18 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Rex NMI Meredith	6669903	A	19 Apr 45	LIA	
*	Sgt	Robert Dunham	33272551	C	19 Apr 45	LIA	
*	Tec 5	Eugene W. Baker	36242848	B	19 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Capt	John NMI Hudson	01307549	C	20 Apr 45	LWA	
	2d Lt	Joe H. Patterson	01999106	Rcn	21 Apr 45	KIA	
	S/Sgt	Anthony G. Schepici	20123378	Rcn	21 Apr 45	KIA	
	Tec 5	J. T. (IO) Dial	34194239	Rcn	21 Apr 45	KIA	
	Pfc	Norman Vigderhouse	33193261	Rcn	21 Apr 45	KIA	
	Pfc	Clayton NMI Anderson	35262612	Rcn	21 Apr 45	MIA	
	Pfc	John M. Wiwi	35168871	Rcn	21 Apr 45	SWA	
	Sgt	Clyde T. Gephart	33261645	Rcn	21 Apr 45	SWA	
	Pfc	Cecil W. Thompson	15010945	Rcn	21 Apr 45	SWA	
	Pvt	Eldridge C. King	34914162	Rcn	21 Apr 45	LIA	
	S/Sgt	Julius J. Fussell	34208886	C	21 Apr 45	SWA	
	Sgt	Alfred L. Parks	20346573	C	21 Apr 45	LIA	
	Tec 5	Deloss B. Morgan	37449685	C	21 Apr 45	SWA	
	Pfc	Kenneth D. Coleman	35623822	C	21 Apr 45	LWA	
	Tec 5	Gordon B. Bernhard	35378260	Rcn	21 Apr 45	LIA	
	Tec 5	Donald L. Carrington	35152806	Rcn	21 Apr 45	LWA	
	Tec 5	Dallas A. Holcomb	33120105	Rcn	21 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Cpl	Alexander Crawford	31244315	C	21 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Pfc	Ralph D. Higgins	38341678	C	21 Apr 45	LWA	
	2d Lt	John R. Foster	02001723	Rcn	22 Apr 45	LWA	
	Tec 5	Marshall R. Nuzum	37205973	B	22 Apr 45	LIA	
*	Pfc	Sterling C. Brown	35132318	C	22 Apr 45	LWA	
*	Pvt	Claude N. Gilliland	33157667	B	22 Apr 45	LWA	
	Sgt	George L. Baldwin	15047931	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	Sgt	James E. Upchurch	34134349	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Herman Adams	15055053	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	Pfc	Roy O Peterson	34053954	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	Sgt	Tom T. Gunn	34147389	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	S/Sgt	Oscar E. Swanson	36185161	Rcn	23 Apr 45	LWA	
	2d Lt	Earl L. Urban	01999201	C	23 Apr 45	KIA	
	Pfc	Arnold A. Asling	37519651	B	26 Apr 45	LIA	
*	Capt	John NMI Hudson	01307549	C	27 Apr 45	LIA	
*	NONE HOSPITALIZED						

II AWARDS:

A. Purple Heart:

S/Sgt	Herston Childers	3521369C	C	per GO 25 Hq 1st AD
Cpl	Mel B. Mensor	1637379A	A	per GO 25 Hq 1st AD
Pfc	Albert B. Crawford Jr	34133988	Rcn	per GO 35 Hq 1st AD
Sgt	George L. Baldwin	15047931	Rcn	

III REPLACEMENTS:

During the period the Battalion received two (2) officers and eight (8) enlisted men as replacements.

IV ROTATION AND TEMPORARY DUTY:

During the period twenty five (25) enlisted men returned to the U. S. on rotation and eleven (11) enlisted men returned to the U. S. on Temporary Duty.



S-3 ANNEX TO OPERATIONS REPORT

Vehicular losses through enemy action sustained by the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion during the month of April 1945 :

GMC-M10	B1	K2 (b)	K1 (b)	/	K1	K1 (105mm)	C2
M10-AC	K1 (a)	/	/	K1 (b)	/	/	K1
M20-AC	/	/	/	K1 (b)	/	/	/
HT-M3	/	/	/	/	/	B2 (105mm)	/
/	<i>igniter</i>	<i>tires</i>	<i>panther</i>	<i>75mm</i>	<i>mines</i>	<i>shelling</i>	<i>other</i>

Legend ~

B-24 fu.  
 C-48 fu.  
 K-destroyer  
 (b)-burned

S-4 ANNEX TO OPERATIONS REPORT

ammunition expenditures during monthly period (approximate) :

3", High Explosive	5404
3", High Explosive (reduced charge)	2046
3", Smoke	65
3", Time	0
3", Star	457
3", APC	763
3", T-105	0
Total	<u>8735</u>
.37mm High Explosive	635
.37mm APC	220
Total	<u>855</u>
.30 Caliber	12500
.50 Caliber	2060
Grenades, Hand (HE)	86
Grenades, Yellow Smoke	110

HEADQUARTERS  
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION  
APO 464 U. S. ARMY

1 May 1945

COMBAT LESSONS LEARNED - 1 - 30 APRIL 1945

During the entire month of April 1945, the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion was in support of the 10th Mountain Infantry Division; with the exception of Company "B" which, during the period 17 - 30 April was under operational control of the 1st Armored Division. Operations, for the greater part, were offensive; consisting of fast-moving Infantry-Tank - Tank Destroyer Combat Teams under Infantry Command. Resistance varied from strong to nil, and the operations covered the entire area from the Appenines through the Po River Valley to the Alps. Terrain varied from flat cultivated valleys with good road nets to high barren mountains where roads were a nonexistent factor. Every conceivable German anti-tank devise from the A/T Grenade and Bazooka to the 88mm gun was contacted by elements of this Battalion.

From the many and varied combat experiences of our personnel during the period, a wealth of combat lessons have been derived. For the sake of simplicity, these Lessons will be discussed under the following headings:

1. Tank Destroyer Gun Companies.
2. Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance Company.
3. Tank Destroyer Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
4. Communications.



## 1. TANK DESTROYER GUN COMPANIES

During the period 1 - 30 April the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 751 Tank Battalion worked in close conjunction supporting the 10th Mountain Division.

Innumerable Tank - Tank Destroyer tactical groupings were attempted, all arranged to meet a given tactical situation. Proper communication enabled each of these organizations to successfully carry out their assigned missions. The two Battalions initially interchanged crystals on all 508 and 528 radios within their respective organizations. This automatically insured communication of any combined groups of Tanks and Tank Destroyers.

Initially in the period each Tank and Tank Destroyer Company interchanged one Platoon. This gave each tank company two platoons of M-4's and one platoon of L-10's, and gave each TD Company two Platoons of L-10's and one Platoon of L-4's. One mixed company was then sent in support of each assault Infantry Battalion. Later in the period all conceivable combinations were profitably used. (Note - The integral Platoon construction always remained unaltered. Exchanges were not made involving units smaller than the Platoon)

The actual assault on enemy positions was carried out as follows:

The Tank Destroyer platoons were used as a base, firing in direct support of the advancing Infantry. The medium Tanks were slightly in rear as a mobile reserve. After the TD direct fire had softened the enemy strong points, the medium tanks came forward, passed through the TD's, and pushed forward to the objective with the Infantry. The TD's continued to over-watch, engaging all targets of opportunity.

In the initial stages of the Divisional attack (vicinity of Castel d' Aiano) some Tank - Tank Destroyer companies had engineers platoons attached. Numerous mines and demolitions were encountered and without immediate engineer assistance the progress of the armor would have been frequently delayed.

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In the advance across the Po River Valley, one platoon of Tank Destroyers usually operated with the forward elements of the motorized columns. The remainder of the TD company were interdispersed (by sections) between the trucks of the motorized Infantry to protect the column from roving German self-propelled guns, which after being by-passed, often fired on the trucks in rear of the armor.

TANK DESTROYER GUN COMPANIES (Cont'd)

It has been the policy of this Battalion that Platoon Leaders are on the M-10 for more effective control of the guns and for his own protection. In flat terrain, such as the Po Valley, the fire of all platoon guns are brought on each target (in mountainous terrain this is not always possible). If the Platoon Leader brings the fire of his gun onto the target, he no longer commands a platoon but one gun; if he does not engage the target, but continues to control the fire of his platoon, he loses the fire of one of his guns. One Company Commander suggests the addition of the fifth gun to the platoon (Organization then similar to the tank platoon). Another Company Commander suggests a light tank in the TD platoon as the Platoon Commander's vehicle (in lieu of the authorized M-20).

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It is imperative that Tanks and Tank Destroyers keep moving when roadbound in mountainous terrain when under enemy observation. North of SAVIGNANO three tanks were destroyed by enemy tank and artillery fire when the column jammed and stopped on the road as the lead tank reached the objective. In this connection, it may be said that when operating with dismounted Infantry columns in mountainous terrain, only a small portion of the TD company should be kept forward (possibly a section or a platoon). The column that advanced up the east side of Lago di Gardo ably proved this point in that the entire attached TD company was kept well forward. A blow in the road was reached and the entire armored column was jammed forward (it being next to impossible to get off the road). The entire left column was thus exposed and offered a most promising target to enemy guns across the lake (range 2500 to 3000 yards).

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German anti-aircraft gunners on the dual-purpose 88 mm gun apparently do not make good A/T gunners. The presence of armor seems to make them lose their nerve. Also, trained to taking leads on fast moving aircraft the A/A gunner firing on tanks will invariably overestimate the lead, and fire in front of the tank. Four times in two days enemy 88 mm A/A guns used for A/T purposes fired on armored cars and TD's at ranges under one thousand (1000) yards, and missed. One particular gun fired five rounds, missing each time. Then the crew evidently abandoned their gun when a TD came forward to engage and destroy it.

## USE OF STAR SHELLS

During the past several months the naval shell, Illuminating, 3 - inch M 24, Mod. 1 w/Fuze T & Sg M54 has been used by this Battalion in the following three roles :

- (1) Illumination of targets for night bombing.
- (2) Illumination of enemy strong points to be engaged by direct fire.
- (3) Illumination of targets for Field Artillery observers for night adjustments.

### Night Bombing:

Our night bombing missions were prearranged by the Air Corps and transmitted to the Battalion through Corps Artillery. We have found that it is necessary to have an officer, familiar with methods of fire direction and simple survey and two guns, with the sole mission of firing illuminating shell. Also several hundred rounds of shell were always on hand at the Battalion dump.

The guns had to be well forward so as to be able to engage efficiently the targets selected by the Air Corps for the night operations. The Battalion was never informed until late afternoon of the locations of the targets (centers of communication, road junctions, etc) which usually were well in front of our lines.

Registration by Air OP or ground OP on area targets is desired but not always necessary. On several occasions, when time did not permit day-light registration, the guns were laid by compass and fired with satisfactory results.

The method of engaging targets by the Battalion was laid down by the Air Corps and IV Corps Artillery.

At TOT (Time over Target) - 2 minutes, an aircraft releases a flare in the target area. This served as an alert notice to the guns which fire two illuminating shells over the center of the target at TOT. At TOT plus 2 minutes, two additional shells are fired over the center of the target. Then from TOT plus 2 minutes to TOT plus 6 minutes both guns fire as many illuminating shells as possible directing them in the

manner: Center of target, three hundred (300) yards left of target and three hundred (300) yards right of target

Engaging Targets with direct fire at night.

At one time during the 10th Mountain Division operation in the Castel d'Aiano sector the enemy was known to be building a strong point about eight hundred (800) yards from our front line. It was planned to have "A" Company, 701 TD En fire star shells over this point and have "B" Company, 701 TD En engage the target with direct fire. Time did not permit registration during day light on the target. The guns were laid by compass and when fired, not having been registered, were off several miles in deflection and instead of lighting up the target, lit up the platoon that was to fire. We never fired this type mission again, but the necessity for registration is obvious.

Registration of Field Artillery by FO at night using Illuminating Shell.

During our operations with the 10th Mountain Division in the Castel d'Aiano sector we used, with some success, illuminating shells for right adjustment of Field Artillery. The method although somewhat crude, is as follows:

Communications with the Artillery were extremely difficult. Mountain artillery can find firing positions without much trouble, while for our gun with its flat trajectory, very few suitable positions could be found. Therefore, distances between artillery and TD's were, as a rule, great, and were impracticable. The SCR510 and SCR 508, due to the mountains were not reliable. So the following method was devised. When the FO picked up or was informed of a target the coordinates were sent to the Battalion which in turn figured the data for the target. The FA would be ready to fire but would not fire until so ordered by the FO and then only after he had seen the star shell over the target area. The area then would be continually lighted until the registration was completed which usually took five (5) to six (6) minutes.

It is felt that some better method could be worked out to insure good illumination using a minimum of shells.

## 2. TANK DESTROYER RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

During the period the Reconnaissance Company of this Battalion seldom operated under Battalion Control or with or in support of the Gun Companies of the Battalion. None the less, the information they derived would be of general value to all Reconnaissance Troops.

In general engagements between Infantry and Reconnaissance Troops, the Infantry will invariably come off second best. M-8 Armored Cars are used as a mobile base of fire against enemy Infantry while 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, crews of the Reconnaissance Platoon operate dismounted, attacking aggressively under covering fire of the M-8's. Six (6) kilometers south of Bomporto, Italy, one Reconnaissance Platoon attacked some one hundred (100) enemy Infantrymen using the above procedure. By segmenting the enemy Infantry into small groups by wedging the M-8's between them, the Platoon captured, killed or wounded the entire group of enemy without casualty to themselves. This enemy group contained thirteen (13) Officers while the total strength of the attacking Platoon was only seventeen (17) men. (Note - Although all of the enemy group were armed with small arms and machine guns, they possessed no useable A/T weapons).

Under similar circumstances, however, this same Platoon some five (5) days later engaged a similar number of enemy SS Troops near Bardolino, Italy. In this case the Platoon procedure for attack was the same, and a wedge was driven between the enemy. This time, however, the enemy troops withdrew a short distance, working to the flanks, and began to attack the armored cars launching A/T Grenades and Bazookas. This aggressive action by the enemy forced the Reconnaissance Platoon to withdraw, but only after it had succeeded in inflicting an estimated ten (10) to twelve (12) casualties upon the enemy.

In action against enemy Infantry in towns and villages, Reconnaissance troops often do not fare so well. In Bomporto, Italy, there were two river and canal bridges which the Division Commander had ordered to be secured intact, if possible. This Company was the first unit to reach these bridges and found them intact upon arrival. Some fifteen to twenty enemy Infantrymen were on the far side of the bridge, plainly visible. Suspecting the bridge to be mined, the Platoon Leader none the less elected to attack. He ordered his armored cars across the bridge firing upon the enemy as they advanced. The enemy Infantry scattered, and by this aggressive action the Platoon Leader saved the bridge. (Some six hundred pounds of TNT was later taken from the bridge by the Company Pioneer Platoon) The second bridge was in the center of the town. The Platoon Leader advanced swiftly and crossed the second (It too was prepared for demolitions). He had dropped off a 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, and crew at each bridge for protection, and now found that he must advance on

through the town without sufficient personnel to clear the houses bordering the street as he advanced. Enemy Infantry evidently realized this and launched A/T grenades from the houses at the M-8's. One Armored car was hit, set on fire, and the Platoon Sergeant and radio operator were killed. The German Infantry then counterattacked and forced the Platoon to withdraw back across the bridge. From this action it may be said that, against aggressive and determined enemy troops in towns and villages, all houses along the route of advance must be cleared abreast of the advancing armor.

When Armored Cars are compelled to engage Tanks or A/T Guns, the results are usually disastrous. On Highway 9 in Italy one Platoon was heading west toward Moncal. This Platoon was engaged by an anti-tank gun firing at a range of three hundred (300) yards. The German A/T gunner evidently realized the limited turning radius of the M-8 for he knocked out the second armored car in the column first, then destroyed the lead M-8 before it could turn away. The Platoon Leader was killed, but the Sergeant in command elected to attack the gun dismounted. He found the gun to be protected by determined German Infantry. Thus, one well placed A/T gun hopelessly blocked a major highway to the Reconnaissance elements and a new route of advance had to be chosen. In this action the Platoon suffered nine (9) casualties while the enemy lost only one (1) man.

Throughout the operation, an armored Field Artillery Battalion used the same 500 series radio channel as the Reconnaissance Company of this Battalion. Thus, without official sanction and entirely by the laws of chance, an all-important and life-saving arrangement was worked out mutually between the air-OP's of the AFA Battalion and the Reconnaissance Platoons. The Observers and Platoon operators gradually learned to distinguish radio voices, and even though the call signs changed daily, each group was able to recognize the other. The Reconnaissance Platoons were habitually in the lead of all north bound columns, and when air-bound the air OP would call the Platoons asking if he could be of any help. The Platoons would reply with their forward location, asking the OP to observe to their front. This resulted several times in the location of enemy tanks and A/T guns to the front and in the passing down of invaluable information to the Platoon from the OP. This procedure was worked many times in the advance to the north, and the possibility of its use in future operations in any theatre should be seriously considered by all echelons of Command.

The Reconnaissance Company, through the above means virtually assured at all times of adequate FA support. At Anzola, Italy, on Highway 9, the Reconnaissance Company was utilized in the defense of the town. At night, German truck columns came west from Bologna to approximately five hundred (500) yards of the forward Platoon outpost, and German Infantry began to detruck. The Platoon leader immediately called for fire from the AFA Battalion. A Battalion concentration immediately broke up the

prospective counterattack.

In retrospect, however, although the damage inflicted upon the retreating enemy by the Reconnaissance Company of this Battalion was beyond measure; Reconnaissance, as befits the name, was a dismal failure. During the entire period, although every Combat Command of the Division used during the period had reconnaissance elements, the Task Force Commander at no time had communication with this reconnaissance. Thus, although the Reconnaissance Platoons ever carried out their assigned missions and were habitually first on objective, they served no purpose than that they were first, for they could not transmit that information which they obtained to the proper authorities. In addition, when the Reconnaissance elements engaged the enemy they were often forced to fight the whole action by themselves, for they were unable to call upon the Task Force commanders for adequate support. This resulted in relatively high casualties in men and equipment and lowered morale among the personnel.

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### 3. Tank Destroyer Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

The Battalion Headquarters of a Tank Destroyer Battalion (and any other Battalion or similar Headquarters) must be prepared to defend themselves in case of attack by infiltrating enemy. This is an easy statement to make, but to execute in fact requires prior preparations and organization. The Headquarters Commandant is the logical person to place in charge of the organization of the headquarters group, and he should be the one to take charge in case of emergency. In the past operation, north of the Ro River, the headquarters of this Battalion became engaged in three fire fights against moving enemy units.

In fast-changing situations it is almost impossible for the TD Battalion to keep close check upon all of its units, for components of the Battalion are usually spread over a complete divisional or often Corps sector. At present writing it is approximately 180 miles from Battalion Headquarters to the Company CP of one of the Gun Companies of this Battalion. Three more platoons (one platoon from each of the gun companies and one Reconnaissance platoon) are more than 145 miles from the Battalion CP. The administrative problems created by these distances are a perpetual strain upon the facilities of the Battalion. During the past winter, the Battalion headquarters and Gun Companies operated in one Corps while the Reconnaissance Company operated in another far across the enemy front. The well-being of these far spread Companies almost completely depends upon the interest displayed in them by the units to which they are attached.

This Battalion began the past Operation with five (5) G.C. trucks on detached service to the provisional IV Corps trucking Company. Most of the time during the operation at least one (1), and usually two (2), Tank Companies were attached to the Battalion. This imposed a supply strain which the Transportation Platoon and the Battalion supply Officer were unable to overcome. Trucks were just not available to haul the required gasoline, diesel, and ammunition. All kitchens, tentage, supply, and other equipment had to be dropped along the way. Due to lack of adequate truckage, it was necessary for the personnel of the unit to forfeit their beer and like rations. Nothing but items of absolute necessity could be carried. Captured enemy vehicles all eviated this shortage for a short time, but Army orders for the turn in of captured vehicles soon put an end to this.



#### 4. COMMUNICATIONS

This Battalion had so long operated with the 1st Armored Division where communications and communications problems have been successfully mastered that the difficulties encountered in operating with an Infantry Division brought about almost unsolvable situations. Adequate communication was not insured between the component elements of the Infantry-Tank-Tank Destroyer forces and the situation of each often became obscure to the other.

The Tanks and Tank Destroyers both used the 500 series radios and a mutual exchange of radios and crystals insured proper and adequate communication between them. Neither, however, had adequate communication with the Infantry they supported. For this reason, Infantry Commanders in the excitement of battle, having no communication with Tank or Tank Destroyer Commanders would attempt to seize control of individual guns often ordering them into impossible situations all without the knowledge of the Armored Platoon Commanders. Confusion and antagonism were the only results of these situations; all unfortunate and inexcusable but understandable. In the same manner, Tanks and Tank Destroyers were often required to fire in support of Infantry actions when they did not have an adequate knowledge of the situation, and the resultant support fires were somewhat ineffective.

Communications between small Tank and Infantry units could have been properly arranged for the Tank - Tank Destroyer Platoon Leaders all possessed 300 series Infantry radios, but were never informed of the unit channels of the organizations that they supported.

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The 528 radio has been suggested as the standard set to equip L-10's in lieu of the present 510. This would give the Tank Destroyers a set-up equivalent to that of the Medium Tanks, would allow a greater range of communication, and would enable a Tank Destroyer unit, which is subject to a change of attachment within a Division, to carry integrally the proper channels for the major units within the Division.

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Air-Ground Tactical communication is still extremely unsatisfactory; the "Rover Joe" and "Rover Pete" organizations are not the answer to this acute problem.

Air-Ground communication should be under the control of the foremost echelon commander of a given Task Force (not the Force Commander, but the commander most forward who has adequate communication with the components of the force). This would normally be either the commander of the Reconnaissance elements or the commander of the Advance Guard.

COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

In the past operation, the Reconnaissance Company of this Battalion was strafed by American P-38 aircraft and one M-8 Armored Car was knocked out even though the vehicle was plainly marked by the maximum display of the prescribed yellow panels issued for identification purposes. Two other times the column was mistaken for enemy, and strafing by P-47 aircraft resulted.

P-47 aircraft at one time worked some 300 yards in front of the lead vehicle of the Reconnaissance Company strafing enemy Infantry, and as the Company approached Highway 9, P-47's strafed an enemy group some five hundred (500) yards to the left rear. With proper communication, this case could have become the rule rather than the exception.

Without exception, the most singly important tactical consideration in any proposed military operation is proper and adequate communication between all component elements of the given command. Three years of Overseas operations by this Battalion have proven this statement to be true.

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